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1Introduction
In the past decades, the world economy has been characterised by an increasing de-
gree of globalisation. Since the mid-nineties the two main indicators of globalisation,
international trade and cross-border capital holdings, have been on the rise. World-
wide exports as well as foreign direct investment (FDI) inward positions have reached
unprecedented levels amounting to about 30% of gross domestic product (GDP) in
the last decade (see Figure 1.1). This process was driven by several factors: on the
one hand, there have been significant advances in information and communication
technologies and in transportation systems. On the other hand, trade in goods and
services as well as capital movements have been subject to a set of liberalisation poli-
cies. Taken together, these developments have enhanced international competition
between firms.
In Europe, the politically induced integration process further added to the in-
ternational globalisation trend. By the creation of its single market, the European
Union actively promoted higher trade and investment flows between its member
states but also with the rest of the world. Imports and exports and similarly FDI
inward stocks of European countries reached more than 40% of GDP in recent years
and FDI outward positions even touched the 70%.1
The consequence of this globalisation process is a system of strongly interlinked
economies which therefore influence each other through various channels positively
as well as negatively. A striking example of possible consequences of such dependen-
cies is the US subprime crisis having started in 2007. Due to global banking, financial
institutions all around the world engaging in this market were in trouble. In addi-
tion, the following recession in the US dampened exports in a considerable number
1 European Commission (2012) provides a detailed picture of the trade and financial integration in the
EU.
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Source: UNCTAD foreign direct investment stocks and goods and services trade flows.
Fig. 1.1. Development of Trade and FDI in Europe and the World
of countries. And finally the loss of confidence in credit and financial markets led to
a tightening of credit supply not only in the US. In Europe, many countries fell into
a deep recession and the crises in the banking system were followed by sovereign
debt crises in several countries. On the positive side, strong cross-country linkages
may be beneficial for technological progress, economic growth, price and consump-
tion levels and ultimately for economic welfare. Furthermore, this may involve that
countries are affected by economic shocks in a similar way. This their capability of
sharing a common monetary policy as in the European Monetary Union (EMU).
The previously cited facts and arguments give an impression of how influen-
tial these cross-country linkages and their transmission effects on the respective
economies can be. It demonstrates the need for a sound understanding of the inter-
connectedness of economies and the possible transmission channels. Only a profound
knowledge of the spillover channels enables a correct evaluation of the effects of eco-
nomic shocks. It provides a fundament for the analysis and discussion of policy
alternatives and of related questions such as the relevance of coordinated policies as
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well. It is essential to take into account the linkages between economies when e.g.
the impact of reforms in product and labour markets are analysed (as in Chapter 3
and 4). Finally, the knowledge about the impact of globalisation is needed to assess
where the drawbacks of the globalisation process are. Policy makers need to be aware
of who the “losers” of the development are which should be assisted or compensated
in order to ensure welfare gains and social justice at the same time.
Based on these needs, a vast body of literature emerged in the last decades. The
following overview confines itself to a few strands of this literature which inspired
the three studies presented in this thesis.
The Impact of Globalisation on the Comovement of Business Cycles
The first strand deals with the question of how globalisation influences the similarity
of business cycles across countries. In addition to measuring the degree of synchro-
nisation, studies in this field attempt to assess the drivers of comovement in cyclical
fluctuations. The importance and policy relevance of this subject stems on the one
hand from the interest to understand the worldwide business cycle dependencies.
If there are strong transmission mechanisms of business cycles present, policy in-
terventions of one country influence the economic outcome of other countries to a
greater extent. And the larger such spillovers are, the more they deliver a rationale
for the coordination of policies across countries. On the other hand, the optimum
currency areas (OCA) theory started by Mundell (1961) assigns great relevance to
the similarity of business cycles in participating countries. The rationale behind this
optimality criterion is that a joint monetary policy can only be beneficial for all
members if they are at the same stage of the cycle because of the one-size-fits-all
interest rate. As such it is also a premise for the well-functioning of the EMU. Thus,
from a policy perspective it is of particular interest to individuate structural policies
that—by fostering synchronisation—improve the efficiency of the common monetary
policy.
In consequence, the evolution of the comovement properties of the main macroe-
conomic aggregates over time and their underlying driving factors became a promi-
nent topic. The assessment of the development in synchronisation in the data varies
greatly with the underlying time period, country coverage and methods of studies
and includes evidence for falling correlations as well as for increased convergence. On
world wide data from 1985 to 2008, Kose et al. (2012) conclude that business cycle
fluctuations diverged between industrial and emerging market economies, whereas
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within these two groups of countries there has been substantial convergence. For the
euro area, Weyerstrass et al. (2011) and Lee (2013), among others, document a high
and increasing degree of synchronicity before the introduction of the euro in 1999
but no further rise afterwards. Furthermore, dynamic factor models such as Kose
et al. (2008, 2012) and Karadimitropoulou and Leo´n-Ledesma (2013), which decom-
pose the cyclical fluctuations of the main macroeconomic aggregates into global,
country-specific and idiosyncratic factors, reveal that factors common to all coun-
tries have been on the rise during the globalisation period (considering industrial or
G7 countries only).2 Note, however, that these studies do not distinguish between
truly global shocks and country- or industry-specific shocks that are transmitted to
all countries.
There are a number of empirical studies taking a different route by examining
which cross-country linkages determine the synchronisation of business cycles be-
tween countries, to which the first study of this thesis in Chapter 2 contributes. The
starting point of this empirical literature is—similar to the studies discussed before—
to assess the effect of increased trade and financial linkages on the comovement as
theory does not give clear predictions. International trade flows create demand- and
supply-side linkages between countries, and financial integration enhances risk shar-
ing between countries, which both should lead to more correlated economic outcomes
across countries. In this case, however, both channels may also have an impact on
the industry structure by stimulating specialisation. If sector-specific shocks play an
important role, as Karadimitropoulou and Leo´n-Ledesma (2013) argue, this devel-
opment should rather decrease the cyclical comovement. The impact on the sector
structure is a consequence of increased competition amongst countries with strong
trade and financial linkages as well as technology transfer. The competition pro-
motes not only the most productive firms which can offer the lowest prices (see
Melitz, 2003) but also enhances high quality and innovation. Finally, the compli-
cated interplay of national institutions in the labour and product market as well as
fiscal or monetary policy stances might also interfere with the impact of globalisation
on comovement properties of the main macroeconomic aggregates.
The results of most empirical studies indicate a significant positive impact of
international trade on output correlations (see Frankel and Rose, 1998 or Baxter
2 Karadimitropoulou and Leo´n-Ledesma (2013) support this result when they define the global factor as
the sum of sector-specific factors which are common among all countries and their world factor which
is the same for all industries.
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and Kouparitsas, 2005). Recent evidence, however, by Kappler (2011), Bo¨wer and
Guillemineau (2006), Jansen and Stokman (2011) and Keil and Sachs (2012) points
to a dependence of the result on the chosen method (cross-country or cross-regional
regressions) and the underlying time period (until the mid-nineties). For financial
linkages the picture is even more heterogeneous. While Kose et al. (2003) or Imbs
(2004) find a positive significant impact on business cycle synchronisation, Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2013) detect the influence to be significant but negative. Again, results
seem to depend on the identification method and time frame, but also strongly on
the measure of financial integration. As discussed in more detail in Section 2.1, the
set of measures considered includes de facto and de jure measures as well as price-
and volume-based measures for various assets.
The Impact of FDI on the Comovement of Business Cycles
The analysis in Chapter 2, which is based on Busl and Kappler (2013), concentrates
on the influence of foreign direct investment, which has a special position among
financial linkages. The multinational firms accruing from these cross-border invest-
ments provide a broad spectrum of transmission channels including intra-firm trade
and internal capital markets that exceed the simple initial financial flow (a more
detailed description of the potential channels follows in Section 2.1).
In this study, we identify the main sources of business cycle synchronisation across
a set of highly economically integrated countries. We extend the previous literature
on the determinants of business cycle synchronisation in two dimensions. First, we
put special attention on the influence of intensified FDI relations when we identify
the impact of the main determinants of business cycle synchronisation, namely trade
and financial integration and differences in the sectoral structure. FDI stocks have
increased strongly in the past decades, much stronger than trade linkages, and by
now a few large multinational firms represent a large share of economic output and
employment in many countries (Kleinert et al., 2012). Hence, they provide a basis for
strong international linkages through their cross-border activities such as intra-firm
trade, firm-wide investment plans or wage setting. In particular for the EMU, foreign
direct investments are essential elements for completing the internal market and thus
promoting economic integration and overall competitiveness of the region. While
economic rationale and research suggest that promoting FDI through investment
policies is a valid instrument to remove barriers in order to complete the internal
market (Ilzkovitz et al., 2007), theory and available empirical evidence are less clear
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about the effects of deeper cross-border capital links within a region on business
cycle synchronisation, as mentioned above. Thus, there could be a potential conflict
between European policies that aim at fostering FDI linkages and the efficient policy-
making by the European Central Bank (ECB) if member states’ cycles tend to move
apart because of desynchronising forces of the FDI channel. Studying the question
whether two countries that are strongly linked through capital stocks show a higher
comovement of output cycles than two countries that are less connected through
capital cross-links will clarify such concerns.
Our second contribution to the literature is a more technical one, as we argue
below. It is a necessary step forward in the empirics of business cycle synchronisation
to use panel instead of cross-section data to identify contemporaneous bilateral re-
lations among the determinants. Previous research mainly focused on data averaged
over time and employed cross-section regressions on country (pair) means of the ex-
planatory variables. In such regressions, business cycle synchronisation between two
countries is usually measured by the Pearson correlation coefficient of GDP cycles
over the entire sample period. Some studies impose a panel structure by computing
correlation coefficients and averages over few non-overlapping sub-periods of equal
size (e.g. Schiavo, 2008; Hsu et al., 2011). These approaches lead to an identification
problem if the data are characterised by trends over time since averages become
time dependent and the building of arbitrary sub-periods will randomly influence
regression results. As will be shown in Chapter 2, in particular trade and FDI in-
tensity measures display strong time trends. A more systematic way of exploiting
the between and within variation of the data is to directly run panel regressions
and, moreover, take country-pair and period fixed effects into account. Country-pair
fixed effects consider unobserved heterogeneity between two countries that arises,
for instance, due to geographical or cultural proximity while period-specific effects
capture common time shocks in the similarity measures. The latter are relevant for
distinguishing the transmission of shocks through trade and FDI linkages from com-
mon shocks as a source of output cycle synchronisation (e.g. Kappler, 2011). Thus,
panel estimations are much more capable of reconciling theory with empiricism than
pure cross-sectional or pseudo panel estimation approaches.
Our results in Chapter 2 show that the contemporaneous effect of trade integra-
tion on business cycle synchronisation is in fact not as robust as the cross-section
effects reported by previous studies. Therefore, the correlation between trade re-
lations and synchronisation may be largely driven by common underlying factors.
1 Introduction 7
This finding is in accordance with the literature discussed above, highlighting the
importance of global shocks. Furthermore, regarding FDI linkages, we find in most
cases a positive significant coefficient, but for inner European FDI relations we do no
find a significant impact. Finally, increasing heterogeneity in the sector composition
between countries is found to have a negative impact on their cyclical synchronisa-
tion.
Our findings with respect to FDI imply that policies fostering bilateral FDI in-
tegration do not harm synchronisation between countries. On the contrary, they
may even increase comovement. The importance of developing policies that enhance
synchronisation is particularly evident in the light of the past years, when the hetero-
geneity in economic development between the countries in the eurozone increased,
forcing the ECB to use country-targeted policy measures in addition to the common
interest rate. Since these measures are highly disputed by experts and come at a risk,
the ECB plans to abandon the non-standard measures once its member countries
exhibit a stable and more similar economic development.
The International Effect of Labour Market Reforms
To stimulate growth and stabilise the economy especially in underperforming coun-
tries, structural reforms have been put on top of the agenda of policy makers.
Thereby, labour market reforms feature a high priority, since unemployment rates
have reached high levels in many member economies. As noted before, when such
policy interventions are designed and evaluated, the strong economic linkages be-
tween countries need to be taken into account. Hence, a multi-country framework
becomes indispensable. Such a framework allows not only to answer the question
how the international environment influences the impact of a reform on the country
in which it is undertaken. It also embeds the possibility to analyse the spillover
effects of the reform to foreign countries.
The main transmission channel in most models, after a reform which improves
somehow the competitiveness of a country, operates through changes in the relative
prices of traded goods. A change in the terms of trade may cause shifts in the traded
quantities as shown in the basic two-country real business cycle model by Backus
et al. (1994). The effect stemming from the relative price channel may be altered
if the structure of the economy is modelled in more detail. If heterogeneity of firms
is taken into account, these effects are accompanied by adjustments through firm
entry and exit decisions (see e.g. Melitz, 2003). The bargaining of wages between
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workers and employers, as discussed in the following, may dampen implied wage
changes in favour of employment adjustments in the foreign country. Furthermore,
if countries are subject to a common monetary policy, Dao (2013b) shows that in
the short run, spillovers increase and domestic effects are dampened whereas, in
the long run, effects are not altered. And last but not least, shifts in the relation to
third parties may create additional effects as Chapter 4 highlights. A second channel
arises if one allows for trade of financial assets in the model. While the trade channel
has a direct impact on demand, integrated financial markets influence the economy
indirectly by allowing for short-term current account imbalances and thus a more
flexible reallocation of resources between countries. Furthermore, channels related
to non-price competitiveness are of great importance for transmission effects as well,
as European Commission (2012) or Estrada et al. (2013) show. They name goods
market efficiency, technological readiness, business sophistication and innovation
capabilities amongst others. Unfortunately, these factors and the related mechanisms
are difficult to integrate in a standard international macroeconomic model.
The literature dealing with the international effects of reforms in labour market
institutions, to which the studies in Chapter 3 and 4 contribute, is relatively recent.
Nevertheless, there is already a lot of variation in the existing studies as to which
labour market institutions are the subject of reform. While some studies capture
rigidities in labour markets with a mark-up parameter on wages or an index that
reflects labour market rigidities as a function of several institutional parameters,
others refer directly to clear-cut institutional parameters such as labour taxes or
unemployment benefits.
The studies reviewed in the following differ substantially across several lines,
particularly as to whether they possess New-Keynesian features and are dynamic
or static, how they treat labour market rigidities, the number of countries/regions
they cover, and whether they contain both traded and non-traded goods. Yet, de-
spite such differences, nearly all theoretical studies that have been published on the
subject obtain positive spillover effects of reforms on employment in the long run.
A notable exception is the study of Helpman and Itskhoki (2010). Their model is
based on a static Melitz-type model with heterogeneous firms enriched with search
and matching frictions in the labour market and an additional sector producing
homogeneous goods. Thus, their model incorporates intra- as well as inter-industry
trade. Spillovers occur mainly through decisions at the extensive margin caused by
changes in relative prices, i.e. workers switching between sectors and firms entering
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(and exiting) foreign and domestic markets. Labour market reforms in the heteroge-
neous goods sector of one country imply negative welfare effects for its neighbours,
whereas employment effects are more differentiated depending on the level of labour
market frictions between sectors and countries.
In contrast, Alessandria and Delacroix (2008) find, based on a model with Ri-
cardian trade and without search and matching frictions, that a major part of the
welfare gains created through an elimination of firing taxes is exported to trading
partners because of worsened terms of trade. There are no spillovers to employment,
though. The authors argue that this explains the reluctance for labour market re-
forms in many countries.
The majority of the models in the literature generates a positive terms-of-trade
effect for the (non-reforming) trade partner of the reforming country in the long run.
This effect accrues from the relative abundance of the reforming country’s good fol-
lowing the labour market reform(s). The terms-of-trade improvement does, however,
not necessarily lead to higher output and employment for the trade partner. Dao
(2013a) shows that with a competitive labour market and a convenient parametrisa-
tion of the utility function of the households, negative spillover effects from reforms
can occur. In particular, the wealth effect on labour supply from the terms-of-trade
improvement can be larger than the productivity effect on labour demand in the
non-reforming trade partner in such a case. With rigidities in the labour market, on
the contrary, the employment levels in both countries are lower in equilibrium and
there is a rent to be shared between firms and workers in the face of a terms-of-
trade improvement in the long run. In other words, positive terms-of-trade effects
of output-enhancing labour market reforms in one country lead to positive long-run
employment effects for the trade partner if the labour market of the trade partner
is subject to rigidities.
As mentioned above, the literature on spillover effects of labour market reforms is
rather diverse as to the reform measures that are evaluated. Bayoumi et al. (2004),
Everaert and Schule (2008) and Gomes et al. (2011) approximate the rigidity of
labour market institutions by a mark-up parameter that drives a wedge between
marginal costs of labour and real wages. While those analyses are illuminating,
they do not deal with institutional parameters that policy-makers can address di-
rectly and abstract from labour market frictions inducing involuntary unemploy-
ment. Other studies refer to specific and observable labour market institutions
and comprise the unemployment phenomenon directly. Among those, Dao (2013a),
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Gomes et al. (2012) and Coenen et al. (2008) explore the impact of a reduction in
the (employers’) labour tax rate, while Felbermayr et al. (2012) focus on the im-
pact of a change in unemployment benefits. In further studies such as Dao (2013b),
Felbermayr et al. (2013) and Schwarzmu¨ller and Sta¨hler (2011), the effects of more
than one reform measure are investigated. These include changes in a combination of
a subgroup of measures such as labour taxes, unemployment benefits, search costs,
bargaining power of firms and workers and firing costs. Despite the diversity of the
models in terms of the measures they evaluate as well as their structure and cali-
bration, the bottom line from the previous paragraph does not change: in the long
run, labour market reforms lead to positive spillovers to other countries through the
interplay of terms-of-trade effects and labour market rigidities.
So far, only two studies evaluate the spillover effects of labour market reforms
empirically with cross-country panel data, both of which report positive spillover
effects of reforms to trading partners. Dao (2013a) investigates the effect of for-
eign unit labour costs instrumented with statutory social security contribution rates
on domestic employment. Felbermayr et al. (2013) include, on the other hand, do-
mestic and foreign tax wedges—defined as the sum of the replacement rate, i.e.
unemployment benefit ratio, and wage taxes—as well as further institutional vari-
ables alongside with control variables in their panel regressions which explain the
domestic unemployment rate.
Chapters 3 and 4 contribute to the model-based literature on the international
effects of labour market reforms. Both studies build on a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model which is borrowed from Fonseca et al. (2009) and has sev-
eral standard features. Most importantly for the analyses, it features labour market
institutions and fiscal policy parameters. In particular, unemployment results from
search and matching frictions a` la Pissarides (2000) in the labour market. Hence,
the model comprises parameters for the efficiency of matching the unemployed with
vacant positions in firms and the unemployment benefit ratio. Furthermore, interna-
tional spillovers occur through two channels in the model: international goods trade
and international financial assets. To be more specific, each country specialises in the
production of its own good, whereas households consume a composite good, which
comprises the intermediate goods of all countries. This standard intra-industry trade
framework maps the trade flows in the European environment in an appropriate way.
Finally, there is a riskless nominal interest rate bond that helps to enhance the shar-
ing of resources internationally.
1 Introduction 11
The Macroeconomic Effects of the German Labour Market Reforms
In Chapter 3, which is based on Busl and Seymen (2013), the effect of the German
labour market reforms of the past decade—the so-called Hartz reforms—on the
macroeconomic outcomes of Germany and its European neighbours is analysed.
We do not only assess the spillover effects of these reforms but also look at the
macroeconomic implications for the German economy as critics of the Hartz reforms
claimed that the reforms led to wage restraint and consequently to consumption
dampening accompanied by beggar-thy-neighbour effects harming Germany’s trade
partners. But the disproportional growth of GDP in comparison to consumption,
labour productivity in comparison to wages and the German trade surplus may
as well have been due to other factors. The aim of the study is to shed light on
this controversy by means of a two-country DSGE model with search and matching
frictions which is calibrated to data from Germany and the rest of the euro area.
In particular, we want to quantify the role of the Hartz reforms, if any, in the
aforementioned developments in the German macroeconomic data. Furthermore,
labour market reforms have been on the policy agenda of many countries following
the global financial crisis, hence our analysis provides several insights as to their
domestic and international impact.
The Hartz reforms had two main components: measures to increase the efficiency
of matching the unemployed with vacancies in firms and a significant decline in
the unemployment benefit ratio. In our analysis, three crucial aspects to evaluate
the Hartz reforms are addressed. First, we analyse the macroeconomic impact of
both components of the reforms in a unifying framework. This aspect has been
missing in the existing studies on the Hartz reforms, although it is known that
different reform components may interact with each other.3 Second, we investigate
both the short-run and the long-run effects of the reforms since those may differ
substantially. Negative short-run effects may hinder, for example, the willingness
for reforms notwithstanding positive long-run effects. Third, we are interested in
both domestic and international effects of the Hartz reforms. The latter have not
received the same attention as the domestic effects in the literature, although many
commentators accuse the Hartz reforms for being the instrument of a beggar-thy-
neighbour policy.
3 See Coe and Snower (1997), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Belot and
van Ours (2004).
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Several studies that we review in Chapter 3 point to a steep increase in the
matching efficiency following the Hartz reforms, the range of the estimated increase
being 10-30%. Additionally, the last package of the Hartz reforms reduced the unem-
ployment benefits by roughly 10 percentage points. When we feed our model with
those Hartz phenomena, it is quite successful in replicating general trends in the
German aggregate data over the period 2003-2010.4 In particular, we find that both
reform components contributed significantly and to a similar extent to the decline in
the German unemployment rate and pushed the economy to a higher growth path.
Consequently, our findings suggest that a 3.3 percentage point reduction in the un-
employment rate and almost a quarter of the 8.6% increase in the German GDP
between 2003 and 2010 is associated with the positive effects of the Hartz reforms.
While the reforms, evaluated separately as well as combined, boost the German
economy on many accounts in the model, they do not lead to any negative effects on
the trade partner—the rest of the euro area—in the long run. Note that this finding
is intrinsic to the model framework we work with. Our model belongs to the class of
theoretical models which generate, following the labour market reforms, small posi-
tive spillovers to other countries due to the existence of both intra-industry (Arming-
tonian) trade and search frictions in the labour market a` la Pissarides (2000).5 These
modelling devices seem appropriate to analyse the effects of labour market reforms
in the euro area, where the major part of trade is caused by product differentiation,
and labour markets are far from being frictionless. Remember that the few existing
empirical studies on the issue also point to positive long-run effects of labour market
reforms on trade partners. The short-run impact of labour market reforms on the
trade partners, in contrast, may not be so obvious a priori and depend on the type
of reform.
Our findings do not suggest a high degree of wage moderation in the sense that
wages decline relative to labour productivity in the face of the reforms. The com-
bined reforms lead to a decline in the labour productivity of 0.26%, whereas wages
4 This implies that we compare 8-year changes in the data with steady state changes in our calibrated
model. We choose this period, since business cycle effects largely cancel out over such a long horizon.
With respect to the model dynamics this should not be problematic, since for most of the variables the
adjustment to the new steady state after the introduction of the reforms is completed to a large extent
within 2-3 years. Note that our arguments in this study are not affected by the choice of the period.
5 This has been shown by Dao (2013a), as mentioned before, in theoretical framework that is very similar
to ours. While Dao (2013a) focuses rather on a reduction of labour taxes for firms, the Hartz reforms
also induce positive terms-of-trade effects for the rest of the euro area in our model and thus Dao’s
finding applies to our model as well.
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decline by 0.39% according to our benchmark calibration.6 Similarly, only a small
amount of the consumption dampening in the data can be traced back to the Hartz
reforms: the combined reforms would increase the output (consumption) by 1.94%
(1.35%). Finally, in our model the combined Hartz reforms lead to small trade
deficits in the short to medium run, rather than to surpluses as in the German data.
This is particularly due to the fact that returns to investment become higher in
the German economy following the reforms, inducing foreign households to register
trade surpluses and invest in German bonds. Accordingly, additional factors must
have contributed to these developments in the data. As we argue in this study,
globalisation-driven changes in the bargaining power of workers represent a promi-
nent factor, which could further explain the wage restraint and the dampened growth
of domestic consumption.
A question not tackled in Chapter 3 is whether single European countries have
been affected in a similar way to the European average. The reforms may have hit
Germany’s neighbours to a different extent as they differ in their trade relationship
to Germany and in their institutions. In consequence, relative competitiveness be-
tween Germany’s neighbours may have shifted, inducing negative indirect effects to
employment in some countries. In case these indirect effects have been very large,
thus overturning positive direct effects, single countries may even have experienced
negative spillovers. The study in Chapter 4, which is based on Busl (2014), elaborates
on the question how important indirect spillover effects can become in quantitative
terms and how they affect the overall spillover.
Third-Country Effects of Labour Market Reforms
Theoretical literature on spillover effects of labour market institutions on foreign
(un-)employment builds on two-country model economies. Thus, it focuses on the
direct impact a country has on its neighbour(s) by carrying out reforms. However,
a reform in one country may also trigger indirect effects which occur through shifts
between the affected foreign countries and, hence, cannot be analysed in a two-
country model. The scope and contribution of this study is the analysis of the
indirect effect in the simplest possible framework with three countries.
6 The matching efficiency increase alone would even lead to real wage gains where the real wage would
rise by 0.34% vis-a`-vis a labour productivity decline of 0.12%. In contrast, the unemployment benefit
reform alone would reduce equilibrium wages by 0.86% vis-a`-vis a labour productivity decline of merely
0.16%
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To be more specific, if a labour market reform in the domestic country decreases
the terms of trade with each of its trading partners to a different extent (e.g. because
of differing trade relations), then the terms of trade between the trading partners
themselves change as well. Therefore, a specific partner experiences an apprecia-
tion in its terms of trade with the reforming country, evoking (positive) effects on
its economy. Contemporaneously, its terms of trade with the other countries may
also appreciate or depreciate depending on the characteristics of the countries in-
volved. Thus, the overall effect of a reform in the domestic country incurred by a
neighbouring country consists of the sum of the direct effect generated by changes
in the relation with the domestic country and the indirect effect caused by shifts
in the relation to other countries. If the country of interest experiences a stronger
appreciation than other countries in its terms of trade with the domestic country, it
also appreciates with respect to the other countries. In consequence, the aggregated
spillover effect exceeds the direct effect. This aspect provides a potential explanation
for the puzzle raised by Felbermayr et al. (2012). They claim that recent empirical
evidence by Felbermayr et al. (2013) points to much higher spillovers relative to
the effects in the reforming country than their model simulations.7 However, if the
relative prices of the other countries react stronger, the country of interest needs
to depreciate with respect to these countries, creating an opposing effect. It cannot
be ruled out a priori, that the indirect effect dominates the direct effect, in certain
cases leading to negative overall spillover.
In Chapter 4, the relevant impact factors for the direction and strength of the
indirect as well as the direct effect and the resulting overall effect are described. In
contrast to previous studies, I do not focus on the characteristics of the reforming
country but on the characteristics of its trading partners and in particular on differ-
ences between these countries which provoke indirect effects. Of course, this study
is not the first to include indirect effects by modelling more than two countries.
There are several studies based on medium to large scale multi-country models (see
e.g. Everaert and Schule, 2008, Gomes et al., 2012), which analyse the (spillover)
effects of labour or product market reforms for a specific country setup. The scope
of these studies is, however, to evaluate the outcome of specific reform scenarios.
7 Other model based studies find spillover effects of a similar size as in the Felbermayr et al. (2012) model,
see Busl and Seymen (2013).
1 Introduction 15
Thus, they do not provide a detailed analysis of the composition and possible values
of the spillover effects.8
This analysis is based on a slightly modified version of the model in Chapter
3. Most importantly, a third country with identical production and labour market
institutions is added to the framework. This three-country setup offers the possibility
to model the bilateral and overall trade intensities appropriately at the same time
(defining the third country as rest of the world), which is not possible in a two-
country model, but important for a quantitative evaluation because of their influence
on the size of the spillover effect. Furthermore, countries are allowed to differ with
respect to their size.
The main part of the analysis deals with the long-run, i.e. equilibrium, effects
of a reform. Therefore, under the assumption that the current account needs to be
balanced in equilibrium, only the trade channel matters for the transmission in this
part. In contrast, when the dynamic response to a reform in the last part of Chapter
4 is investigated, the financial channel is important to allow for short-term current
account deficits or surpluses. Given that the only transmission mechanism in the
long run is a change in terms of trade, the qualitative results of the study apply
to all kinds of reforms which affect the terms of trade. In Chapter 4, I consider a
reduction in the unemployment benefit ratio, which is inspired by a German example
of the recent past, the so-called Hartz IV reform, and the related hot debate on the
spillover and side effects of such reforms as discussed in Chapter 3.
As the derivation of analytical results with respect to the sign and size of the
direct and indirect effects is only feasible to a limited extent, I analyse the relevance
of several country characteristics by simulating the reform for varying values of the
corresponding parameters on an empirically meaningful scale. The baseline calibra-
tion is thereby orientated towards the European context and the German reform
scenario. I find that of particular relevance for the size of the overall employment
spillover and its components are the relative openness and bilateral import prefer-
ences of countries in conjunction with their size. The initial unemployment rate, the
unemployment benefit ratio, the capital share, the elasticity of matching and the em-
ployee’s labour tax rate matter as well for the magnitude of the overall spillover. But
the size of the indirect effect turns out to be relative small vis-a`-vis the direct effect
in all simulations. In consequence, a negative indirect effect, which is e.g. obtained
8 Felbermayr et al. (2012) also work with a three-country model, but they only consider symmetric
neighbour countries. In consequence, a reform does not cause shifts between these countries.
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for relatively small and open countries, does not dominate the positive direct effect.
This implies that the aggregated spillover is always positive, which is in accordance
with the two empirical studies by Felbermayr et al. (2013) and Dao (2013a). The
relative size of the overall spillover effect measured as the ratio between the change
of employment in the country of interest and the reforming country ranges between
0 and 11% for calibrations in an empirically realistic range. The upper range, which
is measured for a very specific calibration with extreme values, is therefore well
above the average of 9% estimated by Felbermayr et al. (2013). But for an average
European country, the spillover turns out to be well below at 1 to 2%.
To summarise the introduction, this thesis contributes to the literature on the
effects of globalisation in three different aspects. The study presented in Chapter 2
inquires the role of FDI in the synchronisation of business cycles. Chapter 3 pro-
vides an analysis of national and international macroeconomic effects triggered by
the German labour market reforms. The indirect spillover effects of labour market
reforms through a third country are subject of Chapter 4. A overall conclusion and
outlook are given in Chapter 5.
2Does Foreign Direct Investment Synchronise
Business Cycles? Results from a Panel Approach1
In this chapter, we study the determinants of the comovement of business cycles.
This research aim has a tradition in the literature that studies the conditions of
optimum currency areas in terms of business cycle synchronisation. This is highly
policy relevant since a considerable degree of business cycle synchronisation between
member countries of currency unions is an important prerequisite for a successful
operation of monetary policy because of the one-size-fits-all interest rate. Empirical
evidence on the channels through which cyclical comovement is induced will add to
the knowledge necessary to develop structural policies that improve the efficiency of
the single monetary policy.
The following analysis pays special attention to the synchronising effects of foreign
direct investment (FDI). Promoting FDI plays a role for the economic integration
strategy of the EU as well as for the growth enhancing policies of many other coun-
tries. In the next section, we discuss the channels through which FDI may impact
on the comovement of business cycles. Furthermore, we provide a short overview on
the theoretical motivation and the empirical results for the main determinants of
business cycle synchronisation based on the pertinent literature.
Our empirical strategy deviates from the standard cross-sectional identification
approach pursued by most studies in that it builds on panel data. So far, genuine
panel data is used by few studies only (see Kappler, 2011, Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013)
which focus on one specific determinant of synchronisation. The advantages of a
panel over a cross-sectional approach are discussed in Section 2.2, where we introduce
our empirical strategy. Section 2.3 contains explanations about the measurement
concepts and data for the variables of our model. Estimation results and sensitivity
1 This chapter is based on joint work with Dr. Marcus Kappler. It is a revised version of WWWforEurope
Working Paper no 23 (see Busl and Kappler, 2013).
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tests are presented in Section 2.4, followed by some concluding remarks in the final
section of this chapter.
2.1 Literature
Despite the considerable degree of cross-boarder activities arising from foreign di-
rect investment, so far theoretical analyses on the effects of financial integration
on business cycles focused almost exclusively on the case of portfolio investment
and bank integration. The studies by Russ (2007) and Cavallari (2007, 2008, 2010)
are an exception. These authors integrate heterogeneous firms in a monetary two-
country business cycle model, which choose whether to enter a domestic or foreign
market and whether to serve foreign markets through trade or through a foreign
affiliate according to their productivity. Households participate in firms activity by
holding shares of all types of home based firms. Thus, the activities of multinational
firms foster the comovement of output across countries by increasing the degree of
(dividend) income interdependence.
As regards financial integration in a broader sense, Heathcote and Perri (2002)
show that in standard two-country, two-good international real business cycle
(IRBC) models the cross-country correlation between output is higher in the case
of financial autarky than with the existence of an internationally integrated bond
market or complete asset market. In open financial markets, firms can reallocate
their resources more efficiently, i.e., to the country with higher productivity, if hit
by a shock. Thus, increased financial integration lowers the synchronisation of out-
put. But if investors are subject to binding collateral constraints, Devereux and
Yetman (2010) and Devereux and Sutherland (2011) find that comovement differs
with respect to the type of financial integration. While integration in bond markets
continues to result in lower output correlation in their model, integration in equity
markets, where constraints are in place, leads to a transmission of technology shocks
across countries through the balance sheet of constrained (international) investors
causing output fluctuations to co-move. A similar mechanisms is emphasised by
IRBC models incorporating multinational banks, which were developed in the after-
math of the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 (see Olivero, 2010; Enders et al., 2011;
Ueda, 2012). In these studies, financial integration is modeled by financial intermedi-
aries (banks) operating at a global level. In consequence, a negative country-specific
shock to the capital of a bank spreads to another country because of binding capital
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constraints faced by the international bank, which results in comovement of inter-
national output fluctuations. In contrast, country-specific technology shocks do not
lead to synchronised business cycles just like in a conventional IRBC model such as
Backus et al. (1992).
The empirical literature suggests several additional transmission channels of busi-
ness cycle shocks through multinational firms which are not incorporated into busi-
ness cycle theory so far. First, FDI gives rise to increasingly international supply
chains enhancing the spillover of idiosyncratic shocks from one country to another.2
Furthermore, Stevens and Lipsey (1992) and Desai and Foley (2006) provide evi-
dence that rates of return and investment of affiliates within a multinational firm
are highly correlated, pointing to cross-border investment plans. Budd et al. (2005)
and Jansen and Stokman (2006) both come to the same conclusion, though the first
study is based on a firm-level panel and the second on macro data: Multinationals
share their profits between their affiliates providing a further transmission channel.
Balance sheet effects (similar to what Devereux and Yetman, 2010 and Devereux and
Sutherland, 2011 propose) may be another transmission channel since the balance
sheet of a multinational may be more susceptible to changes in the financial condi-
tions in one of its host countries due to its international exposure (see Desai et al.,
2008). But multinational firms may also benefit from their internal capital markets
(see Desai et al., 2004) and therefore perform better than local firms under strong
financial constraints as Hovakimian (2011) and Alfaro and Chen (2012) point out.
Finally, when engaging in business abroad, multinational firms trigger knowledge
and technology transfers which in turn may narrow the gap between GDP growth
rates.
To summarise, from a theoretical point of view the direction of the influence of
FDI on synchronisation is not clear. Most of the possible channels, however, point
to a positive relation between FDI integration and cyclical comovement. But as
Morgan et al. (2004) point out, the sign of the relation may strongly depend on the
type of shock. If the financial sector of a foreign country is hit by a negative shock, a
parent company may support its affiliate with financial liquidity. If in contrast there
is an adverse shock to productivity, the parent may withdraw its support and shift
resources to more profitable locations.
2 IRBC models in the spirit of Burstein et al. (2008) capture vertical integration by explicitly including
trade in intermediate goods. They find this to be an important channel for synchronisation.
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Most empirical studies on the determinants of business cycle synchronisation
report a positive impact of financial integration on output comovement irrespective
of the measure in use. De-jure measures like composite indices based on the IMF’s
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)3
are employed as well as de-facto volume-based or price-based measures like bilateral
asset holdings and capital flows or return spreads of equity or bond holdings (see
e.g. Kose et al., 2003,Imbs, 2004,Imbs, 2006,Schiavo, 2008,Keil and Sachs, 2012).
In contrast to these studies, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) use bilateral international
bank assets and liabilities and adopt panel methods including country pair and time
fixed effects to quarterly data. They detect a strong negative effect of their measure
of financial integration on business cycle synchronisation and ascribe this opposing
result to an omitted variable bias in cross-section analyses, which could not account
for global shocks and unobservable country pair specific heterogeneity. Davis (2014)
argues that the integration on differing financial markets may lead to different effects
on synchronisation depending on whether transmission occurs through the wealth
(divergence) or through the balance sheet channel (convergence). According to his
estimation results, integration in credit markets occurs mainly through the balance
sheet channel yielding a positive effect on comovement. Equity market integration, in
contrast, has a negative effect which points to wealth effects as the main transmission
channel.
Only few empirical studies investigate the influence of bilateral FDI linkages
on comovement of business cycles. Considering the strong growth and large scale
of foreign direct investment positions, but also the various potential transmission
channels arising from multinational firms discussed above, this economic linkage
is more than just a financial link and a relevant factor to be included. Empirical
findings by Otto et al. (2001), Hsu et al. (2011), Jansen and Stokman (2011) and
Keil and Sachs (2012) conclude that the positive effects of increased FDI linkages
dominate. The latter two note that there is a shift in importance from trade to FDI
in the mid-nineties. De´es and Zorell (2012) in contrast do not find a significant direct
impact of FDI which may be due to their unusual unscaled FDI measure.
In addition to FDI linkages, we include as major endogenous factors explaining
business cycle synchronisation trade integration and differences in countries’ sector
structure. Trade linkages are the most reviewed and robust determinant of business
3 See for instance the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2008) or the restriction indices by Schindler (2009).
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cycle synchronisation in the literature.4 The positive direct effect of stronger trade
relations found in the data is in line with theoretical considerations according to
which trade directly links foreign and domestic demand and supply. Thus, trade
seems to be an obvious channel for transmission of demand and supply shocks.
However, IRBC models have notorious difficulties to match the empirical findings
quantitatively (see Kose and Yi, 2006). Comparing estimations over subperiods,
Bo¨wer and Guillemineau (2006), Jansen and Stokman (2011) and Keil and Sachs
(2012) find that the relevance of trade linkages for bilateral synchronisation has
decreased since the mid-nineties. New evidence on the dynamic relationship between
synchronisation and trade intensity by Kappler (2011) casts doubt on the importance
of trade in the transmission of cyclical shocks. His results support the common-
shock view as they point to common or global factors being the main drivers of
synchronisation which trigger changes in trade flows contemporaneously. In this
study we focus on the contemporaneous effect of time-varying trade intensity while
accounting for common shocks through year specific effects.
Similarities in the sectoral structure of two countries may also be of importance
for the bilateral comovement of their business cycles. Countries with a similar indus-
try structure are supposed to exhibit higher comovement other things being equal
since they will respond in similar ways to global and sector-specific shocks. An id-
iosyncratic shock to a sector in a country will more likely spread to another country
if the countries are engaged in related businesses. However, extant empirical evi-
dence on the importance of sectoral similarity is mixed. Differences in the sectoral
structure are either found to decrease synchronisation of business cycles significantly
(for instance Imbs, 2004, 2006 or Inklaar et al., 2008) or to have no significant impact
at all (see Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005).
2.2 Empirical Approach
Our estimations to identify the determinants of comovement in cyclical fluctuations
are based on the following equation:
ρijt = α1FDIijt + α2Tijt + α3SDijt + α4I1,ijt + µij + λt + εijt, (2.1)
4 See Frankel and Rose (1998), Imbs (2004), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) to cite the most influential.
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where ρijt is our measure of business cycle synchronisation between country i and
country j at time t. FDIijt denotes the bilateral FDI intensity, Tijt is a measure
for trade integration, and SDijt represents the differences in the sectoral structure
within country pairs. These variables are treated as endogenous variables in the
following. In I1,ijt we include additional time and country-pair varying exogenous
covariates. The disturbances follow a two-way error component model, where µij
denotes country-pair specific effects, λt common year specific effects and εijt the
remainder stochastic disturbance. A detailed description of all variables and their
measurement concepts as well as of their potential impact is given in the next section.
Note that our three endogenous variables may not only directly impact on busi-
ness cycle synchronisation as described in the previous section, but may also interact
with each other and therefore have an indirect impact on synchronisation. To be
specific, inter-industry trade integration is supposed to rise as a result of increasing
differences in the sector structure to exploit endowment differences or comparative
advantages. Intra-industry trade, in contrast, may be fostered by more similar indus-
tries. Increased trade integration in turn results in deeper specialisation according to
classical trade theory based on comparative advantages and economies of scale. This
argument is valid for inter-industry trade. But as pointed out by Frankel and Rose
(1998) and Imbs (2004) among others, trade between industrialised countries and
especially between European countries is predominantly of the intra-industry type.
As such it could be a source for knowledge spillovers similar to FDI and therefore
augment similarity. In addition, trade is supposed to have a positive impact on FDI
since both are driven by common factors such as the productivity level of firms (see
Helpman et al., 2004). Inversely, effects could point in both directions: on the one
hand, horizontal FDI may substitute trade where trade costs are prohibitively high
or firms want to be closer to the customer, on the other hand vertical FDI (i.e.,
off-shoring parts of the production) or export-platform FDI may stimulate trade
in intermediate as well as in final goods.5 Finally, higher similarity may stimulate
new FDI in order to benefit from technological knowhow abroad, to be closer to the
costumer or to reduce transport costs. The impact of FDI linkages on the industry
composition is, however, ambiguous. Due to FDI induced technology transfer, coun-
tries might become more similar with respect to their industry composition, whereas
the slicing of the supply chain and the possibility to diversify risks gives rise to a
higher degree of specialisation.
5 For a analysis of the two-way linkages between FDI and trade see Aizenman and Noy (2006).
2.2 Empirical Approach 23
To take these indirect effects into account, Imbs (2004) proposed the estimation
of a system of equations. In addition to the equation explaining the bilateral comove-
ment of business cycles, such a system contains one equation for each endogenous
variable. Thus, equation (2.1) could be amended by the following equations
FDIijt = β1Tijt + β2SDijt + β3I2,ijt + u2,ijt (2.2)
Tijt = γ1FDIijt + γ2SDijt + γ3I3,ijt + u3,ijt (2.3)
SDijt = δ1FDIijt + δ2Tijt + δ3I4,ijt + u4,ijt, (2.4)
where each endogenous determinant depends on the other endogenous variables
and on exogenous factors Im,ijt with m = 2, 3, 4 being the index of the additional
equation. By analogy with equation (2.1) the disturbances um,ijt are modelled as a
two-way error components structure:
um,ijt = µm,ij + λm,t + εm,ijt. (2.5)
Note, however, that we do not estimate the whole system. We focus on identifying the
direct effects of the determinants of comovement in business cycles, i.e. we estimate
only equation (2.1) by means of a two-stage least squares approach. Nevertheless,
we take the whole system into account when instrumenting, since the instruments
stem from the exogenous variables Im,ijt with m = 2, 3, 4 included in equations
(2.2) to (2.4). Even if we do not estimate equations (2.2) to (2.4) “... much can be
gained in specifying a system of simultaneous equations as it permits identification of
the coefficients of endogenous regressors using as instruments exogenous regressors
excluded from the equation of interest.”, as Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p.762) state.
We acknowledge that an estimation of equations (2.2) to (2.4) would neverthe-
less be useful to disentangle the indirect effects of the determinants resulting from
their interdependence. We would for example know whether trade linkages indi-
rectly foster synchronisation by enhancing FDI or decrease the differences in the
sector composition. In an attempt to identify these relations, we came across the
same problem for all three equations: Our available instrument sets (see Subsec-
tion 2.3.2) were rejected by Hansen’s J test in almost all cases. One of the possible
reasons may be the close relation of trade and FDI, which are determined by very
similar factors. This makes it difficult to find an instrument which is correlated
with one and exogenous to the other of the two variables. If the exogeneity con-
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dition for the instruments is not met, inconsistently estimated coefficients are the
consequence. Therefore, we refrain from estimating non properly identified indirect
effects and from an estimation of the whole system with a three-stage least squares
(3SLS) estimator.6 Previous studies reporting estimates for the indirect relations
either worked with exactly identified systems where overidentifying tests can not be
applied assuming the exogeneity or without reporting tests of their instrumentation
(see Imbs, 2004, Imbs, 2006, Schiavo, 2008, Inklaar et al., 2008, Hsu et al., 2011,
De´es and Zorell, 2012, Keil and Sachs, 2012).
In our analysis, we first conduct estimations based on in a collapsed cross-section
sample with observations pooled over time in keeping with many previous studies.
A pure cross-section or between identification strategy employing means of time-
varying variables, however, is subject to several objections. Identification over the
variation in long-term average behaviour between country pairs is based on the as-
sumption of a stable relation between the variables over time. Several studies like
Frankel and Rose (1998), Inklaar et al. (2008) or Keil and Sachs (2012) deal indi-
rectly with the concern of missing stability by splitting their samples into subperiods
(which serves in Inklaar et al. (2008) also to generate more observations). If results
for subperiods are considered separately, they point to a change in the importance
of trade and FDI over time, corroborating this concern. As we show below, mea-
sures of trade and FDI integration contain strong trends in their behaviour over
time. Thus, an interpretation of their means over the long term is highly question-
able. Applying panel estimation methods allows to capture the within variation in
the data. In addition, cross-section estimates may suffer from omitted variable bias,
since some variables of interest are not observable and a sound theoretical foundation
of the estimated equation is not at hand. Using panel data enables us to mitigate
this problem by taking unobservable country-pair specific effects into account which
capture time invariant explanatory factors. Furthermore, we introduce year specific
effects to control for common shocks to both countries. This is an important aspect
in the light of the strong global shocks of the last years and cannot be tackled in
a cross-section approach. Cross-section data does not allow to disentangle whether
higher comovement is caused by transmission, e.g. through trade, or by common
shocks. Hence, the impact of a strong global shock may in the cross-section view be
6 A 3SLS estimator, which takes contemporaneous correlations across equations into account and is thus
more efficient, would suffer from a bias due to inconsistent estimation of single equations in the system.
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interpreted as stronger economic integration, i.e., increased transmission, because
the variables of interest contemporaneously move in the same direction.
For these reasons, in the main part of our analysis, we estimate the equation ex-
plaining synchronisation with an appropriate panel instrumental variable approach.
We employ the error component two-stage least squares (EC2SLS) estimator pro-
posed by Baltagi (1981) and expounded in Baltagi (2008), which is a random effect
2SLS estimator based on a weighted average of fixed effects and between 2SLS esti-
mators. It differs from a conventional random effects or generalised 2SLS estimator
in taking into account not only endogeneity stemming from correlations between
country-pair fixed effects and explanatory variables but also endogeneity between
the explanatory variables as described by equations (2.2) to (2.4).7
2.3 Measurement Concepts and Data
2.3.1 Business Cycle Synchronisation and its Endogenous Determinants
We measure bilateral synchronisation of business cycles ρijt as the negative absolute
difference between two countries’ real GDP growth rates following Giannone and
Reichlin (2008), Kappler (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013):8
ρijt = − |∆Yit −∆Yjt| . (2.6)
This approach has an interpretation similar to the Pearson correlation coefficient—
higher levels of ρijt indicate a higher degree of bilateral synchronisation between
country i and j in year t. But it has several advantages over this traditional time-
invariant correlation measure of business cycle synchronisation. First, it reveals the
variation in synchronisation over time. Thereby the stationary nature of synchroni-
sation becomes evident.9 Second, ρijt is independent of the underlying sample period
for each t, which is not the case for the mean-based correlation coefficient as used in
most studies, even if it is estimated over subperiods or a rolling window. In addition,
our growth rate based measure is not subject to measurement errors and to critiques
7 The EC2SLS estimator employs more instruments than the G2SLS estimator by exploiting the restric-
tions in the error-component structure of the variance-covariance matrix and is thus more efficient (see
Baltagi, 1981).
8 Detailed information on data sources are listed in Appendix A.1.
9 This applies not only to the synchronisation measure used in our study but also to other time-variant
synchronisation measures proposed in literature, namely by Yetman (2011), Mink et al. (2007), Morgan
et al. (2004) and Alesina et al. (2003).
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on filtering methods which applies to estimated measures of business cycles, e.g. by
the HP filter, and their correlations.
When measuring bilateral FDI and trade integration, we want to capture the
economic importance of these linkages for both countries. Therefore, we apply the
following measurement concept
Tijt =
EXijt + IMijt
GDPit +GDPjt
(2.7)
FDIijt =
Outijt + Inijt
GDPit +GDPjt
, (2.8)
where bilateral export and import flows and FDI inward and outward stocks, respec-
tively,10 are scaled by the sum over the GDP of both countries.11 So as long as a shock
affects trade or FDI and output proportionally, we observe no change in our intensity
measure. We do not account for FDI flows, since they are of minor relevance with
respect to their size (relative to GDP). Furthermore, being mainly the adjustment
of existing FDI relations, they are just one of the channels through which existing
multinationals affect business cycle comovement. As described in detail in Section
2.1, the existence of FDI stocks/multinational firms opens up several transmission
mechanisms from international supply chains to technology transfer (including intra-
firm investment and finance which constitute FDI flows). The stronger the linkages
between countries in terms of FDI stocks, the stronger these channels may work.
To capture differences in the sectoral structure between countries we resort to value
added shares szit for the sectors z = (1, ..., Z) of the OECD STAN database covering
all economic activities (including services) according to the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC) rev. 3 to compute
SDijt =
Z∑
z=1
|szit − szjt| . (2.9)
10 With respect to data on bilateral trade flows and FDI stocks, we follow the approach proposed by
Feenstra et al. (2005): since in practice EXijt = IMjit and Outijt = Injit does not hold, we use the
data from the importing/inward FDI country if available which is assumed to be more reliable.
11 In some studies total trade flows/FDI positions of both countries are used as scaling factor. The resulting
measures have a different interpretation from ours: they capture the importance of a particular bilateral
trade/FDI relation relative to overall trade/FDI of these countries. Thus, these measures assign the same
importance to large trade flows between very open countries and small trade flows between relatively
closed countries with small overall trade. We think that it is the economic value of linkages which matters
for synchronisation and not their share in countries’ overall linkage portfolio.
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This measure is equal to zero if countries have an identical sector structure and
reaches its maximum of two for completely disjunct sectors.12 We expect a negative
coefficient in our estimation since larger differences in the sector structure between
two countries should decrease their degree of synchronisation as they make the
transmission of idiosyncratic shocks less likely.
2.3.2 Exogenous Variables and Instruments
Equation (2.1) as well as equations (2.2) to (2.4) include a set of exogenous ex-
planatory variables denoted by Im,ijt. While variables in I1,ijt are simply exogenous
explanatory variables for our equation of interest, all variables included in I2,ijt to
I4,ijt but not in I1,ijt serve as instruments for the identification of the coefficients of
endogenous regressors in the synchronisation equation. In the following we describe
the set of variables in all Im,ijt.
In the synchronisation equation (2.1) we include in I1,ijt bilateral measures com-
paring monetary and fiscal policy within country pairs. The discrepancy in mone-
tary policy between countries is captured by absolute differences between short term
interest rates. This measure is the higher, the higher the discrepancy between mon-
etary policies, whereas for country pairs which are both in the euro area it becomes
zero13. Coordinated monetary policy may increase synchronisation by enhancing
similar reactions to a common shock or being itself the source of a common shock.
In a currency union, the stability of the exchange rate may provide an additional
indirect positive effect by stimulating trade integration. But in case of idiosyncratic
shocks, countries under a common monetary policy may lack the possibility of ad-
justment to keep cycles moving together. Empirical studies find only weak evidence
for similarity in monetary policy as an enhancing factor (see Baxter and Kouparitsas,
2005). Divergence in fiscal policy is measured as bilateral differences in the govern-
ment budget balance in percentage of GDP following Darvas et al. (2007). From a
theoretical point of view, the effect of fiscal policies on synchronisation is ambiguous
depending on the type of economic shock and on the type of fiscal policy. On the one
hand, discretionary or rule-based fiscal spending may be used to dampen the effects
12 Note that we calculated SDijt only for country pairs and years where the database covered at least 50%
of the economy wide value added.
13 Differences in the short term interest rates may be seen as the lower bound of overall differences in
monetary policy. The extraordinary country specific measures used by the ECB in the last years show
that there may be additional differences even within a currency union, at least during times of crisis. In
consequence, the coefficient of monetary policy has to be interpreted as the upper bound.
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of country-specific or asymmetric shocks implying a positive impact of fiscal diver-
gence on cyclical comovement. On the other hand, fiscal policy may also be employed
in a pro-cyclical way or even be the source of a country-specific shock and therefore
loosen comovement. Empirical studies of Darvas et al. (2007) or Inklaar et al. (2008)
suggest that a higher discrepancy between fiscal deficits has at best a negative effect
on the comovement of business cycles or none as Clark and Van Wincoop (2001)
find. Although previous literature (see Inklaar et al., 2008) based on cross-section
identification shows that there are no major differences in the results between an
exogenous and an endogenous treatment of these policy variables, the assumption of
no contemporaneous reaction of policy to cyclical fluctuations does not necessarily
hold in a panel model. We therefore consider an alternative specification where we
include both policy variables with a lag of one year instead of the contemporaneous
variables. For the lagged variables the assumption of exogeneity is justifiable from a
theoretical point of view. Furthermore, it is known that business cycles usually react
with a lag to changes in fiscal and monetary policy. Qualitatively, there is virtually
no difference in the results between including the contemporaneous and the lagged
values of the policy variables. At the same time, a noteworthy change in the size of
coefficients is observed for FDI integration which results to be about 25% higher in
some specifications when lagged policy measures are used.
As instruments for the endogenous regressors (and as covariates for the remain-
ing equations) previous papers employ mainly time-invariant country pair specific
variables like the well-established gravity variables for trade or the indicators on
the degree of de jure financial openness by La Porta et al. (1998) for financial in-
tegration. In our panel estimation approach all time-invariant explanatory factors
are absorbed by country pair fixed effects. Therefore, by our research design only
time-variant variables are considered as instruments.
Theoretically, an optimal candidate for I2,ijt as an instrument and exogenous
explanatory variable for FDI integration would be a de jure measure of openness to
FDI. As a change in GDP growth is unlikely to cause a contemporaneous regulatory
change, it can be assumed that a bilateral version of a de jure measure of FDI
but also trade openness is uncorrelated to the synchronicity measure. The OECD
provides an index on FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness, but unfortunately only for a
few years.14 But even more comprehensive data on the legal situation like the indices
by Schindler (2009) on direct investment restrictions or the more general Chinn-Ito
14 The index is provided for the years 1997, 2003, 2006 and on an annual basis since 2010.
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index (Chinn and Ito, 2008) measuring the degree of capital account openness are
problematic for panel data analyses since their within variation is low for most
countries and thus their explanatory power is limited. If we include one of these
variables—transformed into a bilateral measure by taking sums or differences—in
I2,ijt our regressions return an insignificant effect in the first stage no matter in which
estimation specification, while the coefficients of the second stage do not change.
Therefore, we do not include any de jure measure of capital or FDI openness in
I2,ijt. Instead we use indicators for de facto capital controls to explain the degree of
bilateral FDI linkages. A better general access to capital in each single country may
be an important criterion for direct investment decisions and therefore be favourable
to FDI integration. The same holds true for trade integration. Since the following
measures are not based on truly bilateral data but are computed by taking differences
or sums of indicators for overall capital openness of each of the two countries, it seems
reasonable to assume their endogeneity with respect to bilateral FDI integration.
We include the bilateral sum of the gross private capital flow ratio to GDP as a
volume-based measure of capital openness. As an alternative, we use a price-based
measure, namely the return spread between share price indices which are constructed
to represent share price movements in national stock markets. According to theory,
in perfectly integrated capital markets the law of one price should hold, implying
equal returns on comparable assets (Keil and Sachs, 2012). Smaller return spreads
indicating a higher degree of financial market integration are therefore expected to
foster FDI integration. Additionally, we include lagged FDI integration as suggested
by Schiavo (2008) and a measure of overall economic development of a country pair
given by the bilateral sum of GDP per capita.
In explaining trade integration with panel data we can build on an established
literature. We follow Egger (2000) in including the following index measuring the
similarity in the economic size of countries in I3,ijt:
GDPsimilarijt = 1−
(
GDPit
GDPit +GDPjt
)2
−
(
GDPjt
GDPit +GDPjt
)2
. (2.10)
This index is the larger, the more similar two countries are in terms of GDP. Very
similar countries are supposed to have a high degree of intra-industry trade and
therefore also of general trade linkages. Furthermore, I3,ijt contains the same measure
of overall economic development like I2,ijt. Additionally, we include an index on the
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degree of bilateral (de jure) economic integration which is taken from the Database
on Economic Integration Agreements by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), but which is
only available until 2005.
Differences in the sector structure are explained by overall economic development
(like trade and FDI linkages) and by differences in economic development/wealth
between countries measured by the absolute difference in GDP per capita. These two
measures both draw on the idea that economies manifest certain patterns regarding
the industrial composition in different states of development (Imbs and Wacziarg,
2003). This argument may be less appropriate the more similar countries are with
respect to their sectoral structure and stage of development.
For most of the described instruments it is not possible to completely exclude
a correlation with our measure of bilateral cyclical comovement between countries
by theory. Therefore, we test the validity of instruments by means of Hansen’s
J test, i.e., testing the validity of overidentifying restrictions. In contrast to the
Sargan test, this test is consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Note that
for panel random effect estimators Hansen’s J test can even be applied if there is
only one instrument for each endogenous determinant. When applying the EC2SLS
estimator, the exogenous regressors (in our case the indicators for monetary and
fiscal policy as well as all year dummies) are subject to a GLS transformation before
the estimation. In the IV estimation (on the transformed data) the transformed
regressors are all treated as endogenous while for each of them their demeaned and
re-centered transformation as well as their group mean transformation are used as
excluded instruments. In contrast, for a fixed effects 2SLS estimator, where such a
transformation is not used, the test is not applicable in this case since the equation
is just identified. In addition, we control the first stage F-statistics to prevent using
a weak instrument set.
2.3.3 Data Overview
Since the emphasis of our identification approach lies on the within variation in the
data, we choose the longest possible sample at the expense of a reduction of the
number of country pairs. After the exclusion of South Korea because of its strongly
differing synchronisation patterns, there are 16 countries left yielding 120 country
pairs.15 Due to the limitations in time range given by the OECD’s bilateral FDI data
15 These countries are: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, US.
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Fig. 2.1. Cross-Sectional Means of Business Cycle Synchronisation and its Endoge-
nous Determinants
and the OECD STAN database used to calculate sectoral differences, we obtain a
usable data set for the period from 1982 to 2009 at an annual frequency. The panel
is unbalanced, however, with an increasing number of observations for more recent
years. Descriptive statistics for all variables are included in the Appendix A.1 in
Table A.1.
In Figure 2.1 we plot cross-section averages for each point in time of our synchro-
nisation measure and the three endogenous determinants. The plots reveal that all
variables but synchronisation exhibit significant changes in levels over time, casting
the meaningfulness of long-term averages into doubt as they vary with the underly-
ing period.
2.4 Results
In this section, we briefly report what a cross-section approach would imply for
our data set before we present detailed estimation results for the panel dimension.
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With respect to the instrumentation, we start with a parsimonious specification
where we include one (time-variant) instrument for each endogenous variable. These
instruments are the volume-based measure of capital openness, economic similarity
and overall economic development.16 In the following, we discuss and test the choice
of instruments by employing the other available instruments discussed before.
2.4.1 Cross-Section
Before conducting panel estimates, we confront our data basis with the cross-section
based literature. We do this by estimating the synchronisation equation with cross-
section data obtained by averaging the data over time.17 To make the comparison
more appropriate, we additionally include a set of time-invariant exogenous vari-
ables. Our identification approach based on time-variant instruments presented in
Section 2.3.2 cannot correctly identify effects in the cross-section where fixed ef-
fects cannot be taken into account. In such a setting, we obtain low F-statistics for
FDI and trade integration in the first stage pointing to weak instruments. Including
some time-invariant variables serves to at least partially control for country pair
specific characteristics. We use standard gravity variables, namely the distance be-
tween the main economic centers and dummy variables for common borders from
CEPII’s GRAVITY dataset18, as well as the bilateral sum of an index measuring
share holder rights provided by La Porta et al. (1998). These additional variables
remedy the weak instruments problem in the cross-section raising the F-statistics of
first step estimations well above the rule of thumb value of 10. In addition, Hansen’s
J test does not report problems with the validity of the instruments. Estimations
are carried out based on pooled data over the entire period from 1982 to 2009 as
well as over the subperiods 1982-1998 and 1999-2009, that is before and after the
introduction of the euro.
We find that coefficients—especially those of trade and FDI intensity—vary
strongly with the underlying sample period. The shift in the coefficients over time
does not necessarily have to be a signal for a change in the strength of the underly-
ing relation between FDI or trade linkages and synchronisation but may simply be
16 Note, however, that the instruments are not assigned one by one to the single determinants by means
of the estimator, but are all together used in each first-stage regression of the endogenous.
17 This is the common procedure in the cross-section literature for all time-variant variables. Bilateral
synchronisation, however, is usually calculated as the Pearson correlation coefficient between business
cycles of two countries.
18 http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/bdd.asp
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driven by the calculation of means over time series containing trends. In addition,
multicollinearity between FDI and trade may be a big concern in the cross-section as
we will show in detail in the next section. Thus, we refrain from further interpreting
the results which are reported in Table A.2 in Appendix A.2.
2.4.2 Panel Approach
In this section we discuss the results of estimating equation (2.1), employing the error
component two-stage least squares (EC2SLS) estimator on panel data. All panel
estimations include country-pair specific effects and a full set of year dummies if not
stated differently. Hence, they focus on the transmission channels of idiosyncratic
business cycle shocks.
Basic Specification with Parsimonious Instrument Set
The results of our basic specification with the parsimonious (time-variant) instru-
ment set as described above are reported in Table 2.1 column (1). The estimation
points to a significant positive influence of FDI integration implying that the syn-
chronising effect dominates among the various cross-boarder linkages in multina-
tional firms. We do not find a significant impact of trade relations on the comove-
ment of business cycles. As we will show in the following, the coefficient of trade
integration is insignificant not only in our basic specification but also in all alter-
native specifications. Differences in the sectoral structure in turn have a negative
significant effect on cyclical comovement implying that the transmission of idiosyn-
cratic shocks between countries is the weaker, the bigger the differences in their
sectoral structure. Therefore, FDI and trade possibly exert an indirect influence on
business cycle synchronisation by causing changes in the sectoral composition of
economies. Differences in monetary policy are estimated to have a negative impact
on the cyclical comovement of a country pair implying higher synchronisation in
countries with similar short term interest rates. In contrast, differences in the net
lending position of governments have a positive effect. This result may arise from
the fact that governments incur debts when trying to buffer their country from
idiosyncratic shocks.
To validate our identification approach, we first checked the F-statistics of the
EC2SLS (and FE2SLS) first stage regressions. These signal no problems of weak
instrumentation for any of the endogenous covariates being all two-digit. In addition,
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Table 2.1. Business Cycle Synchronisation: EC2SLS with Varying Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Instrumentation Parsim. Econ. Diff. Return Spread EIA L.FDI
Period 1982-2009 1982-2009 1982-2009 1988-2005 1983-2009
FDI 0.249 0.269 0.285 0.489 -0.011
(0.124)** (0.134)** (0.123)** (0.168)*** (0.059)
Trade -0.157 -0.172 -0.194 -0.204 0.069
(0.198) (0.218) (0.192) (0.226) (0.160)
Sectoral Differences -0.039 -0.037 -0.038 -0.032 -0.040
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
Monetary Policy -0.097 -0.095 -0.096 -0.093 -0.083
(0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.026)*** (0.024)***
Fiscal Policy 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.059 0.054
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.015)*** (0.012)***
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,793 1,793 1,791 1,447 1,750
Hansen’s J Test
χ2 (d.f.) 19.98 (25) 17.39 (27) 29.59 (27) 26.21 (21) 21.26 (28)
p-value 0.748 0.921 0.333 0.198 0.814
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
we find F-statistics from FE2SLS to be higher than the single-digit F-statistics of
first stage between regressions emphasising that country pair specific effects should
not be neglected (see Baltagi, 2008). Second, we test the exogeneity of instruments
by means of Hansen’s J test which is reported in the lower part of Table 2.1. The
degree of freedom of the χ2 distribution is given by the number of exogenous time-
varying variables after the transformation. The result of Hansen’s J test on the
EC2SLS estimations confirms the validity of our parsimonious instrumentation.
Alternative Instrumentation
In order to test the dependence of our results on the instrumentation, we add the al-
ternative instruments discussed in Subsection 2.3.2 one-by-one to the parsimonious
instrument set. In Table 2.1 we report the estimation results as well as the test
statistics of Hansen’s J Test. We add in turn the measures of differences in economic
development (column 2), differences in return spreads (column 3) and the indicator
on Economic Integration Agreements (EIA) (column 4) and finally lagged FDI in-
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tensity (column 5) to the instrument set.19 The changes in the instrumentation do
not come with significant changes in the results reported for the parsimonious speci-
fication except for the FDI coefficient when including EIA or lagged values of FDI. In
the first case, the impact of FDI is bigger, which is due to the data limitations of the
EIA indicator. As mentioned in Subsection 2.3.2, it stops in 2005 so that the crisis-
driven years since 2007 are excluded from the sample. The recent global crisis has
provoked a particularly sharp plunge in FDI stocks among industrialised countries
(see Figure 2.1 and 1.1) which might be the reason behind the higher coefficients
in the shorter sample. When we estimate the parsimonious specification excluding
the years from 2007 onwards from the sample, we also obtain a higher coefficient
for FDI (0.397) at a 1% significance level but no remarkable changes regarding the
other variables (not reported). Including lagged FDI integration as an instrument
yields an insignificant effect of FDI integration on business cycle synchronisation.
Relation of FDI and Trade
A potential reason for the insignificant effects of trade integration could be its mul-
ticollinearity with FDI. Indeed, in the cross-section we observe an unconditional
correlation as high as 0.71 between the two variables, which makes cross-section
based estimations including trade and FDI even more questionable. In the panel
data the unconditional correlation still amounts to 0.65, but drops to 0.44 when
we take country-pair fixed effects into account and to 0.37 when, additionally, year
specific effects are included. Considering the correlation between country pairs and
within country pairs separately, it emerges that the high correlation is mainly driven
by strong relations between trade and FDI across country pairs, but not over time.
The correlation between country pairs amounts to 0.69 averaged over all years,
whereas the correlation over time adds up to just 0.31 averaged over all country
pairs (a detailed statistic on between and within correlation is included in Appendix
A.2, Figure A.1 and A.2). This said, multicollinearity seems to be more of an issue
when we look at shorter samples or at the cross-section.
As a further test of the importance of multicollinearity for our estimation re-
sults, we compute estimations excluding in turn trade and FDI. To stick with our
instrumentation approach we drop GDP similarity and global capital openness, re-
spectively, from the instrument set in this step. But very similar results are obtained
19 In addition, we tried various combinations of bigger instrument sets, but in most of the cases Hansen’s
J test rejected these bigger instrument sets.
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Table 2.2. Business Cycle Synchronisation: EC2SLS Excluding Trade/FDI and
Restricted Country-Pair Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Country Group OECD OECD OECD EU EMU
Period 1982-2009 1982-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009 1988-2009
FDI 0.186 0.249 0.183 0.169
(0.088)** (0.115)** (0.182) (0.321)
Trade 0.160 -0.137 -0.169 0.116
(0.128) (0.183) (0.267) (0.435)
Sectoral Differences -0.037 -0.035 -0.040 -0.050 -0.053
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.022)** (0.027)*
Monetary Policy -0.089 -0.058 -0.101 -0.172 -0.236
(0.023)*** (0.023)** (0.024)*** (0.036)*** (0.055)***
Fiscal Policy 0.063 0.055 0.063 0.089 0.085
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.022)*** (0.034)**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,793 1,802 1,763 1,014 574
Hansen’s J Test
χ2 (d.f.) 18.65 (24) 24.5 (24) 21.14 (23) 14.52 (19) 9.30 (15)
p-value 0.770 0.433 0.573 0.753 0.861
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
when keeping all instruments from the parsimonious specification. In the first case,
we obtain a somewhat smaller but significant coefficient for FDI linkages in the
synchronisation equation leaving the remaining results qualitatively unchanged (see
Table 2.2, column 1). Excluding FDI instead leads to greater changes: the trade
coefficient becomes positive but remains insignificant. If we restrain the sample to
more recent years, though, the coefficient becomes significant but results are more
sensible to the choice of instruments. These results imply that trade effects are not
completely irrelevant for the synchronisation of business cycles. But the impact of
trade may be more of the indirect type, i.e., by fostering stronger FDI linkages and
influencing the degree of sectoral differences between economies. Taking FDI out of
the system eliminates the first of these indirect channels and results in a weak direct
impact of trade.
Synchronisation in the EU and EMU
We also investigate whether our conclusions from the entire sample, which is based
on OECD countries, hold for the European environment. Therefore, we re-estimate
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the equation for two smaller country samples, the first limited to country pairs in
the European Union (EU) and the second including only relations between euro
area members (EMU). Since before 1988 there is no bilateral inner European data
available for some of the variables, we report the results for this shorter time frame
for all country groups. Estimated coefficients are presented in Table 2.2 column (3)-
(5). They imply very similar results for synchronisation in the EU and the EMU.
In contrast to the OECD sample, the impact of FDI is insignificant. Thus, it seems
that positive and negative effects of inner European FDI linkages on business cycle
synchronisation between member countries cancel out on aggregate. So increasing
intensity of FDI neither fosters nor harms convergence of business cycles between
European countries.
Since monetary policy in the euro area is uniform after the introduction of the
single currency, we re-estimate equation (2.1) without including differences in mon-
etary policy as exogenous explanatory variable. The estimated coefficients change
only marginally compared to the baseline specification, therefore we refrain from
reporting them for the sake of space.
Subperiods
In contrast to the cross-section, estimates of the baseline specification for the recent
period from 1999 to 2009 do not strongly differ from the overall sample (see Table
2.3). In essence, differences in monetary policy are not significant in this subsample,
which is not surprising given that 9 out of our 16 countries are subject to the
single interest rate of the EMU. In the period before the introduction of the euro
we find an insignificant coefficient for fiscal policy and for FDI integration. That
FDI linkages have no impact on business cycle synchronisation in the earlier period,
fits the data (see Figure 2.1), according to which bilateral FDI relations start to
intensify around the mid-nineties. It also goes with the cross-section evidence by
Jansen and Stokman (2011) and Keil and Sachs (2012) discussed in Section 2.1.
Finally, as described above, the financial crisis had its impact on the strength of the
synchronisation effect exerted by FDI integration: the inclusion of the period after
2007 abates the coefficient our FDI intensity measure. Since year-specific effects
are already taken into account, this may indicate a more profound change in the
relevance of FDI linkages for synchronisation at the current edge. With respect to
trade we do not find a significant impact for any subsample. Note, however, that
the results based on relatively short samples should be interpreted with care since
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Table 2.3. Business Cycle Synchronisation: EC2SLS Parsimonious Specification for
Subperiods
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1982-2009 1982-1998 1999-2009
FDI 0.249 0.585 0.199
(0.124)** (0.404) (0.089)**
Trade -0.157 -0.052 -0.050
(0.198) (0.344) (0.152)
Sectoral Differences -0.039 -0.053 -0.017
(0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.007)**
Monetary Policy -0.097 -0.137 0.008
(0.024)*** (0.034)*** (0.029)
Fiscal Policy 0.064 0.021 0.036
(0.012)*** (0.024) (0.012)***
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 1,793 681 1,112
Hansen’s J Test
χ2 (d.f.) 19.98 (25) 21.19 (16) 15.97 (13)
p-value .748 .172 .255
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
multicollinearity of trade and FDI integration could influence the results in these
shorter samples as mentioned above.
2.4.3 Sensitivity
To test the sensitivity of our results, we estimate several variations of our basic
specification.
Alternative Measures of FDI and Trade Linkages
In a first step, we use alternative measures for FDI and trade intensity which take
into account the asymmetry between countries. In case a country pair consists of
countries which differ strongly with respect to their economic size, our trade and
FDI integration measures may understate the importance of linkages for the small
country. Therefore, we repeat our estimations employing a measure where bilateral
trade and FDI linkages are scaled by the GDP of the smaller country as proposed
by Otto et al. (2001):
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Table 2.4. Business Cycle Synchronisation: Sensitivity with Alternative Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sync. measure ∆ GDP ∆ GDP HP-filtered Residual Relative
based on GDP ∆ GDP ∆ GDP
FDI Alternative 0.035
(0.018)*
FDI 0.249 0.139 0.194 12.936
(0.124)** (0.113) (0.136) (6.248)**
Trade Alternative -0.029
(0.025)
Trade -0.157 0.198 -0.012 -9.744
(0.198) (0.179) (0.218) (10.188)
Sectoral Differences -0.041 -0.039 -0.049 -0.032 -1.456
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.436)***
Monetary Policy -0.099 -0.097 0.017 -0.147 -1.820
(0.022)*** (0.024)*** (0.022) (0.025)*** (1.039)*
Fiscal Policy 0.061 0.064 0.042 0.056 3.053
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** (0.531)***
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793
Hansen’s J Test
χ2 (d.f.) 28.21 (25) 19.98 (25) 73.88 (25) 32.15 (25) 19.6 (25)
p-value 0.298 0.748 0.000 0.154 0.768
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
T alt.ijt = max(
EXijt + IMijt
GDPit
,
EXijt + IMijt
GDPjt
) (2.11)
FDIalt.ijt = max(
Outijt + Inijt
GDPit
,
Outijt + Inijt
GDPjt
). (2.12)
Results, displayed in Table 2.4 column (1), are very similar to those in Table 2.1.
The main difference lies in lower coefficients for FDI and trade integration, which is
natural as the alternative measures are by definition bigger than the measures em-
ployed before. FDI linkages have a significant impact, even though significance drops
to the 10% level. The coefficient of trade remains insignificant for the alternative
measure.
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Alternative Measures of Synchronisation
Furthermore, we conduct estimations with alternative synchronisation measures.
First, we use our synchronisation measure based on the business cycle computed
as HP-filtered output instead of year-on-year growth rates of output. We test this
measure as it is the most common measure of the output gap in literature. However,
the HP filter implies that this alternative synchronisation measure is smoother and
exhibits a high degree of autocorrelation which may be problematic in a static panel
approach.
Second, we adopt a measure proposed by Morgan et al. (2004), which is computed
in two steps: first, we recover the residuals from of a regression of real GDP growth
on country-pair and year specific fixed effects:
∆Yit = µi + λt + εit. (2.13)
Simply speaking, this residual GDP growth captures for a given year a country’s
deviation from its own long-run GDP growth and from the cross-section average
growth rate in that specific year. The alternative synchronisation measure is then
constructed in a similar fashion as the basic measure by taking the negative absolute
difference between residual GDP growth, i.e.,
ρresid.ijt = −|εit − εjt|. (2.14)
In contrast to our basic measure, this proxy is corrected for changes in the amplitude
of fluctuations. Finally, we employ a measure proposed by Mink et al. (2007), which
scales our original measure by the size of the average GDP growth rate in the sample
and can be expressed as follows:
ρrelativeijt = −
|∆Yit −∆Yjt|
1
n
n∑
i=1
|∆Yit|
. (2.15)
In Table 2.4 we compare the estimated coefficients for these different measurement
concepts with column (2) which repeats the result for our standard synchronisation
measure. We find that for the latter measure results barely change in qualitative
terms (column 5). Quantitatively, the coefficients are all much higher as the relative
comovement measure has a much bigger value range (see descriptives in Table A.1 in
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Appendix A.1). Using the synchronisation measure based on residual GDP growth,
FDI is insignificant in the parsimonious specification but significant for several other
instrumentations (not shown), whereas the remaining results persist (see column 4).
When the HP-filtered measure is used in column (3), in addition to FDI, monetary
policy looses its significance. But the instrumentation seems problematic when the
dependent variable is based on HP-filtered GDP. There is no sign of weak instru-
ments, but Hansen’s J Test rejects the exogeneity of our parsimonious instrument set
as well as of alternative instrumentation. Additionally, autocorrelation coefficients
for the residuals strongly exceed those of our original measure of comovement.
Alternative Error Structure
In our basic specification, contemporaneous correlation of the errors across panel
individuals arising, e.g. by common shocks hitting the country-pairs, are modelled
by common time effects in the error term. To check the robustness of the reported
results with respect to this choice, we follow an alternative approach proposed by
Pesaran (2006) and include cross-sectional averages of the endogenous variables
instead of year dummies in the estimation equations. The cross-sectional averages
provide a solution to soak up cross-sectional correlation. The idea of this approach
is to model the residuals of the panel equation as being composed of two orthogonal
components. The first component comprises common factors that soak up the cross-
sectional comovement in the data whereas the second component captures mainly
idiosyncratic variable-specific movements. Following Pesaran (2006), we estimate
the common factors consistently by cross-sectional averages of the country-specific
variables (synchronisation, FDI, trade and sectoral differences) and their lagged
values. In general, results are qualitatively very similar to those reported in Table
2.1 with year dummies, the only exception being the parsimonious specification
with a negative trade coefficient which is significant at the 10% level (see Appendix
A.2 Table A.3). But Hansen’s J test rejects the validity of instruments for this
specification pointing to inconsistent estimates. Quantitative changes occurred in the
FDI coefficient which is about 20% higher in all specification when cross-sectional
averages are included.
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Estimation in Log-like Transformation
We estimate our model not only in levels but also in a log-like transformation fol-
lowing Levy Yeyati et al. (2007) which for a variable x can be written as20
loglike(x) = sign(x) ∗ ln(1 + abs(x)).
We test this specification as many studies refer to models in logs, even though Kose
and Yi (2006) make a strong point for an estimation in levels. Results produced by
estimating the transformed system do not differ significantly from the ones of the
basic specification and are not reported.
2.5 Conclusion
We readdressed the determinants of business cycle synchronisation in this chapter
to test, on the one hand, whether FDI promoting policies may have consequences for
the business cycle comovement between countries, and on the other hand, whether
more plausible identification strategies change previous results. Understanding the
determinants of synchronisation is of great political relevance, since a considerable
degree of cyclical comovement is important for the efficiency of a common monetary
policy in a currency union. Our results suggest that linkages through foreign di-
rect investment contribute in most cases positively to the synchronisation between
country pairs. This implies that policies to attract more FDI from abroad go, in
general, hand in hand with an increased similarity of business cycles with these in-
ternational partners. In the specific case of bilateral synchronisation between EMU
members, we do not identify a positive significant effect for the long sample but
also no negative one. Thus, our results suggest no conflict of goals between policies
to promote FDI and the necessary synchronisation of business cycles in the EMU.
In contrast, the beneficial effects of trade integration for the similarity of business
cycles are less robust and thus less important for the transmission of idiosyncratic
shocks between countries than previously thought. One explanation for this result is,
that trade moves together with business cycle synchronisation because of common
shocks. Finally, we find that larger differences in the sector structure between two
economies result in a bigger gap between their business cycles.
20 This more complicated transformation is necessary, since FDI positions and in consequence our measure
for bilateral FDI intensity can be negative and are therefore not compatible with a simple logarithmic
transformation.
3The German Labour Market Reforms in a
European Context: A DSGE Analysis1
The preceding chapter empirically analysed the importance of the channels through
which spillover effects of idiosyncratic shocks between countries occur. The present
and the next chapter, in contrast, investigate how labour market reforms in one
country spill over to other countries. They thereby build on a model framework
which contains transmission channels standard in the DSGE literature: the terms
of trade channel through international trade in intermediate goods and the short-
term reallocation through an international bond market. Using this framework, in
the present chapter the macroeconomic consequences of the controversially debated
German labour market reforms on the national and international level are evaluated.
In the last decade, Germany launched a series of labour market reforms—the
so-called Hartz reforms—in order to deal with a protracted unemployment problem.
The main components of the reforms consisted in measures to increase the efficiency
of matching the unemployed with vacancies in firms and a significant decline in
the unemployment benefit ratio. Over the period from 2003 to 2010, following the
introduction of the first Hartz reform package, four trends are conspicuous in the
German macroeconomic data. First, the unemployment rate declined significantly
from 9.3% to 7.1%. Second, the increase in GDP of 8.6% has been much stronger than
the increase in consumption of 3.6%. Third, labour productivity rose significantly
by 5.5%, accompanied by a merely moderate wage rise of 0.7%. Fourth, the German
economy registered large current account surpluses, which have been driven by trade
surpluses to a large extent and have persistently been above 5% of GDP since 2005.
While a widespread consensus exists among macroeconomists that the Hartz re-
forms have successfully contributed to the decline of the unemployment rate, the
1 This chapter is based on joint work with Dr. Atılım Seymen. It is a slightly revised version of ZEW
Discussion Paper No. 13-097 (see Busl and Seymen, 2013). An earlier version is WWWforEurope
Working Paper no 8.
44 3 The German Labour Market Reforms in a European Context: A DSGE Analysis
role of the reforms in driving the other aforementioned developments in the data is
anything but clear-cut. Critics of the Hartz reforms read those figures as supportive
for the claim that the reforms caused wage restraint and consequently consumption
dampening in Germany and induced thereby beggar-thy-neighbour effects. The fol-
lowing sections analyse by means of a two-country DSGE model with labour market
frictions to what extent the Hartz reforms contributed to the aforementioned devel-
opments in the German macroeconomic data. The scope is to assess whether the
Hartz reforms are to be blamed for wage restraint and consumption dampening in
Germany or whether there must have been other factors at stake.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The literature on the effects of
labour market reforms/institutions and the relation of our study to that literature
is discussed in the next section. Section 3.2 presents the model in detail. The quan-
titative results as well as their sensitivity are the subject of Section 3.3. The section
starts with the discussion of the model calibration followed by the presentation of
the domestic and spillover effects of the Hartz reforms as well as their sensitivity
with respect to the calibration of several parameters in separate subsections. Section
3.3 closes with a discussion of further factors that could—at least partially—have
contributed to the trends in the German data. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1 Related Literature
The Hartz reforms have been introduced in four law packages between 2003 and
2005. The last reform package—the so-called Hartz IV— included a decrease of more
than 10 percentage points in the unemployment benefit ratio.2 The measurement
of the impact of the first three Hartz law packages on the efficiency of matching
the unemployed with vacancies in firms is, however, more challenging and requires
the use of econometric techniques.3 The estimates of Fahr and Sunde (2009), that
2 The previous German unemployment benefit system consisted of several layers of payments depending
on the length of unemployment and/or whether a person received additional vocational training. The
estimate of a decline of above 10 percentage points is based on the OECD calculations of the gross
replacement ratio. Dao (2013b) uses a similar figure to ours.
3 Hartz I-III included a number of efforts to improve the matching efficiency by improving the perfor-
mance of public employment services and of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP). In particular, the
public employment services were modernised in terms of their organisational structure and were geared
to be result and customer-oriented. In addition, incentives for alternative private placement services
were introduced to generate market forces and the allocation of measures was subordinated to cost
effectiveness. Furthermore, direct integration measures were boosted vis-a`-vis training and job creation
measures which prevent participants from a fast return into work. See Jacobi and Kluve (2007) for a
detailed review of all reform measures.
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refer to the impact of the Hartz I/II reforms measured over the period March 2000–
December 2003, point to a 5-10% increase in the matching efficiency. The authors
measure the impact of the Hartz III reform over the period March 2003–December
2004 to be somewhat weaker. Yet, the joint impact of the first three Hartz law
packages on the matching efficiency has been a visible 10-15% within a very short
period after their introduction according to the authors’ estimates. In a more recent
study, Klinger and Rothe (2012) obtain very similar numbers. Hertweck and Sigrist
(2013) estimate the range of increase in the efficiency of the matching process in
Western Germany of the combined reforms to lie between 12% and 31%, whereby
their point estimate, a 23% decrease in the matching efficiency, corresponds to a
20% decrease in the unemployment rate.
In addition to the studies that measure the extent of matching efficiency gains
due to Hartz reforms, few papers provide comprehensive analyses of how the reforms
affected aggregate macroeconomic variables in general and the unemployment rate
in particular: Krause and Uhlig (2012), Krebs and Scheffel (2013), Nie (2010) and
Launov and Wa¨lde (2013). These studies all build on models with heterogeneous
agents, and their main focus lies on the effects of the Hartz IV reform that changed
the German unemployment benefit system substantially. Krause and Uhlig (2012)
develop a quantitative labour market model similar to the one in Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2007) with skill heterogeneity of workers, search and matching frictions a`
la Pissarides (2000), and endogenous job acceptance and separation rates. Krebs
and Scheffel (2013) combine the incomplete-market model of Krebs (2003) with the
model of search unemployment of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), while Nie (2010)
employs an extension of the same Ljungqvist-Sargent model with a training decision
and a broader menu of unemployment benefits. The model of Launov and Wa¨lde
(2013) is an extension of the standard matching model with time-dependent unem-
ployment benefits, endogenous effort, risk-averse households an exogenous “spell-
effect” and Semi-Markov features.
The foregoing studies all find a reduction in the equilibrium unemployment rate
following the Hartz IV reform, but differ in their estimates regarding the extent to
which the reform reduced the equilibrium unemployment rate in Germany. Krause
and Uhlig (2012) find a 35% reduction in the equilibrium unemployment rate of Ger-
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many, Krebs and Scheffel (2013) 14% and Launov and Wa¨lde (2013) merely 2.8%.4
Nie (2010), who explicitly distinguishes between the multiple levels of the former
unemployment benefit system, finds that the reduction in unemployment benefits
for all workers, regardless of whether they were attending a training programme,
lowered the unemployment rate by 11.5% from 11.3% to 10%. Given the large dis-
crepancies between our model framework and the ones in the foregoing studies, we
find it useful to compare our findings with theirs. However, our comparisons will
mostly be limited to the unemployment rate and output, since the models of the
existing studies on the Hartz IV reform do not contain many further aggregate vari-
ables such as consumption. Krebs and Scheffel (2013) are an exception in this regard.
Moreover, all of the existing studies abstract from international linkages.
A crucial aspect of structural reforms in labour (and product) markets is the
potential interaction of different reforms with each other, thus raising or reducing
the impact of individual reform components, as implied by the results of several
studies such as Coe and Snower (1997), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003) and Belot and van Ours (2004). Yet, the existing studies on
the Hartz reforms focus almost exclusively on the impact of the Hartz IV reform,
disregarding the impact of the first three reform packages on the matching efficiency.
Krause and Uhlig (2012) is the only study that briefly mentions the impact of the
matching efficiency increase, but Krause and Uhlig consider only the long-run impact
of a matching efficiency increase of 10%, guided by the findings of Fahr and Sunde
(2009). Yet, the authors evaluate the impact of such an increase in the matching
efficiency in an isolated manner and do not consider the joint impact of both Hartz
reform components on the unemployment rate and output. Our study appears to be
the first one to address this gap.
Another gap in the existing literature that we try to fill in our study regards
the international spillover effects of the Hartz reforms. There is only one study by
Dao (2013b), who calibrates a two-country DSGE model with respect to Germany
and the rest of the euro area as we do. However, she looks at the impact of the
decline in the German unemployment benefit ratio (only in the long run) but does
not consider the impact of the increase in the matching efficiency and the way she
constructs the labour market differs from ours. While no other study addressed
4 Note that these calculations are based on different initial, pre-reform steady state unemployment rates.
The decline in Krause and Uhlig (2012) is from 10.8% to 8%, in Krebs and Scheffel (2013) from 9% to
7.76%, and Launov and Wa¨lde (2013) from 10.5% to 10.2%.
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the issue pertaining to the Hartz reforms up to now, several studies deal with the
international effects of reforms in labour market institutions as has already been
set out in Chapter 1. To sum up the results of these studies, the spillover effects of
labour market reforms to employment are predominantly found to be positive by the
existing empirical and theoretical literature. However, the empirical evidence as well
as the theoretical analyses on the sign of reform spillovers such as the ones in Dao
(2013a) and Felbermayr et al. (2013) refer only to long-run effects. Although few
studies such as Dao (2013a), Dao (2013b) and Gomes et al. (2012) report positive
short-run spillover effects of labour tax reductions, negative spillovers in the short
run in the case of other reform measures and/or alternative calibrations of the models
cannot be ruled out a priori.
3.2 The Model
In this section, we describe our model framework which is a standard two-country
real business cycle model enhanced by matching frictions in the labour market, an
international bond market and fiscal policy parameters. It closely follows Fonseca
et al. (2009). If not stated otherwise, we describe the decision problems of households
and firms in the home country, called country 1, in the following. The complete
equation system of the model is provided in Appendix B.1.
3.2.1 Households
Each country is inhabited by an infinitely living mass of agents normalised to unity.
Agents maximise their lifetime utility at the beginning of each period without know-
ing whether they will end up unemployed or not. But since they are assumed to be
risk averse and to have access to complete income insurance markets, their decisions
are independent of their individual labour market outcome. Only the aggregate out-
come and, correspondingly, the probability of being employed Nit in country i at
period t matter. A representative household in country 1 maximises its expected
life-time utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [N1tU(C
n
1t, h1t) + (1−N1t)U(Cu1t)] , (3.1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, Cn1t and C
u
1t denote consumption in case of
employment and unemployment, respectively, and h1t represents the number of hours
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worked by an employed agent. The number of hours per period is normalised to unity.
Thus, time spend on leisure is given by 1− h1t. The per-period utility functions of
employed and unemployed individuals are additively separable in consumption and
leisure and can be written as
U(Cn1t, h1t) = log (C
n
1t) + κ
n
1
(1− h1t)1−ξ
1− ξ (3.2)
U(Cu1t) = log (C
u
1t) + κ
u
1 (3.3)
with κn1 and κ
u
1 being parameters that affect and determine the value of leisure for
employed and unemployed agents, respectively, and 1
ξ
measuring the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of leisure with ξ > 0.
When agents are employed, they receive an income w1th1t from employment, w1t
being the hourly wage rate in terms of the locally produced good, subject to an em-
ployees’ labour tax τ d1 . Otherwise, they are eligible for a fixed level of unemployment
benefits b1 evaluated in units of the consumption good. In addition, there are direct
transfers from the government to households (or lump-sum taxes on households de-
pending on whether the consumption and labour tax revenues are enough to cover
the unemployment benefit payments) amounting to T1t. As owners of the domestic
intermediate good firms, households are entitled to the profits Π1t accruing from
the domestic firms. Furthermore, agents can hold bonds denominated in terms of
the domestic good available in an international bond market which yield an interest
payment it for each unit. Households spend their income on consumption including
a consumption tax τ c1 and on new bond holdings B1t+1. If the household changes its
bond holdings, it faces a portfolio adjustment cost CA1t which is given by
CA1t =
Φb
2
(
B1t+1
P c1t
)2
(3.4)
that is scaled by the factor Φb > 0. The adjustment cost guarantees the stationarity
of the model in the light of its incomplete financial market.5
Taking the foregoing elements together, the budget constraint of the representa-
tive household expressed in terms of the intermediate good produced in country 1
reads as
5 Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) discuss this issue in detail.
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(1 + τ c1)P
c
1t [N1tC
n
1t + (1−N1t)Cu1t] +B1t+1 + P c1tCA1t =
= P1tN1th1tw1t
(
1− τ d1
)
+ (1−N1t)P c1tb1 +B1t (1 + it) + T1t +Π1t (3.5)
with P c1t being the consumer price index at home. P1t represents the price of the
domestic intermediate. Note that we choose the intermediate good of country 1 to
be our nume´raire and fix its price P1t to unity. The households’ optimisation decision
problem is summarised by the Bellman equation
FH1t = max
Cn1t,C
u
1t,B1t+1
[
N1tU(C
n
1t, h1t) + (1−N1t)U(Cu1t) + βEt
(
FH1t+1
)]
(3.6)
which is subject to the budget constraint (3.5) and the law of motion of aggregate
employment N1t
N1t+1 = (1− s1)N1t + φ1t(1−N1t). (3.7)
In this equation, s1 is the constant job separation rate for employed workers which is
exogenously given6 and φ1t the probability of finding a job when being unemployed.
Thus, φ1t(1−N1t) is the number of successful matches which result in hirings H1t.
The number of unemployed agents in country 1 is given by U1t = 1−N1t. Since we
normalise the mass of the potential workforce to unity, U1t stands for the unemploy-
ment rate at the same time. Note that the hours worked h1t do not directly enter
the representative household’s optimisation problem, since they are determined by
negotiations between firms and workers through Nash bargaining which is handled
below.
We define λ1t as the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the budget constraint
(3.5) and derive the first order conditions of the representative agent’s optimisation
problem (3.6) as follows. With respect to consumption we obtain
1
Cn1t
=
1
Cu1t
= (1 + τ c1)λ1tP
c
1t. (3.8)
This condition implies that the optimal level of consumption does not depend on the
agents’ employment status. Therefore, we call the aggregate level of consumption
Cc1t = C
n
1t = C
u
1t in the following. Regarding the bond holdings, the optimality
condition is given by
6 This assumption is in accordance with empirical evidence: according to Bachmann (2005) job “separa-
tions are relatively flat over the business cycle” in Germany.
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λ1t
(
1 + Φb
B1t+1
P c1t
)
= βEt [λ1t+1 (1 + it+1)] . (3.9)
3.2.2 Final Good Sector
In each country there is a competitive final good sector, which produces a non-
tradable final good Dc1t used for consumption and investment. The quantity of final
goods in country 1 produced by assembling tradeable intermediate goods according
to the standard Armington aggregator is given by
Dc1t =
[
κ
1
η y
η−1
η
11t + (1− κ)
1
η y
η−1
η
21t
] η
η−1
, (3.10)
where yjit denotes the quantity of intermediate input in the final good production of
country i = 1, 2 stemming from country j = 1, 2. 0 < κ < 1 represents the preference
for domestic goods in domestic spending, the so called home bias and 1 − κ is the
preference of consumers for products from the other country. η > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods.
Final good producers maximise their profits given by P c1tD
c
1t − P1ty11t − P2ty21t.
The resulting demand functions for the intermediate goods used in country 1 read
y11t = κ
(
P c1t
P1t
)η
Dc1t (3.11)
y21t = (1− κ)
(
P c1t
P2t
)η
Dc1t, (3.12)
where P c1t/P1t represents the price of the final good in country 1 in terms of the
intermediate good produced in the same country. We define the terms of trade of the
foreign country as the relation of its import to export prices, i.e. TOTt =
P2t
P1t
= P2t;
then we can relate the consumer price index P c1t of country 1 to the terms of trade
by combining the intermediate good demand functions with equation (3.10):
P c1t =
[
κ+ (1− κ) (TOTt)η−1
] 1
1−η . (3.13)
3.2.3 Intermediate Good Sector
In each country a continuum of firms operates in a perfectly competitive intermediate
good market. Firms produce goods with the Cobb-Douglas production technology
using domestic labour N1th1t and capital K1t as input:
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Y1t = A1K
α
1t (N1th1t)
1−α , (3.14)
where 0 < 1 − α < 1 is the labour share of income. In addition, the output level
depends on the level of technology A1, which we keep constant, since it has no
relevance for our analysis of the impacts of policy changes.
Each period firms face wage bills amounting to N1th1tw1t which are subject to
taxes, denoted by τ f1 , contributing to the government budget. Furthermore, they post
vacancies in the job market to adjust the size of the workforce for the next period,
which is reduced by exogenous job separation. Thereby, they incur a cost ω1 > 0 for
each vacant job posted. The total number of posted vacancies is V1t. With q1t being
the probability of finding an appropriate match, the number of successful matches
in the labour market leading to hirings H1t can be expressed as q1tV1t. Hence, we
can rewrite the law of motion of aggregate employment in terms of vacancies as
N1t+1 = (1− s1)N1t + q1tV1t. (3.15)
The accumulation of capital occurs according to the standard law of motion for
capital
K1t+1 = (1− δ)K1t + Ic1t, (3.16)
where 0 < δ < 1 stands for the capital depreciation rate and investment Ic1t is made
up of the same combination of domestic and foreign goods as the consumption basket
of households. Firms incur costs when adjusting their capital stock amounting to
CI1t =
ΦI
2
(K1t+1 −K1t)2
K1t
, (3.17)
where ΦI > 0 is a scaling parameter.
Firms maximise their profits Π1t given by
Π1t = P1tY1t − P1tN1th1tw1t
(
1 + τ f1
)
− ω1P c1tV1t − P c1tIc1t − P c1tCI1t. (3.18)
Their optimisation problem can be summarised as
F F1t = max
K1t,N1t
[
Π1t + βEt
(
λ1t+1
λ1t
F F1t+1
)]
, (3.19)
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subject to the production technology (3.14), and the law of motion of capital (3.16)
and aggregate employment (3.15). Firms’ future profit flows are weighted by the
ratio of the future to the present Lagrange multiplier λ1t+1/λ1t of households’ budget
constraint, since households are the owners of the firms. This weight assesses the
relative importance of wealth changes for households.
The optimality conditions with respect to capital and labour can be combined in
qT1t = βEt
[
P c1t+1λ1t+1
P c1tλ1t
{
P1t+1
P c1t+1
α
Y1t+1
K1t+1
+ qT1t+1 − δ +
ΦI
2
(
Ic1t+1 − δK1t+1
K1t+1
)2}]
(3.20)
and
ω1
q1t
= βEt
[
P c1t+1λ1t+1
P c1tλ1t
{
z1t+1 − P1t+1
P c1t+1
h1t+1w1t+1
(
1 + τ f1
)
+ (1− s1) ω1
q1t+1
}]
,
(3.21)
where the shadow price of capital is labelled qT1t and given by
qT1t = 1 + ΦI
Ic1t − δK1t
K1t
and z1t is defined as
z1t =
P1t
P c1t
(1− α) Y1t
N1t
.
3.2.4 Matching and Bargaining in the Labour Market
The process of matching vacancies and unemployed persons results in hirings ac-
cording to the following constant returns-to-scale technology proposed by Pissarides
(2000):
H1t = χ1V
ψ
1t (1−N1t)1−ψ , (3.22)
where χ1 > 0 is a parameter that measures the efficiency of the matching process
and 0 < ψ < 1 denotes the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
vacancies.
Each period firms and workers bargain over wages w1t and the number of hours
worked h1t within a Nash bargaining framework. The outcome of the negotiation
process is obtained by maximising the weighted marginal value of an additional
employed in terms of utility for firms and households:
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max
w1t,h1t
(
λ1t
∂F F1t
∂N1t
)(
∂FH1t
∂N1t
)1−
, (3.23)
where 0 <  < 1 measures the bargaining power of the firm. For the household the
marginal value of a match is given by
∂FH1t
∂N1t
= κu1−κn1
(1− h1t)1−ξ
1− ξ +λ1t(P1th1tw1t(1−τ
d
1 )−P c1tb1)+(1−s1−φ1t)βEt
[
∂FH1t+1
∂N1t+1
]
.
(3.24)
For firms the value of an additional worker (in terms of the final good) can be written
as
∂F F1t
∂N1t
= P1t(1−α) Y1t
N1th1t
h1t−P1th1tw1t(1+τ f1 )+(1−s1)βEt
[
λ1t+1
λ1t
∂F F1t+1
∂N1t+1
]
, (3.25)
where we assume that the marginal value of work in production (1 − α) Y1t
N1th1t
is
taken as fixed in the bargaining process following Andolfatto (1996).
Defining labour market tightness θ1t as
V1t
U1t
, optimal labour contracts according
to equation (3.23) imply
w1th1t =
1− 
1 + τ f1
P c1t
P1t
[ω1θ1t + z1t] +

1− τ d1
[
P c1t
P1t
b1 +
1
λ1t
(
κu1 − κn1
(1− h1t)1−ξ
1− ξ
)]
(3.26)
κn1
λ1t
(1− h1t)−ξ = 1− τ
d
1
1 + τ f1
(1− α) Y1t
N1th1t
. (3.27)
3.2.5 The Government
The governments in both countries balance their spending on transfers T1t and
unemployment benefits b1 with their income from consumption and labour taxation.
In case the amount of the unemployment benefits exceeds the tax revenue, the
government imposes a lump-sum tax on the household instead of a transfer payment.
For the home country the government budget constraint is hence
τ c1P
c
1tC
c
1t +
(
τ d1 + τ
f
1
)
P1tN1th1tw1t = T1t + (1−N1t)P c1tb1 (3.28)
With unemployment benefits b1 fixed, transfer payments endogenously adjust to
balance the budget.
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3.2.6 Equilibrium
Global equilibrium requires market clearing in financial and goods markets. In the
markets of home and foreign intermediate goods, the equilibrium is given by
Y1t = y11t + y12t (3.29)
Y2t = y21t + y22t. (3.30)
Market clearing in the composite good markets is obtained if for all countries i = 1, 2
Dcit = C
c
it + I
c
it + ωiVit + CIit + CAit. (3.31)
holds. For the international bond market, the equilibrium is defined as
B1t+1 +B2t+1 = 0. (3.32)
The trade balance of country i reads TBit = PitYit − P citDcit. Note that the evo-
lution of the trade balance has to be equal to that of the balance of payments
Bit+1− (1− it)Bit in equilibrium, which can be shown by combining equations (3.5),
(3.18), (3.28) and (3.31).
The model is solved by log-linearising the equation system around the determin-
istic steady state and applying the Newton-Raphson algorithm as implemented in
DYNARE for deterministic models.
3.3 The Impact of the German Hartz Reforms
In this section, we start out by describing the calibration of our model to German
and euro area data. Then, we present the results from our quantitative analysis.
First, we explain the impact of the German labour market reforms on the German
economy and compare it to the data. In a second step, we discuss the spillover
effects to the “rest of the euro area”. In Subsection 3.3.4, we present the results of
a sensitivity analysis to changes in selected parameters and compare our results to
the literature. Finally, we propose additional factors that could contribute to the
explanation of the gap between wages and productivity growth and consumption
and output growth as well as persistent trade surpluses in the German data.
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Table 3.1. Symmetric Calibration
Labour Market Production Technology Preferences Bond Market
 ωV/Y ψ q α h δ ΦI β κ η ξ Φb/NX
0.5 0.015 0.5 0.7 0.34 0.33 0.025 7 0.99 0.7 1 4 0.0038
3.3.1 Calibration
We calibrate our model to quarterly data and set most of the parameters symmetri-
cally between the two economies. Allowing for heterogeneity only in labour market
and fiscal policy parameters, i.e., potential reform parameters, enables us to abstract
from differences between the economies that are irrelevant for our analysis. We start
by discussing the commonly set parameters, which are summarised in Table 3.1.
Labour Market
We follow the literature on labour market rigidities in Europe (see e.g. Dao, 2013b
or Faia et al., 2013) in choosing  = 0.5, splitting the bargaining power in the Nash
bargaining equally between firms and workers. We set the elasticity of vacancies in
the matching function ψ likewise to 0.5 in line with the estimates of Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001), thus preserving the Hosios condition.7 We set the aggregate
vacancy posting costs per GDP ωV/Y to 1.5% as in Fonseca et al. (2009) and show
in Subsection 3.3.4 how sensitive our results are with respect to these costs. The
probability of filling a vacancy q is typically set between 0.7 (den Haan et al., 2000
and Krause and Lubik, 2007) and 0.9 (Andolfatto, 1996 and Hairault, 2002). We
choose the lower bound of values used in the literature, since a lower probability
seems more in line with the European case (see Campolmi and Faia, 2011).
Production Technology
The production technology parameters are calibrated to reflect the German and
European production environment. While the labour share in production has been
roughly constant over the past decades in the US, it was subject to a considerable
decline in many European countries including Germany and the gap between the
US and Europe has narrowed.8 In our benchmark calibration, we set the elasticity of
7 The condition derived by Hosios (1990) implies that the outcome of the bargaining process and thus
the level of unemployment in equilibrium is efficient (i.e. welfare maximising). It is met when the firm’s
share of surplus is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies.
8 According to the EU KLEMS database, the labour share of income in Germany declined from 0.72 in
the 1970s to around 0.66 in the 2000s. On the other hand, it shrank only by roughly 0.02 points from
0.64 to 0.62 in the US over the same period. See also Hogrefe and Kappler (2013).
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substitution for capital α in the production function to 0.34 in accordance with the
German data for the past decade. Following the literature, the steady state value
of hours worked h is set to 1/3 and the capital depreciation rate δ to 0.025.9 The
scaling factor of capital adjustment costs is chosen to be ΦI = 7, which is taken from
Patureau (2007) and reflects the volatility of investment (relative to output) in the
G7 countries.10
Preferences
The discount rate of households is given by β = 0.99, which corresponds to an
annual real interest rate of about 4% in the steady state according to equation
(3.9).11 ξ is derived to have the value 4 assuming a (Frisch) labour supply elasticity
of (1− h) /(h ξ) = 0.5 following the recommendation of Chetty et al. (2011).12 The
elasticity of internationally traded goods η is set to 1 as in Heathcote and Perri
(2013). The parameter defining the home bias of consumed products κ is calibrated
by setting the import-to-GDP ratio (1−κ) to a value of 0.3 which corresponds to the
average import share observed in Germany vis-a`-vis the world since the introduction
of the euro. Since the home bias in the consumption bundle as well as the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods might influence spillovers sig-
nificantly via the trade channel, we carry out a sensitivity analysis with respect to
κ and η below.
Finally, the scaling parameter for portfolio adjustment of households Φb is derived
using empirical estimates of the ratio of the scaling parameter and steady state
exports reported to be 0.0038 by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002).
9 Our results in the next sections are hardly sensitive to the choice of the depreciation rate.
10 We performed a sensitivity analysis setting ΦI to very low and very high values. Our quantitative results
in the next sections are not sensitive to variations in ΦI . There occurs only a slight change in the initial
dynamics of wages and consumption after the introduction of the reforms.
11 The long term average in annual real interest rates in Germany till 2003 amounted to roughly 3 to 4%
(depending on the starting year) which would imply a discount rate between 0.993 and 0.99. Considering
only the past decade, on the other hand, would yield a significantly lower interest rate of about 1% and
a higher discount rate of 0.998. In the analysis, we choose to work with the long term average. Yet, we
checked the implication of lower interest rates and higher discount rates as indicated by the recent past.
Since the consequent changes in the response to our reforms are minimal, we refrain from reporting
further results.
12 Chetty et al. (2011) show that the estimates of the Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours worked differ
substantially between micro and macro models, but not the elasticity on the intensive margin. Since our
model differentiates between the intensive and extensive margins, we use the value of 0.5 recommended
for the Frisch elasticity on the intensive margin. Furthermore, Bargain et al. (2011) show that labour
supply elasticities do not differ much across countries.
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Table 3.2. Calibration of Heterogeneity in the Labour Market Institutions and
Fiscal Policy
2003 2010
Germany EA Germany EA
1−N Unemployment 9.81 9.02 7.08 10.13
1/φ Av. duration of unemployment 9.53 16.57 8.68 14.20
φ Job finding probability 31.48 18.11 34.57 21.13
b/wh Unemployment benefit ratio 31.89 27.70 21.54 27.85
τf Employers’ labour tax 17.00 23.75 16.20 23.34
τd Employees’ labour tax 17.00 9.44 17.20 8.74
τc Consumption tax 16.00 19.11 19.00 19.14
Notes: All numbers are in percentage points except the average duration of unemployment which
is given in months. Unemployment (average duration of unemployment) are EA (EU) averages as
published by the OECD including Germany. b/wh, τf , τd and τc are calculated as EA-12 averages
excluding Germany using GDP weights at PPP exchange rates of the corresponding year.
Sources: OECD Reference Series, Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, OECD Labour Market Statistics,
OECD Benefits and Wages: Statistics, OECD Taxing Wages 2003, OECD Taxing Wages 2010,
OECD Recent Tax Policy Trends and Reforms in OECD Countries 2004, OECD Consumption
Tax Trends 2012.
Heterogeneity in Labour Market Institutions and Fiscal Policy
In our basic setup, several parameters and steady state values of variables in country
2 are matched to German data in 2003, whereas country 1 is calibrated to the euro
area (EA) situation in 2003.13 We employ data for the EA-12 countries excluding
Germany whenever possible in our calculations but have sometimes to resort to
aggregates including Germany. For simplicity we label the aggregate EA in all tables.
Since our reform scenarios are partially based on institutions observed in 2010, we
report for both Germany and the euro area the values corresponding to 2010 as well.
The corresponding figures are displayed in Table 3.2.
We use annual harmonised unemployment rates from the OECD Reference Series
dataset to calibrate the steady state unemployment rate 1−N . This definition ex-
cludes short term fluctuations in unemployment lasting less than one year. The job
finding probability φ is set by using the inverse of the average unemployment dura-
tion. Data on average duration of unemployment in months stem from the German
13 If we use average values over the period 1999-2003 instead of 2003 values, the institutional parameters in
our calibration would hardly change. The only sizable difference would be a lower initial unemployment
rate which implies smaller effects from the reforms carried out. But since the high unemployment rate
was among the triggering factors of the reforms, we prefer to use its immediate pre-reform level.
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Table 3.3. Implied Values
Germany EA
s Job separation rate 0.034 0.018
χ Matching efficiency 0.47 0.36
ω Vacancy posting cost 0.33 0.63
θ Labour market tightness 0.45 0.26
Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit) and for the euro area ag-
gregate we use a European average provided by the OECD Labour Market Statistics.
Consequently, we derive the labour market tightness in the steady state from the
relationship θ = q/φ (see Table 3.3 for implied parameter and steady state values).
We use the data on gross replacement rates (GRR) from the OECD Benefits and
Wages: Statistics in order to obtain the unemployment benefit ratios of both regions
and calibrate bi by setting the steady state value of b/(wh) equal to the GRR values
in 2003.14 The data on employers’ and employees’ tax rates on wages (τ f , τ d) as
well as the consumption tax rate τ c stem from several OECD publications (see Table
3.2). The parameters for the matching efficiency χ are calibrated using the steady
state relationships of the two countries in 2003. The same applies to the parameters
κn and κu that relate to the impact of leisure on utility. In the next subsection,
we provide a more detailed discussion on the heterogeneity in our calibration of
Germany and the euro area. Note that this heterogeneity is also accompanied by
differences in the exogenously given job separation rate. The steady state condition
derived from equation (3.7) implies s = φ(1−N)/N . This yields job separation rates
of s1 = 0.018 and s2 = 0.034 in our model calibrated to 2003 values, which are in
line with empirical estimates (see Hobijn and S¸ahin, 2009, Gartner et al., 2012 or
Kohlbrecher et al., 2013).
3.3.2 The Impact of the Reforms in Germany
In contrast to many other countries, the German labour market performed remark-
ably well during and in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009. Table
3.2 summarises a few telling observations. First, between 2003 and 2010, the unem-
ployment rate increased by 1.1 percentage points in the EA (including Germany),
14 The OECD GRR data consist of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance benefits and do
not take into account tax and social security contributions on earnings and benefits. Furthermore, the
GRR data are based on three different household types. They are a weighted average of the payments
over the first five years of unemployment with the first year being weighted more heavily.
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whereas it decreased by 2.7 percentage points in Germany. Second, the job find-
ing probability increased by roughly 3 percentage points in both regions.15 Third,
the unemployment benefit ratio decreased by more than 10 percentage points in
Germany, whereas it stayed constant in the rest of the EA-12 during the period
2003-2010. Fourth, the three tax rates that we focus on in this study stayed roughly
constant over time in both Germany and the euro area. Note, however, that Ger-
many differs significantly from the average of the remaining EA-12 countries in this
respect, particularly in terms of labour taxation. In addition, recall from Section 3.1
that studies by Fahr and Sunde (2009), Klinger and Rothe (2012) and Hertweck and
Sigrist (2013) found a significant increase in the matching efficiency as a consequence
of the reform package.
The foregoing numbers suggest that a large portion of the strong labour market
performance of Germany might be traced back to the increase in the matching effi-
ciency due to the reform laws called Hartz I-III and the decline in the unemployment
benefit ratio due to the last reform law, Hartz IV. Therefore, we ask in this subsec-
tion to what extent the changes in these two parameters can explain the evolution of
several variables in Germany between 2003 and 2010 and whether they generate the
undesirable effects put forth by critics of the Hartz reforms. The spillover effects of
the reforms on other EA members as well as the effects on Germany’s trade balance
are deferred to the next section.
Before we present the results from our quantitative experiments, we find it useful
to have a look at the first column of Table 3.4 which summarises the evolution in
selected variables over the period 2003-2010. We observe that total hours worked
increased by 2.9% in Germany over this period. This increase resulted from the
increase in employment by 5.0% and occurred despite the decline in average hours
worked per worker of 1.9%. At the same time, real wages stagnated to a large extent
and increased by merely 0.7% over the 8-year period. Furthermore, the increase
in GDP between 2003 and 2010 was with 8.6% much higher than the increase in
consumption which amounted only to 3.6% and was therefore labelled consumption
dampening in the introduction. Finally, the terms of trade of Germany in comparison
to its EA neighbours declined by 4.9%, computed as the ratio of GDP deflators
between Germany and the EA.16
15 Note that the average length of unemployment may decrease in times of crisis thus increasing the job
finding probability because of a strong increase in the number of short-term unemployed.
16 Using the ratio of consumer price indices yields a growth rate of -1.9%.
60 3 The German Labour Market Reforms in a European Context: A DSGE Analysis
Table 3.4. Percentage Change in Selected Variables between 2003 and 2010
Germany EA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Data χ2 ↑ b2 ↓ χ2 ↑ χ2 ↑ b2 ↓ χ2 ↑
b2 ↓ b2 ↓
Nh 2.91 1.04 1.36 2.20 0.01 0.02 0.03
N 4.95 1.73 1.81 3.28 0.02 0.03 0.05
U -2.73 -1.56 -1.63 -2.96 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
φ 3.09 6.59 6.98 15.10 0.05 0.06 0.10
h -1.95 -0.67 -0.44 -1.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
w 0.70 0.34 -0.86 -0.39 0.12 0.16 0.26
Y 8.57 0.92 1.20 1.94 0.14 0.18 0.28
C 3.56 0.99 0.42 1.35 0.37 0.49 0.78
I 7.16 0.68 0.89 1.44 0.37 0.48 0.78
TOT -4.86 -0.78 -1.01 -1.63
Data source for the first column: OECD.Stat database.
Notes: The reported change is absolute for U and φ, and relative for the remaining variables.
Terms of trade are calculated as ratio of CPIs.
In the following, we discuss the effects of an increase in the matching efficiency
and a decrease in the unemployment benefit ratio first separately and then jointly
to uncover the mechanisms at work and to highlight the consequences of the inter-
actions of the two measures. We pay attention to the long-run effects of the reforms
as well as to their short-run effects, since the latter also take centre stage in debates
on the implementation of structural reforms. Indeed, structural reforms may incur
costs for states as well as for some groups in the society which may hinder their
implementation in practice, although their long-run benefits may by far exceed the
short-run costs. Another question of interest related to short-run effects is how long
it takes for structural reforms to take effect.
Increasing the Matching Efficiency
In our first exercise, we increase the matching efficiency parameter by 20% in Ger-
many. This is an intermediate value between the lowest estimate of 10% reported
by Fahr and Sunde (2009) and Klinger and Rothe (2012) and the upper bound of
31% provided by Hertweck and Sigrist (2013). Starting out with the parametrisation
of Germany and the EA as described above for 2003, the adjustment paths of the
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Notes: Red-dashed (blue-solid) line shows the adjustment in Germany (EA) after a 20% increase
in the matching efficiency parameter χ of Germany. The initial parametrisation follows from the
values for Germany and the EA in 2003 given in Table 3.2.
Fig. 3.1. Increasing the Matching Efficiency
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selected variables of both economies are illustrated in Figure 3.1. The corresponding
equilibrium effects can be found in the second column of Table 3.4.
The efficiency increase in matching means that for given levels of vacancies and
unemployment more people are hired by firms. Hence, after a slight increase on im-
pact firms reduce their steady-state vacancy level by 15.7%. Since the equilibrium
output rises by slightly less than 1%, the share of vacancy filling costs of firms in na-
tional output declines from 1.5% to 1.3%. At the same time, unemployed agents find
a job more easily for a given level of vacancies lowering the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate in Germany to a new level of 8.3%. Consequently, with a non-increasing
labour force in our model world, the German employment is predicted to grow by
1.7% in the long run.
With the job finding probability rising by 6.6 percentage points to 38.1% and
complete income insurance, the working members of the household slightly decrease
their average hours worked by 0.7%, i.e., the income effect dominates, and the hourly
wages hence go up by 0.3% in the long run. It is eye-catching that wages exhibit a
non-monotonic behaviour after the reform in contrast to other variables. After an
initial rise following the reform, they decline due to the drop in vacancies in the
first six quarters, but rise again thereafter due to the consumption-hours worked
substitution effect.
The combined effect of the changes in employment and hours worked per employee
on total hours worked amounts to an increase of 1.0%. Since the increase in wages is
accompanied by a decline in hours worked per employee of roughly the same order
and the level of unemployment benefits is fixed, however, the unemployment benefit
ratio is hardly affected by the increase in the matching efficiency. Note that even
though hourly wages rise by 0.3%, the total wage earnings of an employee (wh)
decrease by 0.7% in comparison to the former steady state because of the lower
number of hours worked. Nevertheless, the total wage income of the representative
household (Nwh) increases by 1.4%, since more members of the household find a
job in the new steady state.
Finally, output and consumption respectively increase by 0.9% and 1.0% in the
long run following the matching efficiency increase. That the consumption increases
by slightly more than output in percentage terms reflects the fact that some of the
resources that are set free from search activity can be channelled to private consump-
tion. These results imply that the first part of the Hartz reform package tackling
the matching efficiency did not cause wage restraint or consumption dampening. In
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Notes: Red-dashed (blue-solid) line shows the adjustment in Germany (EA) after a 10.35% decline
in the unemployment benefit of Germany. The initial parametrisation follows from the values for
Germany and the EA in 2003 given in Table 3.2.
Fig. 3.2. Decreasing the Unemployment Benefits
contrast, wages increase even stronger than labour productivity as a result of the
matching efficiency increase in our model.
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Decreasing the Unemployment Benefit Ratio
While the increase in the matching efficiency reduces the frictions in the labour
market and thus facilitates higher output and consumption levels, the impact of
the second policy reform that we now analyse, the decline in the unemployment
benefit ratio by 10.35 percentage points, impacts directly on the labour supply and
reduces the outside option of workers in the Nash bargaining and thus ultimately
their wages. Note that the unemployment benefit ratio is not a parameter that
we control directly. Therefore, what we do in our exercise is to compute a new
unemployment benefit level (b) that is obtained by imposing the unemployment
benefit ratio of 2010 in Table 3.2 on total wage per employee (wh) as computed
with our initial calibration with 2003 values for Germany.17 So we decrease the
unemployment benefit ratio based on 2003 total wages by 10.35%. Total wages per
employee (wh) decline, however, by 1.3% as a result of this reform at the new steady
state. Therefore, the effective decline in the unemployment benefit ratio at the new
steady state reads 10.1 percentage points.
The unemployment effects of this reform are similar to the effects of the reforms
that increased the matching efficiency on many accounts as an inspection of Figure
3.2 and column (3) of Table 3.4 shows. The unemployment rate declines to 8.2%,
accompanied by a 1.8% increase in employment, in the long run. Thereby, the dete-
rioration in the outside option of workers, which directly impacts on the bargaining
outcome through the relationship in equation (3.26), is the main factor behind the
falling wages and corresponding increase in the labour demand. The decline in the
unemployment benefit ratio induces more unemployed agents to work at the steady
state to compensate for the decline in their income. The subsequent decline in wages
generates a negative substitution effect on the hours worked of agents in employ-
ment.18 This leads firms to post 40% more vacancies than at the former steady state
on impact and 24.4% more in the long run. Consequently, hirings rise by 1.8% and
the job finding probability increases to 38.5% at the new steady state.
17 One possibility would be to endogenize the unemployment benefit instead of fixing it to a certain value
as, e.g.,
bit = rriwithit,
where rri stand for the replacement ratio in country i. Such a modification of the model leads, however,
to an implausibly high volatility in the unemployment benefit level as it adjusts to changes in current
wages (w) and hours worked per employee (h). Fixing the unemployment benefit ratio only at the steady
state is, on the other hand, more successful in reflecting the data.
18 On impact average hours worked rise to compensate the unanticipated reform shock given that employ-
ment decisions are predetermined.
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The total hours worked increases more strongly, by 1.4%, after the decline in
unemployment benefits than after the increase in the matching efficiency. As to the
total income of the households from wages and unemployment benefits, the increase
in equilibrium employment does not compensate for the decline in the hourly wages
and unemployment benefit level, the total wage and unemployment benefit before-
tax income (Nwh+ (1−N) b) being 1.9% lower at the new steady state than at the
former steady state.
Despite the significant positive impact of the decline in the unemployment benefit
on employment, output is only weakly affected by the reform in the short run,
since labour and capital are predetermined and the later adjusts only gradually.
Consumption declines by 0.4% on impact, although it steeply rises in the periods
afterwards and eventually approaches its new steady state level which is 0.4% higher
than its previous steady state level. Thus, households postpone consumption for the
sake of investment, which is needed to rise the capital stock and ensure a higher
output and consumption level later on. The long-run increase in the output level
after the decline in the unemployment benefits is with 1.2%, three times as large as
the increase in consumption in terms of percentage points. Hence, in contrast to the
reform targeting the matching efficiency, a stand-alone reduction of unemployment
benefits leads to gaps between the growth of labour productivity and wages as well
as output and consumption. The consumption dampening is of a similar size in
relative terms as in the data, whereas the wage restraint driven by the reduction
in the unemployment benefit ratio is much less pronounced in our model than in
reality.
Increasing the Matching Efficiency and Decreasing the Unemployment Benefit
Ratio Simultaneously
We now introduce the two reforms simultaneously in the model in order to see
to what extent they can account for the changes we observe in the data. Before
we discuss the quantitative results of this exercise, it is apposite to note that the
reforms were not introduced simultaneously in reality. The first three Hartz reforms
increasing the matching efficiency were launched in 2003 and 2004 in pieces, while
the last Hartz reform package decreasing the unemployment benefit ratio came in
2005. Moreover, it might be convenient to assume that particularly the measures
increasing the matching efficiency manifested themselves gradually over time. Yet,
we reckon that these observations should not have a serious impact on the message
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Notes: Red-dashed (blue-solid) line shows the adjustment in Germany (EA) after a 20% increase
in the matching efficiency parameter χ and a 10.35% decline in the unemployment benefit of
Germany. The initial parametrisation follows from the values for Germany and the EA in 2003
given in Table 3.2.
Fig. 3.3. Increasing the Matching Efficiency and Decreasing Unemployment Bene-
fits Simultaneously
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of this study, since the findings of Fahr and Sunde (2009), who use data merely
until the end of 2004, point to a very quick realisation of matching efficiency gains
following the reforms. Finally, introducing the matching efficiency gradually to the
model would require arbitrary assumptions about the diffusion of the effects of the
first reform component, since that phenomenon is not directly observable in the
data.
Another issue is the timing of the reforms: there were two years between the
introduction of Hartz I and Hartz IV. As has already been reported above for the
stand-alone reform components, the adjustment to the new equilibrium after reforms
takes place within a period of 2-3 years for most of the variables so that our compar-
ison of equilibrium change with the change in the data over an 8-year period would
hardly be affected. As to the short-run dynamics, if we let the unemployment benefit
reduction occur 8 quarters (i.e. 2 years) after the matching efficiency increase, the
dynamics would be identical to Figure 3.1 in the first 8 quarters and then a jump
would occur due to the introduction of the matching efficiency reforms which would
be qualitatively similar to the dynamics in Figure 3.2. All in all, the adjustment
dynamics would take 5-6 years to converge to the new equilibrium to a large extent
for most variables, but the message of our study would hardly be affected by the
sequential introduction of the reforms.
The quantitative effects of our exercise are shown in Figure 3.3 and column (4) of
Table 3.4. When the reforms are introduced simultaneously, their combined effects
are not equal to the sum of their individual effects, as a comparison of the sum of the
second and third columns of the same table with the numbers in the fourth column
suggests. The summed effects of the two separately conducted reforms is larger than
the effects of the combined reforms in column (4), which points to the existence
of some nonlinearities when the two reforms are introduced simultaneously.19 For
example, whereas the stand-alone increase in the matching efficiency and the reduc-
tion in unemployment benefit ratio respectively lead to a 1.56 and a 1.63 percentage
point drop in the unemployment rate, making up a total of 3.19 percentage points,
the simultaneous introduction of both reform components decreases the unemploy-
ment rate by 2.96 percentage points in equilibrium. Recall that the studies on the
effects of Hartz reforms reviewed in Section 3.1, which investigate the impact of the
Hartz IV reform only, point to an unemployment rate reduction in the range of 2.8%
19 Since the size of the individual reform effects depend on the initial level of the economy, interaction
effects arise when at least two reforms packages are launched simultaneously.
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to 35%. For comparison, our finding of 2.96 percentage points reduction due to the
entire Hartz reform package follows from an initial unemployment rate 9.81% and
hence suggests a 30% reduction in the unemployment rate.20
The dynamic response to the combined reforms, shown in Figure 3.3 points to
the meaningfulness of introducing reforms jointly and the importance of timing. The
immediate decline in German consumption by 0.4% after a 10.35% decline in the
unemployment benefit may render the implementation of that reform alone rather
difficult, although the long-run consumption increase is 0.5% and the consumption
level exceeds its before-reform steady-state level already one year after the reform.
Nevertheless, if the unemployment benefit reform is introduced simultaneously with
the matching efficiency reforms, the immediate impact on consumption is virtually
zero and increases gradually following the initial reform period. If we allow for a gap
between the introduction of the two reforms, after an initial increase consumption
would drop at the point in time where unemployment benefits are reduced and then
rise again, but never fall below its initial steady state level. In terms of government
budget, on the other hand, both reforms swell the German government coffers as
the increase in transfers to households indicate. Thus, such type of reforms could
even be desirable at times where government debt levels do not allow other measures
that would incur costs for the government budget. With respect to investment in
Germany, we observe that the simultaneous introduction of both reforms reduces
domestic investment at impact, although it increases significantly in the long run as
illustrated in Figure 3.4.
As to the speed of adjustment to the new equilibrium after reforms, we can differ-
entiate three groups of variables. First, job finding probability and unemployment
benefit share adjust immediately after the introduction of reforms, both at home and
abroad. Second, labour market variables—unemployment, vacancies, employment,
average hours worked and total hours worked—come very close to their new equi-
librium values after the reforms within roughly two years. This suggests that labour
market reforms of the Hartz type lead to a relatively fast adjustment in terms of
(un)employment. This result is in accordance with the findings of Krause and Uhlig
(2012). Third, the adjustment of the remaining variables takes much longer than the
ones in the aforementioned two groups. In particular, the very slow adjustment of
20 The introduction of the Hartz IV reform, i.e., unemployment benefit reduction, in our framework alone
would lead to a 16.6% reduction in the unemployment rate, which is roughly in the middle of the
corresponding values reported in the literature.
3.3 The Impact of the German Hartz Reforms 69
10 20 30 40
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Capital stock
Quarters
%
10 20 30 40
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
Investment
Quarters
%
Notes: Red-dashed (blue-solid) line shows the adjustment in Germany (EA) after a 20% increase
in the matching efficiency parameter χ and a 10.35% decline in the unemployment benefit of
Germany. The initial parametrisation follows from the values for Germany and the EA in 2003
given in Table 3.2.
Fig. 3.4. Increasing the Matching Efficiency and Decreasing Unemployment Bene-
fits Simultaneously: Investment and Capital
the trade balance and of net foreign assets (see Figure 3.6 in the next subsection) is
responsible for the slow adjustment of output and consumption. It should be noted,
however, that a large part of the adjustment in the latter variables occurs within
the horizon of the first two years, in which the labour market almost completes its
long-run adjustment to the reforms. The rest of the adjustment in output and con-
sumption has to do with the build up of the capital stock and the accumulation and
liquidation of international bonds, is quantitatively small and occurs very slowly
over the long run.
A striking observation is that the model gets the qualitative changes, i.e., sign
changes, in the data correct following the two reforms, as a comparison of columns
(1) and (4) in Table 3.4 suggests. The only exception to this assessment is the change
in the wage rate, which increased by 0.7% in the data and decreases by 0.4% in our
calculations. This is due to the absence of factors that we did hitherto not take into
account as we discuss below. All in all, our quantitative model suggests that these
two reforms are able to explain a large portion of what happened in the German data
between 2003 and 2010. The estimate of our model of the change in employment
(hours worked per employee) is, for example, 3.3% (-1.1%), whereas it happens to
be 5.0% (-1.9%) in the data. The total hours worked, which increase by 2.2% due
to the two reforms in the model, increased by 2.9% in the data.
As to the output and consumption, the percentage increase in output was 8.6%,
more than twice as large as the percentage increase in consumption in the data. Ac-
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cording to the model estimates, however, the long-run increase in output is expected
to be only 44% larger than the increase in consumption. Furthermore, the model
underestimates the increase in output (consumption) by 6.8 (2.2) percentage points.
Thus, our benchmark calibration suggests, the Hartz reforms led to a less vigorous
growth of consumption in comparison to output, i.e., consumption dampening can
partially be attributed to the Hartz reforms. Whereas the percentage increase in
output is higher than the consumption increase by a factor of 2.4 in the data, it is
higher by a factor of merely 1.4 with our benchmark calibration.
With respect to the gap between the growth in labour productivity and wages,
the combined reforms lead only to a very small discrepancy: a 0.3% decrease in
productivity faces a 0.4% drop in wages. In the data we observe an increase of
productivity of 5.7% against a 0.7% rise in wages. Hence, our exercise suggests
that the combined Hartz reforms cannot be a significant factor behind the observed
wage restraint in the data. Nevertheless, we observe that the two components of the
Hartz reforms have quite different implications in this regard. A stand-alone reform
increasing the matching efficiency by 20% would lead to an equilibrium real wage
gain of 0.3% vis-a`-vis a labour productivity decline of 0.1%. In other words, the
matching efficiency component of the reforms has a dampening effect on the wage
restraint.21 A stand-alone unemployment benefit ratio reduction of 10.35 percentage
points, in contrast, would reduce equilibrium wages by 0.9% and labour productivity
by 0.2%. Hence, although the latter reform component would contribute somewhat
to the wage restraint, its contribution would be just a small portion of what is
observed in the data.
The model overestimates the decline in the unemployment rate: it falls to 6.9%
after the introduction of the two reforms according to the model, while it declined to
7.1% in 2010 in reality. Note furthermore that there exists an inconsistency between
our model and the reality in this context. While we overestimate to decline in the
unemployment (rate), we do not overestimate the increase in the employment level
with our model.22 This suggests that demographic factors as well as in- and outflows
to and from the potential workforce may also have played a role in shaping the
active working age population in the period of interest. Moreover, the 2009 global
financial and economic crisis may have affected the labour market disproportionately
21 If we consider the lower bound of estimates w.r.t. the increase in the matching efficiency the dampening
effect turns out somewhat weaker.
22 Recall that U for both the unemployment level and unemployment rate due to the normalisation of the
entire workforce in our model.
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negatively despite the anti-crisis measures of the German government. We abstract
from such effects in the analysis.
Additionally, to isolate the effects triggered by the labour market reforms, we
have abstracted from developments in total factor productivity (TFP) in our anal-
ysis, which are taken to be the main driving force of long-run growth in standard
models such as King et al. (1988). In these models, growing variables such as out-
put, consumption, investment, wages and labour productivity share the same trend
growth rate, while employment (and hence unemployment) are stationary and do
not exhibit a time trend. Turning to the OECD.Stat database with this insight, we
observe that the German multi-factor productivity—i.e., TFP—increased by 4.4%
over the period 2003-2010. Adding 4.4 percentage points to the predictions for the
corresponding variables in column (4) of Table 3.4, the gap between the data and
our model predictions for output, consumption and investment would diminish to
a large extent and the sign of the change in wages would become correct. But we
would overshoot the increase in wages by 3.3 and in consumption by 2.2 percentage
points, thus even decreasing the relative size of the growth gap between output and
consumption as well as labour productivity and wages.
With respect to social welfare, our evaluation can only make a limited contribu-
tion as the model does not contain distributional aspects which are of detrimental
importance as Krebs and Scheffel (2013) reveal. Our model predicts that aggregate
steady-state welfare rises in both countries. In Germany as well as in the EA, this
result is driven by the increase in consumption as well as by the reduction in aver-
age hours work which imply more utility from leisure combined with the increase in
employment.23
To sum up, our calibrated model points to significant effects on German em-
ployment, output, consumption and wages induced by the increase in the matching
efficiency and the decline in the unemployment benefit ratio together with the TFP
growth as observed in the data. Yet, the disproportional increase in output in com-
parison to consumption and in labour productivity in comparison to real wages in
the data can only partly be accounted for by the Hartz reforms according to our find-
ings. We address the remaining discrepancies in Section 4.5 and argue that factors
other than labour market reforms are likely to have been responsible for them.
23 In addition to steady-state welfare, we calculated life-time welfare, i.e. taking the adjustment path into
account. The results differ only to a negligible extent.
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3.3.3 International Spillovers
Having discussed the effects of labour market reforms on the German economy, the
focus of this section moves to the spillover effects on the outside world, i.e., in our
case on the euro area neighbours which may also be reinterpreted as rest of the world
since our baseline calibration with κ = 0.7 reflects Germany’s import relationship
with the rest of the world. When our two reforms take effect simultaneously, the
long-run increase in EA output is 0.28% as shown in column (7) of Table 3.4.24 The
impact on the EA consumption of 0.78% is stronger than the impact on output.
These effects are driven mainly by the terms-of-trade channel and follow partly
from the existence of international capital markets as we show in the following.
International spillovers are triggered by changes in the terms of trade TOTt in
our framework, similar to Dao (2013a). Following the German reforms, the output
in Germany increases, which induces a reduction in the relative price of the German
good. The combined long-run effect on the terms of trade of Germany, when the
reforms are introduced simultaneously, is a decline of 1.63%. Note that the decrease
is in line with what is reported for the change in the German terms of trade vis-a`-vis
EA in the data, see the first column of Table 3.4. The higher valuation of the EA
good increases the surplus to be shared between firms and workers through Nash
bargaining and has positive employment and output effects on the euro area. It
should be noted, however, that the labour market effects of the German reforms on
its EA neighbours are rather limited: employment in the EA hardly moves in the
short run and increases negligibly by 0.05% in the long run, thus being two orders of
magnitude smaller than the effects observed in Germany. Furthermore, in the short
run there are opposing effects which are, however, of very small size: the adjustment
in employment, vacancies and output is negative in the first two quarters, whereas
the negative effects in wages and transfers reverse after about two years.
As indicated by equation (3.13), the decline in the terms of trade of Germany
manifests itself as a decline in the prices P c1t and P
c
2t of the composite consumption
goods of both regions as shown in the first graph of Figure 3.5. Not surprisingly, the
households of both regions increase the amount of the German good that goes into
their composite consumption good as the second and third graphs of the same figure
illustrate. The amount of the EA good in the consumption good of both countries,
24 Just to put the numbers into context, 0.28% of German (rest of EA-12) GDP amounts to 6.99 (18.30)
billion EUR in 2010.
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on the other hand, decreases slightly in the first periods after the joint reforms,
whereas it also increases in both regions in the long run.
With the same logic as for consumption, the decline in the German terms of trade
renders investments in both German and EA economies cheaper.25 This leads to an
increase in investment and hence accumulation of more capital in both regions after
the reforms as has already been illustrated in Figure 3.4. Note that the increase in the
German capital stock also partly occurs thanks to the existence of the international
bond market. Whereas none of the countries holds any bonds at the steady state in
our two-country world, the favourable macroeconomic conditions that follow from
reforms in the German economy motivates EA households to save some of their gain
from German reforms and buy German bonds with those savings which in turn are
used for increasing German firms’ capital stock even further in the middle run. This
is reflected in the negative, albeit small, trade balance of the German economy in
the first 5-6 years after the introduction of the reforms. It turns slightly positive
after that period and approaches gradually zero in the very long run. Thereby, the
German net foreign asset position as a share of GDP improves gradually, reaching
a share of -0.5% about 6 years after the introduction of the reforms as illustrated in
Figure 3.6. These assets are liquidated very slowly after that peak and are mainly
25 Note that there is no distinction between consumption and investment goods within each country in
our model world, i.e. there is only one good with price P cit.
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Fig. 3.6. Increasing the Matching Efficiency and Decreasing Unemployment Bene-
fits Simultaneously: Trade Balance and Net Foreign Assets
used for building capital in the euro area. In the long run, the capital stock in the
EA increases by a significant 0.8%, which is more than half of the relative increase
in the German capital stock of 1.4%.
In a nutshell, we find positive spillovers of domestic labour market reforms to
foreign output, consumption, investment and wages. With Germany being very open
(κ = 0.7), its trade partners benefit from an increase in consumption which is more
than half the amount of the effect observed in Germany. Spillover effects with respect
to unemployment or hours worked are, however, very limited in absolute terms and
about two orders of magnitude smaller than the effects in Germany.
3.3.4 Comparison with the Literature and Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we start by comparing our spillover results with the existing
literature. Then, we turn our attention to the impact of a few parameters that
might influence the quantitative results significantly if set to different values than we
used in our baseline scenario, namely the parameters κ and η subsuming household
preferences with respect to the consumption bundle and the share of vacancy posting
costs in GDP ωV
Y
determining ωi. While the size of κ depends on the interpretation
of the two-country setup, whether to capture Germany’s overall openness to trade or
just its openness towards its EA-12 neighbours, η is a parameter which is relatively
hard to measure. Both κ and η are expected to affect the size of spillovers through
the trade channel. ω directly affects the size of the impact of labour market reforms
by influencing the vacancy posting behaviour of firms. In Table 3.5 we summarise
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the reform-induced changes in the steady-state values under different scenarios and
compare them with our baseline calibration in column (1), where κ = 0.7 and η = 1
and ωV
Y
= 0.015.
Comparison with the Literature on Spillovers
As pointed out in the literature review in Section 3.1, size and sign of spillovers
are influenced by modelling and parametrisation choices. Since we model trade as
intra-industry trade and allow for labour market frictions, income effects outweigh
competitiveness effects in our model and spillovers are positive in the long run
by construction. In the following, we discuss further crucial modelling assumptions
which may affect the size of spillovers. Then, we turn our attention to the sensitivity
of our quantitative results.
With respect to the size of spillovers, Felbermayr et al. (2012) find that a static
multi-country trade model with heterogeneous firms and search-and-matching un-
employment underestimates the relatively large spillover effects found in the data.
While in their empirical analysis spillover effects to employment are one order of
magnitude smaller than the effects in the reforming countries, their theoretical model
implies effects which are about two orders of magnitude smaller, similar to our model
or Dao (2013a). Therefore, the authors introduce completely rigid real wages into
their model and observe that spillovers of reforms to the foreign country in terms
of unemployment can become almost half as large as in the home country. The in-
crease in spillovers with rigid wages results from the fact that quantities are adjusted
much stronger due to a lack of adjustment possibilities through wages. Yet, in our
dynamic model, any degree of real wage rigidity with the exception of perfectly rigid
wages has no impact on the equilibrium effects of reforms if wages can be adjusted
in the long run. Assuming perfectly rigid wages for Germany or the EA countries,
however, seems exaggerated as the duration of standard collective wage agreements
in Germany amounts to 1-2 years.
Dao (2013b) highlights that reform effects can also be transmitted through the
interplay of national inflation and a common monetary policy. In her model, she
finds that the short-term response to an average tax cut is abated in the reforming
country and amplified abroad by the introduction of price rigidities and monetary
policy. Hence, nominal rigidities do not alter long-term effects but could dampen
incentives to reform because of lower benefits at home directly after the reform and
stronger (involuntary) export of benefits to the foreign country.
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Furthermore, the relative country size may influence the size of spillovers. Fel-
bermayr et al. (2013) find that the spillover effects of domestic labour market insti-
tutions are the larger, the larger the relative size of the home country. Our model
implies that Germany and the rest of the EA-12 are of equal size. In consequence,
spillovers are supposed to become smaller if country size is taken into account in our
setting as Germany constitutes less than 30% of the EA-12. Additionally, as pointed
out by Kose and Yi (2006) bilateral trade linkages between two countries, say Ger-
many and France, are much smaller than between Germany and the EA or the world.
Therefore, spillover effects of the German reforms to single countries are supposed
to be smaller than to the aggregate. Furthermore, there could be third-country ef-
fects if the German labour market reforms do not affect all trading partners to the
same extent. This implies that terms of trade across these countries might change
as well and create additional positive or negative effects. In Chapter 4 we tackle
this issue in a three-country framework comparable to Kose and Yi (2006) which is
able to represent the difference between overall openness to trade and bilateral link-
ages adequately. Note, however, that Everaert and Schule (2008) as well as Gomes
et al. (2012), by means of large scale multi-country models, find effects similar to the
two-country model literature following labour market reforms, namely small positive
spillovers.
Differences in the Preferences of the Consumption Good Composition
The choice of the home-bias parameter κ in the country-specific composite consump-
tion goods as well as the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic
goods η both have a quantitative impact on the responses of domestic and foreign
output, consumption, investment and wages to reforms. In contrast, labour market
variables as well as the qualitative results described in the foregoing subsections are
not altered. The parameters κ and η basically determine how the ‘cake’—the benefits
in terms of economic outcome resulting from the reforms in the home country—is
divided up between the foreign and domestic economies. The stronger the home-
bias, i.e., the higher κ and the higher the elasticity parameter η, the less the foreign
country participates in the reform effects. In the first alternative scenario, we set
1 − κ = 1 − 0.88 which corresponds to the average German import share from its
EA-12 neighbours in the past decade (in contrast to our baseline scenario where we
considered its import share from the rest of the world). For η there is no observable
empirical counterpart available and estimates by Hooper et al. (2000) of the income
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and price elasticities of exports and imports in the G7 on data till 1994 lie in a broad
range from 0.8 to 2.3. Therefore, we alternatively consider a relatively low value of
0.85 suggested by Corsetti et al. (2008) and a higher value of 1.5 which has often
been used in international real business cycle models starting with Backus et al.
(1994).
If we increase κ to 0.88, i.e., the preference for the share of the domestic good
in the foreign consumption bundle is weaker (and stronger in the domestic bundle),
foreign consumers profit less strongly (and domestic consumers accordingly more
strongly) from the price reduction in domestic goods as a result of the reforms than
in the baseline scenario (see column (2) of Table 3.5). This goes along with the fact
that the drop in terms of trade TOTt after the reforms is stronger with higher κ and
the adjustment in the trade balance is slower and of a smaller size. In addition, the
adjustment through the international bond market occurs more slowly, leading to a
weaker (stronger) increase in investment and capital abroad (at home).
Lower values of η imply that consumers in both countries are more prone to ad-
justing the composition of their final consumption good in response to exogenous
impulses in the economy. Hence, the EA neighbours demand even more of the Ger-
man and their own good after the joint reforms accompanied by a stronger drop in
prices. In consequence, terms of trade deteriorate more strongly with a lower elas-
ticity and adjustments in the trade balance (TB) and the net foreign asset position
(NFA) occur more slowly and are smaller compared to the baseline scenario. For
η = 0.85 the TB and NFA of the EA are even negative in the first two and six
quarters, respectively. This reflects the fact that a lower elasticity implies stronger
adjustment in the composite consumption and investment goods in Germany in the
period of the reform, since German firms cannot adjust the labour input immediately
and therefore post more vacancies on impact than at the new steady-state level. In
the long run, output and consumption grow weaker at home and rise considerably
stronger abroad. The opposite applies to the high elasticity case (see column (4) of
Table 3.5). The adjustments in the labour market at home in terms of employment,
hours worked or unemployment after the reforms are hardly effected by changes in
the preference parameters. In contrast, abroad a higher home bias of κ = 0.88 or
higher elasticity of substitution η = 1.5 shrinks the already small spillover effects
to unemployment/employment found for the baseline calibration even further. In
addition, choosing higher values for these parameters implies a smaller gap between
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output and consumption growth than in the baseline case at home. The gap between
productivity and wage growth is not affected.
Lower Vacancy Posting Costs
With our choice of ωV
Y
= 0.015 we are close to the upper bound of vacancy posting
cost shares used in the literature, which seems justifiable for European economies
vis-a`-vis the US calibration used in most studies. Nevertheless, the broad range
of values used by other authors for the US and the missing empirical evidence
for the German and the European case require testing for sensitivity with respect
to ωV
Y
. Table 3.5 includes in column (5) the implied changes in the steady state
values due to reforms when the ratio of total vacancy posting costs to output is
fixed to 1% as in Hairault (2002). If firms are faced with lower costs, they post
more vacancies in response to the combined reforms, more hirings occur and the
unemployment rate shrinks even stronger to 6.4% in Germany. This leads to higher
domestic output, consumption and total hours worked, while wages drop stronger
than in the baseline scenario. With a lower vacancy cost share, there is a slightly
larger gap between the development of labour productivity and wages as well as
output and consumption growth. However, the new parametrisation does by no
means change our previous conclusions on the contribution of the Hartz reforms to
wage moderation and consumption dampening. The amplified effects in the domestic
market spill over to the foreign economy through a stronger change in relative prices,
i.e., in terms of trade. Thus, we observe stronger increases in foreign output and
consumption as well as employment and job finding probability. This suggests that
in case the true costs of vacancy posting are lower than in our benchmark scenario,
reform effects would be larger for domestic as well as foreign countries. But the
relative size of the spillovers becomes only slightly larger than in the baseline case.
Even if we decrease ωV
Y
further to 0.5%, the implied change in employment abroad
makes up less than 2% of the effect observed in the home country.
3.3.5 Alternative Explanations
As pointed out in the introduction, dampened consumption relative to output, wage
restraint in the form of weaker growth of wages than labour productivity as well
as the persistent large current account and trade surpluses recently observed in
the German economy are often attributed to the Hartz reforms by critics. When
3.3 The Impact of the German Hartz Reforms 79
Table 3.5. Sensitivity Scenarios: Percentage in Selected Variables after Reforming
χ and b in Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Scenario Baseline κ = .88 η = .85 η = 1.5 ωV
Y
= 0.01
G
er
m
an
y
Nh 2.20 2.21 2.20 2.21 2.55
N 3.28 3.30 3.28 3.29 3.77
U -2.96 -2.98 -2.96 -2.97 -3.40
φ 15.10 15.21 15.06 15.17 18.52
h -1.05 -1.05 -1.04 -1.05 -1.18
w -0.39 -0.25 -0.44 -0.30 -0.54
Y 1.94 2.09 1.89 2.04 2.25
C 1.35 1.76 1.20 1.62 1.50
I 1.44 1.85 1.30 1.71 1.67
TOT -1.63 -1.92 -1.93 -1.07 -1.87
E
A
Nh 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04
N 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.06
U -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06
φ 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.12
h -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
w 0.26 0.12 0.31 0.17 0.30
Y 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.33
C 0.78 0.37 0.93 0.51 0.91
I 0.78 0.37 0.93 0.51 0.90
TOT -1.63 -1.92 -1.93 -1.07 -1.87
Notes: In the baseline scenario, κ = 0.7, η = 1 and ωV
Y
= 0.015. Percentage change in U und φ is
absolute, in all other variables relative.
our model is subjected solely to the Hartz reforms, however, it can only partially
account for the consumption dampening and the wage restraint while generating
a trade deficit in the short-to-middle run instead of a surplus, as we have seen in
the foregoing subsections. In this subsection, we discuss alternative explanations for
those phenomena which are not related to the labour market reforms.
We first turn our attention to the bargaining power of workers  which is another
criticial parameter in our model, particularly for labour market outcomes. Recent
literature suggests that globalisation has been one of the drivers of the decline in
union membership and thus lower bargaining power of unions (see, e.g., Dreher and
Gaston, 2007 and Abraham et al., 2009). In Europe, this trend has been further
strengthened by the eastward expansion of the European Union in 2004, which
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took place simultaneously with the Hartz reforms. In Germany, for example, trade
union density decreased from 25.3% to 18.6% in the period 1999 to 2010 according
to OECD data.26 Dustmann et al. (2014) describe the shift in the German union
landscape in detail. They argue that the changes have been at the heart of the
weak wage development in Germany and even contributed to the decrease in the
unemployment rate.
In order to explore the potential impact of the decline in the bargaining power
of the workers, we first introduce a permanent shock in Germany alone which shifts
the bargaining power of the firms  from 0.5 to 0.6. Both short-run and long-run
dynamics that accrue from this change are very similar to the dynamics that occur
after a stand-alone 10.35 percentage point reduction in unemployment benefits in
our model, for which reason we do not report any results from the new experiment
in tables or graphs. This should not be surprising, since reductions in both the
bargaining power paramater and unemployment benefits weaken workers’ ability to
impose their terms upon firms in the Nash bargaining process. Hence, the increase in
the bargaining power of firms further contributes to the explanation of consumption
dampening and wage restraint as does the unemployment benefit reduction, whereas
it does not lead to a surplus in the German trade balance at all.
In a second exercise, we impose a contemporaneous and persistent increase of  to
0.6 in both Germany and the rest of the euro area, since globalisation and eastward
expansion of the EU affected both of them. Nearly all EU countries registered a
decline in trade union density over the period 1999-2010 according to the OECD
data. When the bargaining power of firms rises to 0.6 in both Germany and the
rest of the euro area, the results for Germany as to most of the variables are very
similar to the previous exercise, where we increased  for Germany only. In the
upper panel of Figure 3.7, we report the adjustment of the variables pertaining to
the consumption dampening and wage restraint debate, which do not change much
in comparison to the previous exercise. Conspicuous differences exist, however, in
the adjustment of the terms of trade and the current account, which are reported
in the lower panel of Figure 3.7. The response of the terms of trade is still negative,
yet much smaller in absolute terms. Moreover, it shows a hump-shaped response
in contrast to the foregoing scenario. The German trade account exhibits a small
26 “Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members,
divided by the total number of wage and salary earners” citing the OECD Labour Force Statistics
website.
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Fig. 3.7. Decreasing the Bargaining Power of Workers
positive surplus of 0.1% of GDP in the first year following the increase in , which
disappears, however, from the second year on. However, the volume and persistency
of the surplus hardly matches the data which registers surpluses above 5% of the
GDP after 2005.
While our exercise concerning the change in the bargaining power of workers
is tentative due to the difficulty of measuring the value of the parameter in the
data, we believe that it provides valuable insights for our discussion.27 On the one
hand, we see the potential for the change in that parameter to further explain the
consumption dampening and the wage moderation; yet possibly not large enough
to close the gap between the model and the data. On the other hand, the decline
in the bargaining power of workers are unable to explain the large and persistent
German trade surpluses.
27 We recognise that the level of decline in the bargaining power as well as the exposure of countries to
globalisation vary a lot. Moreover, the change occurs not at once but gradually. Yet, these aspects are
hard to include in our current framework and are left to future studies.
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Therefore, we next review two recent studies which investigated the driving forces
of current account and/or trade surpluses (among others). In the first of these, Euro-
pean Commission (2012) economists, who study current account surpluses in the EU
by means of an estimated version of the QUEST model of Ratto et al. (2009), discuss
several hypotheses that could potentially explain the German trade surpluses. One
hypothesis is that competitiveness gains through wage restraint and labour market
reforms have been a major force behind the surpluses.28 Thereby, the authors im-
plicitly see the wage restraint solely as the product of labour market reforms29 and
emphasise that a decline in the relative unit labour costs has improved the trade
competitiveness of Germany relative to the rest of the euro area. However, their
results attribute only a moderate role to the wage restraint in the emergence of the
surpluses, while the Commission economists find the main drivers of the surpluses
to be (i) financial market integration and interest rate convergence in the euro area
leading to a narrowing of risk premia and thus net capital outflow from Germany
and correspondingly weakening domestic investment, (ii) strong world demand par-
ticularly for German capital goods as well as (iii) higher household savings due to
population aging accompanied by the introduction of a private pillar in the pension
system.
In another related paper, Estrada et al. (2013), who study patterns of conver-
gence and divergence in the euro area empirically, investigate the driving forces of
the current account among others. They find that relative price levels of tradable
goods do not show a strong relation with current account imbalances, whereas the
so-called non-price competitiveness factors do. Four non-price competitiveness fac-
tors stand out in explaining the current account performance: (i) goods markets
efficiency; (ii) the ability of entrepreneurs to adopt existing technologies to enhance
the productivity of industries; (iii) the quality of countries’ business networks and
supporting industries; and (iv) innovation capabilities. Estrada et al. (2013) find the
role of these factors to be more important than a reduction in wages for reducing
and sustaining current account deficits.
To sum up, both European Commission (2012) and Estrada et al. (2013) empha-
sise the importance of a number of non-competitiveness factors as potential driving
28 The Commission economists approximate the German labour market reforms by an exogenous labour
supply expansion and the reduction in the unemployment benefit ratio.
29 Note that our results contradict this view, even when we consider a reduction of the unemployment
benefit ratio complemented with a decline in the bargaining power of workers. In other words, our
analysis suggests the existence of other factors to fully explain the wage restraint.
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forces the German current account/trade surpluses. While those factors are out of
the scope of our analysis and not included in our model, they are useful potential
candidates to explain the gap particularly as to trade surpluses between our model
estimates and the data. The bottom line of this review for our study is that the
driving forces of surpluses are to be searched for in factors other than the Hartz
reforms.30
3.4 Conclusion
The still observable repercussions of the 2008-2009 global recession and the slow
adjustment in its aftermath, accompanied by monetary and fiscal policies that have
already reached their limits as growth stimulators, have put structural reforms on
top of the reform agenda of policy makers in many countries. Thereby, labour mar-
ket reforms feature a high priority, particularly in the European Union where un-
employment rates reached high levels in many member economies. In this context,
the conspicuous success of the German labour market reforms of 2003-2005—the
so-called Hartz reforms—in bringing down unemployment rates seems exemplary.
Yet, critics of the Hartz reforms often argue that the reforms had undesirable side
effects leading to a strong wage restraint and consumption dampening in Germany
accompanied by effects harming the country’s trade partners.
In the current chapter, the goal has been to check up on the validity of this
view by investigating the impact of the reform package on macroeconomic outcomes
both nationally and in terms of international spillovers. We chose a two-country
DSGE model with labour market frictions and intra-industry trade calibrated to
data for Germany and the rest of the euro area—Germany’s most important trade
partner—to this end.
Our findings show that increasing the matching efficiency and lowering unem-
ployment benefits in our model in line with the observed implications of the Hartz
reforms indeed lead to a drop in the unemployment rate of similar size as observed
in the data, but neither wage moderation nor consumption dampening are as strong
as observed in the data. While the matching efficiency increase does not produce
such effects at all, reducing the unemployment benefits indeed creates a gap between
30 Note that a very recent paper by Kollmann et al. (2014) comes to a different result attributing a partial
role to the labour market reforms as drivers of the current account surplus. However, their analysis
does not include non-price competitiveness factors. The main driver of the current account surplus are
according to their findings positive shocks to the German saving rate.
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wages and productivity growth and dampens domestic consumption relative to out-
put to a certain extent. Thus, we conclude that additional factors must have con-
tributed to these developments in the data. As we argue in this study, globalisation-
driven changes in the bargaining power of workers represent a prominent factor,
which could further explain the wage restraint and the dampened growth of domes-
tic consumption.
In addition, our model does not imply negative spillover effects from the Hartz
reforms to trade partners, but small positive effects with respect to unemployment,
and sizeable positive spillovers in terms of consumption and output in the long run.
These results are driven by modelling devices which are the most reasonable for an
analysis of the European countries: intra-industry-trade and labour market rigidities
accompanied by a fairly high unemployment rate. A further notable observation is
that neither the Hartz reforms nor the decline in the bargaining power of workers
seem to explain the large current account surpluses of Germany that came into
being after 2005. This is indeed in line with the latest findings, as our review of the
recent literature suggests, which reports non-price-competitiveness factors rather
than labour market reforms as the main driving forces of surpluses.
We find that the adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium takes place rather
quickly following the Hartz reforms, the adjustment for labour market variables
being almost entirely completed after 2-3 years. Other quantities such as output,
consumption and investment register a non-negligible part of their adjustment also
over such a short period; however, arriving at the new long-run equilibrium takes
much longer for these variables. This is due to consumption smoothing and the effects
of international resource-sharing on capital accumulation: both Germany and the
rest of the euro area increase their capital stock very slowly and gradually after
the reforms. The favourable effects of the reforms on production possibilities leads
the rest of the euro area to invest in German bonds in the first 7-8 years after the
reforms which are then driven down in order to increase own consumption.
Recall that we compared trends in the German data over the 8-year period 2003-
2010 with the change in equilibrium values in our model. A crucial aspect that
might affect our long-run comparisons and that we did not address in the model
is the 2008-2009 global financial and economic crisis. We reckon that the lack of
the global financial crisis in our model could partly explain its overshooting of the
drop in the unemployment rate when driven by the Hartz reforms. In this context,
it should be emphasised that the German government introduced a number of anti-
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crisis measures with a positive impact on labour market outcomes, discussed by e.g.
Faia et al. (2013) and Burda and Hunt (2011) among others. However, those were
measures that focused on evening out negative business cycle effects. While long-run
effects of the crisis is a contentious topic and is left to future studies, we reckon that
the inclusion of the crisis in our model would not lead to any significant changes in
our conclusions as to the relation of the Hartz reforms to the 2003-2010 trends in
the German macroeconomic data.
To sum up, our study suggests that the German Hartz reforms can only partially
explain the wage restraint and consumption dampening observed in the data and
do not lead to beggar-thy-neighbour effects on the trade partners that manifest
themselves as a decrease in employment, output or consumption and as large current
account surpluses of Germany. Moreover, we find that the effects of the reforms
depend on the institutional level of an economy and that there are non-negligible
interaction effects between reforms. Therefore, using the German reforms as best-
practice policy may not be advisable as institutions and initial conditions in the
labour markets differ across European countries.
Note that, while our model proves to be a useful tool for the analysis of the ag-
gregate effects of the Hartz reforms, it is not informative about distributional issues.
The findings of Krebs and Scheffel (2013) suggest that the reform of unemployment
benefits created losses in terms of lifetime consumption for the unemployed, whereas
employed persons gained. If these distributional issues are not tackled by the gov-
ernment, the reputation of such reforms in the public might be low, as it has been
the case in Germany.

4Spillover Effects of Labour Market Reforms in a
Three-Country World1
In contrast to the previous chapter, which builds on the classical two-country model
framework to discuss the international consequences of a national labour market
reform, the following study explicitly considers a three-country scenario. The main
reason behind the choice of this model structure is that it allows for indirect spillover
effects, which arise through an alteration in the economic link between two countries
after a reform in a third country. The analysis of the relevance of indirect effects, in
combination with direct effects, is at the heart of this chapter. As already discussed
in Chapter 1, the allowance for indirect effects could potentially increase the overall
size of the spillover or, on the flip side, switch its sign from positive to negative.
But the three-country framework has an additional advantage over the two-
country set-up: in the latter, the trade balance and net foreign asset position of
one country has always to be a perfect mirror image of the second country as the
country pair represents the world. A three-country model breaks this strong link be-
tween the single countries since effects in the first country do not necessarily trigger
effects in the second country. It allows to map bilateral and overall trade intensities
at the same time as highlighted by Kose and Yi (2006), and is thus the appropri-
ate framework to assess the size of bilateral spillover effects. This becomes evident
in the last part of the chapter, which provides an analysis of spillover effects for
various European countries. Even though the model is highly stylised, considerable
differences between the single countries emerge.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: in the next section, I describe the
model details and the baseline calibration of a symmetric three-country world. In
Section 4.2, I briefly summarise the effects triggered by a reform of the unemploy-
ment benefit ratio in a symmetrically calibrated model. Subsequently, I explain the
1 This chapter is based on a unpublished working paper (see Busl, 2014).
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mechanism and composition of the direct and indirect spillover effects. The theoret-
ical exposition is followed by a simulation-based analysis of the parameters driving
the size and direction of the spillover components. Finally, Section 4.3 provides an
exemplified analysis of the equilibrium effects and the dynamic responses to the Ger-
man reform for different European countries, namely France, Belgium and Austria.
Section 4.4 concludes.
4.1 The Model
This section summarises the model framework which is in many aspects identical to
the model described in Section 3.2. It builds on a standard international real business
cycle model enhanced by search and matching frictions in the labour market, an
international bond market and fiscal policy parameters. The main differences to the
previous model are that the world consists of three instead of two countries and
that countries are allowed to differ with respect to their size. These properties of the
model crystallise most importantly in the trade relations between countries. As in the
two-country version, each country specialises in the production of an internationally
traded intermediate good. All three intermediate goods are combined nationally to a
non-traded final good which is used for consumption and investment of households.
Shifts in the relative prices of intermediate goods caused by a change in policy
parameters are at the heart of the analysis of spillover effects in the following section.
Since the focus of the analysis is mainly on the long-run implications of the model,
I abstract from any price and wage rigidities.2 To simplify the analytical analysis of
spillover effects, I also omit the labour-leisure choice and assume that each employed
person works a fixed amount of time instead. Thus, adjustments in the labour market
occur only at the extensive margin. In the following, I focus on the aspects of the
model that differ from Section 3.2. The complete system of equations characterising
the model is set out in Appendix C.1.
4.1.1 Households
At the beginning of each period, agents in each country i maximise their expected
lifetime utility without knowing whether they will end up unemployed or not:
2 These features would improve the match with international business cycle statistics to a big extent,
though, as Patureau (2012) shows.
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E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [NitU(C
n
it) + (1−Nit)U(Cuit)] , (4.1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and Cnit and C
u
it denote consumption in case
of employment and unemployment, respectively. Per period utility is derived from
consumption alone and given by U(Ccit) = log (C
c
it). With agents being risk averse
and having access to complete income insurance markets, their decisions depend
only on the aggregate probability of being employed Nit in country i at period t but
are independent of their individual labour market outcome.
The budget constraint of the representative household expressed in terms of the
intermediate good produced in country i can be written as
(1 + τ ci )P
c
it [NitC
n
it + (1−Nit)Cuit] +Bit+1 + P citCAit =
= NitPitwit
(
1− τ di
)
+ (1−Nit)P citbi +Bit (1 + it) + Tit +Πit. (4.2)
Similar to Section 3.2, household income is composed by labour income wit subject
to taxes τ di or unemployment benefits bi, respectively, interest payments from bond
holdings, government transfers Tit and firm profits Πit. Households spend their in-
come on consumption including a consumption tax τ ci , on new bond holdings Bit+1
and portfolio adjustment cost CAit defined as in equation (3.4). In equation (4.2),
P cit is the price of the local final good while Pit represents the price of the local
intermediate good. Note that the intermediate good of the domestic country where
the reform occurs, i.e. of country 1, is chosen as nume´raire, hence P1t = 1. Finally,
the law of motion of aggregate employment Nit is given by
Nit+1 = (1− si)Nit + φit(1−Nit), (4.3)
with si being the constant and exogenous job separation rate of employed workers
and φit being the probability of finding a job when being unemployed. Again, I define
the number of successful matches which result in hirings as Hit = φit(1−Nit) and the
number of unemployed agents as Uit = 1−Nit, which represents the unemployment
rate at the same time normalising the potential workforce to unity.
Thus, the household maximises its life-time utility (4.1), subject to the budget
constraint (4.2) (with λit being the Lagrange multiplier) and the law of motion
of aggregate employment (4.3), obtaining the following first order conditions with
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respect to consumption and bond holdings:
U ′(Cnit) = U
′(Cuit) = (1 + τ
c
i )λitP
c
it (4.4)
λit
(
1 + Φb
Bit+1
P cit
)
= βEt [λit+1 (1 + it+1)] . (4.5)
Note that condition (4.4) implies that the optimal level of consumption does not
depend on the agents’ employment status, i.e. Ccit = C
n
it = C
u
it. This follows from the
assumption of complete income insurance markets.
4.1.2 Final Good Sector
In each of the three countries there is a competitive final good sector, which produces
a non-tradable final goodDcit used for consumption and investment. I follow Kose and
Yi (2006) in using the standard Armington aggregator to describe the composition
of the final good in terms of the three intermediate goods
Dcit =
[
κ
1
η
iiy
η−1
η
iit + κ
1
η
jiy
η−1
η
jit + κ
1
η
kiy
η−1
η
kit
] η
η−1
, (4.6)
where η > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. yjit denotes
the quantity of intermediate input in the final good production of country i = 1, 2, 3
stemming from country j = 1, 2, 3. 0 < κji < 1 is the preference of consumers in
country i for products from country j and in particular κii represents the preference
for domestic goods in domestic spending, the so called home bias. I will refer to κji
as import or openness preference in the following.
The demand functions for intermediate goods used in country i are derived by
maximising the profits of final good producers P citD
c
it − Pityiit − Pjtyjit − Pktykit:
yiit = κii
(
P cit
Pit
)η
Dcit (4.7)
yjit = κji
(
P cit
Pjt
)η
Dcit (4.8)
ykit = κki
(
P cit
Pkt
)η
Dcit, (4.9)
where P cit/Pit represents the price of the final good in country i in terms of the
intermediate good produced in the same country. Let’s define the terms of trade
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of country i with any country j as the relation of its import to export prices, i.e.
TOT ijt =
Pjt
Pit
. Taking the intermediate good demand functions and equation (4.6)
together, the price relation P cit/Pit of country i results to be a combination of the
terms of trade with its trading partners j and k:
P cit
Pit
=
[
κii + κji
(
TOT ijt
)η−1
+ κki
(
TOT ikt
)η−1] 11−η
(4.10)
4.1.3 Intermediate Good Sector
In the intermediate good sector only the production function differs from Section
3.2 as the number of hours worked is fixed. It thus reads
Yit = AiK
α
itN
1−α
it , (4.11)
where 0 < 1−α < 1 is the labour share of income. The level of technology Ai is kept
constant as in the previous analysis. The law of motion of aggregate employment in
terms of vacancies Vit, the law of motion for capital Kit and the costs of adjusting
a firms capital stock CIit are as described by equations (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17) in
Section 3.2.
The profit of intermediate good firms Πit can then be written as
Πit = PitYit − Pitwit
(
1 + τ fi
)
− P citIcit − ωiP citVit − P citCIit (4.12)
with τ fi being a payroll tax and ωi the cost of posting a vacant job. Firms’ intertem-
poral optimisation problem with respect to capital and labour can be summarised
as
F Fit = max
Kit,Nit
[
ΠFit + βEt
(
λit+1
λit
F Fit+1
)]
(4.13)
subject to the production technology (4.11), the law of motion of capital (3.16)
and aggregate employment (3.15).3 If we again define qTit = 1 + ΦI
Icit−δKit
Kit
and
zit =
Pit
P cit
(1− α) Yit
Nit
, the optimality conditions are given by
qTit = βEt
[
P cit+1λit+1
P citλit
{
Pit+1
1
P cit+1
α
Yit+1
Kit+1
+ qTit+1 − δ +
ΦI
2
(
Iit+1 − δKit+1
Kit+1
)2}]
(4.14)
3 The ratio of the future to the present Lagrange multiplier λit+1/λit of household’s budget constraint is
used to weight firms’ future profit flows, since households are the owners of the firms.
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ωi
qit
= βEt
[
P cit+1λit+1
P citλit
{
zit+1 − Pit+1
P cit+1
wit+1
(
1 + τ fi
)
+ (1− si) ωi
qit+1
}]
. (4.15)
4.1.4 Matching and Bargaining in the Labour Market
The technology of hiring by matching vacancies and unemployed persons follows
Pissarides (2000) as in equation (3.22). The Nash bargaining of firms and workers
in each period changes insofar as now only wages wit are subject of the negotiation.
The outcome can be calculated by maximising the weighted marginal value of an
additional employed in terms of utility for firms and households:
max
wit
(
λit
∂F Fit
∂Nit
)(
∂FHit
∂Nit
)1−
(4.16)
with 0 <  < 1 measuring the bargaining power of the firm. For the household the
marginal value of a match is given by
∂FH1t
∂Nit
= λit(Pitwit(1− τ di )− P citbi) + (1− si − φit)βEt
[
∂FHit+1
∂Nit+1
]
. (4.17)
For firms the value of an additional worker (in terms of the final good) can be written
as
∂F Fit
∂Nit
= Pit(1− α) Yit
Nit
− (1 + τ fi )Pitwit + (1− si)βEt
[
λit+1
λit
∂F Fit+1
∂Nit+1
]
. (4.18)
Defining labour market tightness θit =
Vit
Uit
, optimal labour contracts according to
equation (4.16) imply
wit =
1− 
1 + τ fi
[
ωi
P cit
Pit
θit + (1− α) Yit
Nit
]
+

1− τ di
P cit
Pit
bi. (4.19)
4.1.5 The Government
The government collects income from its taxation of consumption and labour on the
one side, which is spent on benefits for the unemployed and transfer payments on
the other side. The government budget constraint reads then as follows
τ ci P
c
itC
c
it +
(
τ di + τ
f
i
)
PitNitwit = Tit + (1−Nit)P citbi. (4.20)
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4.1.6 Equilibrium
Global equilibrium requires market clearing in all goods and financial markets. The
conditions given below highlight how the three countries in the model are linked to
each other. In the markets of intermediate goods, the equilibrium is given by
pi1Y1t = pi1y11t + pi2y12t + pi3y13t (4.21)
pi2Y2t = pi1y21t + pi2y22t + pi3y23t (4.22)
pi3Y3t = pi1y31t + pi2y32t + pi3y33t, (4.23)
where pii is the exogenous number of households in country i, thus determining the
size of the country. The total number of households in the world is normalised to 1,
which implies
3∑
i=1
pii = 1.
Market clearing in the final good markets is obtained if for all countries i = 1, 2, 3
holds
Dcit = C
c
it + I
c
it + ωiVit + CIit + CAit. (4.24)
Finally, for the international bond market the equilibrium is defined as
pi1B1t+1 + pi2B2t+1 + pi3B3t+1 = 0. (4.25)
The trade balance of country i reads then TBit = PitYit − P citDcit which has to be
equal to the balance of payments Bit+1 − (1 + it)Bit in equilibrium.
The model is solved by log-linearising the equation system around the determin-
istic steady state and applying the Newton-Raphson algorithm as implemented in
DYNARE for deterministic models.
4.1.7 Baseline Calibration of Symmetric Countries
In my basic setup, I calibrate all three countries symmetrically to match quarterly
German data. Therefore, most parameters values are chosen to be the same as in
the previous chapter for Germany and will not be discussed further in this section.
Omitting the labour-leisure choice from the model leaves me with one more free
parameter when calibrating the labour market related parameter. So I back the real
vacancy posting cost ω out, which varies widely across the literature. All parameter
values of the baseline scenario are summarised in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. Given
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Table 4.1. Calibrated Parameter and Steady State Values
1−N Unemployment rate 0.098 b/w Unemployment benefit r. 0.32
φ Job finding probability 0.32 τ f Employers’ labour tax 0.17
q Vacancy filling probability 0.70 τ d Employees’ labour tax 0.17
ψ Elasticity of vacancies 0.50 τ c Consumption tax 0.16
 Bargaining power firms 0.50 β Depreciation rate 0.99
α Capital share 0.34 η Elast. of substitution
δ Discount factor 0.025 btw. intermediate goods 1.5
ΦI Scal. invest. adj. costs 7 κii Home bias 0.7
Φb/NX Scal. portfolio adj. costs 0.0038 κji Bil. import preference 0.15
Sources: OECD Reference Series, Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, OECD Labour Market Statistics,
OECD Benefits and Wages: Statistics, OECD Taxing Wages 2003, OECD Taxing Wages 2010,
OECD Recent Tax Policy Trends and Reforms in OECD Countries, OECD Consumption Tax
Trends 2012.
these parameters and the deterministic steady state of equations (4.15) and (4.19),
one can compute the vacancy posting cost.
Further deviations from the calibration in Chapter 3 occur obviously in the trade
related part of the model. Central to the size of spillovers is the calibration of the
Armington aggregator weights κij, as the following analysis shows. The parameter
defining the home bias of consumed products κii is set so that the implied steady
state import-to-GDP ratio matches the average import share observed in Germany
vis-a`-vis the world since the introduction of the euro, which corresponds to setting
1−κii = 0.3.4 For simplicity, I assume in the baseline scenario that bilateral import
preferences are all symmetric, i.e. κji = 0.15 for i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i 6= j.
The elasticity of internationally traded goods η is set to 1.5 as originally proposed
by Backus et al. (1992). For a given output level the openness preference parameters
κii and κji and the elasticity η determine the demand for intermediate goods. The
country sizes pii are then given by means of equations (4.21)-(4.23), summarising
the intermediate goods market equilibrium and the normalisation of the world size
to one. Of course, in the symmetric baseline scenario all countries are of the same
size, i.e. pii = 1/3. The relation between the openness preferences and the country
sizes implies that a country is the bigger, the larger its home bias κii relative to the
other countries. In contrast, more open countries are smaller. For the three-country
case, asymmetries in bilateral preferences influence country sizes as well. The more a
country imports from one country relative to another, the bigger is the first country
4 Intermediate good prices are normalised to one in the deterministic steady state.
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Table 4.2. Implied Values
s Job separation rate 0.034
χ Matching efficiency 0.47
ω Vacancy posting cost 2.37
θ Labour market tightness 0.45
pi Country size 1/3
in comparison to the second. How the country size depends on the import preferences
of countries and how it varies if preferences of one country differ from the baseline
case, is illustrated in Appendix C.2.
In Section 4.2, I first deviate from the symmetry assumption with respect to the
openness preferences (and therefore also the size) of the trading partners. Conse-
quently, I additionally vary other country characteristics to test their impact on the
direct and indirect spillover effects.
4.2 Spillover Effects in a Three-Country Model
The underlying reform scenario in the next subsections is based on the German ex-
ample of a reform called Hartz IV which reduced the average unemployment benefit
ratio by about 10 percentage points from originally 32 percentage (see Table 4.1).
In the main part of the analysis, I focus on the steady state effects of the reform
and discuss the factors influencing the direction and strength of spillovers to other
countries. The dynamic effects are discussed based on an example in the follwing
section, as short-run consequences may differ strongly from the long-run effects and
are of great importance to get political support for reforms.
To start with, I briefly describe the effects of a reduction in unemployment ben-
efits in a country (labelled country 1) with trading partners which are all identical
and therefore perfectly symmetric. This specification implies that no indirect effects
take place as no shift in relative terms occurs between foreign countries, being all
affected to the same extent. In the following sections, I analyse how asymmetry
in various characteristics influences the direct spillover effects from the reforming
country and triggers indirect effects through a third country. First, I concentrate
on asymmetries in the import preferences and the related country sizes. The conse-
quent experiments, where I analyse the effect of variations in other parameters, are
based on a scenario with asymmetric import preferences. The scenario is chosen to
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replicate the spillover effects of Germany to an average European country and the
rest of the euro area.
Notice that I select a specific type of reform here, namely a reduction in un-
employment benefits. However, the main and only channel in the long run through
which spillovers to other countries occur in the model is through changes in the terms
of trade between countries. So as long as a reform of labour market institutions or of
fiscal institutions spurs production and decreases domestic relative to foreign prices,
spillovers are qualitatively comparable and are influenced by very similar factors. In
this vein, the following findings may be interpreted in a more general sense.
4.2.1 Domestic and Foreign Effects in a Symmetric World
By assuming that all trading partners of the reforming country are identical, we
obtain a scenario which resembles a two-country world since indirect effects do not
occur. Therefore, I summarise the domestic and foreign effects caused by the reform
in the unemployment benefit ratio only briefly in the following. A more detailed
description of reform effects in comparable two-country models is given in Chapter
3 or in Dao (2013a).
Domestic Effects
A reduction of unemployment benefits in country 1 decreases the outside option of
workers in the bargaining process with firms and therefore lowers the negotiated
wage rates. This boosts labour demand causing firms to post more vacancies and
ultimately employment and output to rise. A higher supply of intermediate goods
produced in country 1 leads to a drop in relative prices a inducing positive income
effect to domestic as well as foreign households. This effect is opposed by income
losses of domestic households due to the cut in unemployment benefits and wages.
On impact, the second effects dominates even though firm profits and transfers
increase and consumption and investment in country 1 fall. Investment recovers
immediately at the cost of deferred consumption which increases slowly afterwards
when hirings become effective, the capital stock grows and firm profits increase.
Whether the long-run effect on consumption is positive and how big it is depends
on the international environment as the analysis of the openness preferences at the
end of this subsection reveals.
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Spillover Effects
As the prices in the reforming country drop, the terms of trade of its trading partners
(defined as export/import prices) improve. In this subsection, I assume that all
trading partners are perfectly symmetric. This implies that the terms of trade change
for all foreign countries by the same amount and relative prices, i.e. terms of trade,
between these countries do not change. Therefore, all foreign countries are subject
to the same direct effects stemming from the price changes in country 1 described
in the following, but relative quantities between these countries are not affected by
the reform.
The higher evaluation of goods produced in foreign countries increases the sur-
plus from production there to be shared between foreign workers and firms through
Nash bargaining. In consequence, wages and output as well as employment rise in
the foreign countries. The fall in prices in country 1 as well as higher wages and a
lower share of unemployed in the foreign countries induce households there to con-
sume more. The quantitative evaluation of the model below shows that while the
effects on output and consumption can be quite pronounced, the response of foreign
employment is on average about two orders of magnitude smaller than in country 1.
Impact of Characteristics of the Domestic Country
To conclude this subsection, I briefly describe the most important characteristics
of country 1 determining its relationship with the international environment and
driving the strength of domestic and foreign effects while sticking to the assumption
that its trading partners are all identical.
• Openness preference of country 1 (1 − κ11) relative to foreign countries
(1− κ22 = 1− κ33):
The influence of openness and size of the reforming country has already been
discussed in previous studies (see Felbermayr et al., 2012). In the present model
the size of a country is strongly linked to its relative openness (see discussion
in Subsection 4.1.7). The size of country 1 decreases with its openness relative
to its neighbours. As in Felbermayr et al. (2012) and Felbermayr et al. (2013),
the openness and size of the reforming country play a role for the strength of
effects at home and abroad. The more open country 1, the smaller the domestic
and foreign effects on employment, although the response of foreign employment
to the home bias in country 1 is minimal. In contrast, if foreign countries are
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Notes: In this scenario foreign countries are identical. They differ from the domestic country only
with respect to their home bias κii.
Fig. 4.1. Percentage Change in Employment after a Reduction in b1 as a Function
of 1− κ11 and 1− κ22 = 1− κ33
more open, the domestic and foreign effects on employment are strengthened,
and in this case the change in the domestic response is minimal. This finding
is in accordance with the empirical results of Dao (2013a), according to which
the degree of openness of the domestic country has no impact on the spillover
size. It also matches the results of Felbermayr et al. (2013). They find in their
model as well as in their empirical analysis that spillovers to more open/central
economies (which are characterised by lower trade costs in their model) and to
smaller economies are stronger. Figure 4.1 summarises the results for the baseline
calibration with overall openness preferences 1 − κii of the domestic as well as
of the foreign countries varying between 0.01 and 0.5, that is from a very small
steady state import share of 1% to a share of 50% as e.g. observed in Belgium
w.r.t. the other euro area members since the introduction of the euro. If both
foreign countries are very open, the spillover effect amounts to about 1.6% of
the domestic effect, whereas the effect approaches zero for very closed countries.
The same relation is observed for output and consumption (not shown), but for
the latter changes in response to the countries own preference for openness are
much more pronounced in terms of percentage changes. The size of the output
(consumption) spillover ranges from about 0.2% (1%) if all countries are very
closed to over 9% (300%) if all countries are very open.
• Elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods η:
This parameter influences the reform effects at home and abroad. The lower η, the
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stronger is the adjustment in the composition of the final good after an exogenous
shock. A greater change in the relative quantities of intermediate goods used to
produce the final good implies a more pronounced change in the terms of trade.
Therefore, the lower η, the stronger is the increase in output, consumption and
employment abroad in the long run, whereas domestic effects are dampened. If
country 1 is very open, i.e. there is a high preference for foreign intermediate
goods, and the elasticity of substitution η between foreign and domestic goods
is low, effects on domestic consumption can even be negative.5 This result is of
great relevance for the political feasibility of such a reform in small and very
open countries. It also points to the fact that it is very important to model the
trade preferences of a reforming country adequately to correctly evaluate reform
effects. Unfortunately, the appropriate value for η is hard to pick as there is no
observable empirical counterpart available and Hooper et al. (2000), who estimate
the income and price elasticities of exports and imports in the G7 on data until
1994, find it to lie in a broad range from 0.8 to 2.3.
4.2.2 Direct and Indirect Effects in an Asymmetric World
What drives the size of spillovers to employment in the foreign countries taking the
characteristics of the reforming country as given? And how do differences in the
characteristics of the foreign countries affect the spillover? As described above, in
the long run, changes in the terms of trade are the only channel creating an impact
on foreign economic outcomes.
Direct Effect
As long as all foreign countries are identical, the equilibrium effect stems solely
from terms of trade changes with the country where reforms occur. This effect is
labelled direct effect in the following. The size of the direct effect depends on the
strength of the terms of trade change and the elasticity of foreign outcomes—I focus
on employment in the following—w.r.t. this terms of trade. As shown in detail in
Appendix C.4, one can derive the elasticity of employment in the foreign country
of interest (which I call country 2 from now on) w.r.t. the terms of trade between
this country and country 1 in steady state, N2,TOT 21 , which is given by the following
formula:
5 Setting e.g. η = 1 and 1− κ11 ≥ 0.4 leads to such effects in the model.
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N2,TOT 21 =
κ12
ω2
s2ψ(
s2 + χ2θ
ψ
2
) 
(
α
1
β
−1+δ
) α
1−α
[
(1−β(1−s2))(1−ψ)
βχ2
θ1−ψ2 + (1− ) θ2
] > 0 (4.26)
First, notice that this elasticity is always positive, which is in line with the finding
in Dao (2013a). She proofed that in a two-country world with labour market frictions,
an increase in terms of trade for the foreign country always leads to a positive
reaction of employment in that country. According to expression (4.26), import
preferences towards country 1 κ12 and firms bargaining power  have a positive
impact on the elasticity. In contrast, the vacancy posting cost ω2 and initial labour
market tightness θ2 decrease the response of employment to changes in terms of
trade. A higher matching efficiency χ2 and job survival rate 1 − s2 increase the
elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to terms of trade θ2,TOT 21 , whereas
their impact on N2,TOT 21 is ambiguous.
While the elasticity of employment w.r.t. a country’s terms of trade can be pinned
down analytically and its sign and driving factors can be derived unambiguously,
the same cannot be done with the change in terms of trade caused by a reform, i.e.
there is no analytical expression describing which parameters are relevant and how
they impact on the change in terms of trade after a reform. Therefore, I defer the
analysis of the factors influencing the resulting change in the terms of trade to the
empirical quantification in the consequent subsections.
Indirect Effect
If the foreign countries are not identical, the size of the marginal impact of terms
of trade changes may differ between country 2 and 3, i.e. N2,TOT 21 6= N3,TOT 31 .
Furthermore, it is likely that the reform of country 1 depreciates its terms of trade
with different trading partners to a different extent, i.e. ∆TOT 21 6= ∆TOT 31 . In this
case, a contemporaneous shift in the terms of trade between the foreign countries,
TOT 23 , occurs, which induces an additional indirect effect on N2. The size and sign
of the indirect effect on N2 depends on the size and sign of the change in TOT
2
3 and
of the elasticity of employment in country 2 w.r.t. to the terms of trade between
country 2 and 3, N2,TOT 23 . This elasticity differs from equation (4.26) only in the
import preference parameter in the nominator, where we have κ32 instead of κ12
(see Appendix C.4). Hence it is always positive as well. If country 2 has identical
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preferences for intermediates from country 1 and 3, i.e. κ12 = κ32, a marginal change
in the terms of trade with one of these country has exactly the same effect on
employment in country 2. While we know that country 2’s terms of trade with
country 1 always improve after the reform, thus yielding a positive direct spillover
effect concerning employment, the same must not hold true for its terms of trade
with country 3. These terms of trade appreciate if the relative prices of country
2 increase stronger than the relative prices of country 3, otherwise they fall. In
consequence, whether the indirect effect on employment in country 2 is positive or
negative, depends on its relative change in terms of trade.
Overall Spillover
An approximation of the total effect on N2 around the initial steady state i.e. taking
the elasticity as constant, can be written as
∆N2 ≈ N2,TOT 21 ∗∆TOT 21︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+ N2,TOT 23 ∗∆TOT 23︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
(4.27)
where ∆x is the growth rate of x.6 Based on equation (4.27) the total effect
can be decomposed and the relevance of differences in country characteristics on
the components of ∆N2 can be separated. The key question is then which country
characteristics induce a dampened spillover effect by creating a negative indirect
effect, i.e. a decrease in TOT 23 and which enhance the spillover through a positive
indirect effect. Furthermore, it is of interest how the relevant characteristics for the
size and sign of the indirect effect impact on the direct effect. And finally what are
the quantitative implications for the overall spillover effect? How large or small can
the spillover become and can the indirect effect possibly dominate the direct effect,
turning the aggregated effect negative?
Simulation Procedure
In the next subsections, I describe the impact of several country characteristics
within their empirically relevant range on ∆N2. I proceed by updating the value of
the selected parameter in the initial calibration of the model following the approach
described in Subsection 4.1.7. Then, the effect of the reform for the newly calibrated
6 It turns out that the approximation is relative precise in the following evaluations. I find all approximated
values to be less than 1% above the true change in N2.
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model is calculated. This method entails that the implied parameter values, namely
the job separation rate s, the matching efficiency χ and the vacancy posting costs
ω, may adjust accordingly, especially when labour market related characteristics are
subject of the analysis. The same applies for the country size when import prefer-
ences are varied. Alternatively, one could fixed these parameters to their values in
the basic calibration and let the initial steady state values of unemployment, the job
finding probability and the vacancy filling probability adjust. The drawback of this
approach is that the resulting effects on employment over the value range of the se-
lected parameter are not comparable anymore as the initial steady state employment
level could differ. Therefore, I stick to the initial calibration assumptions.7
The results of the simulations are summarised in Table 4.3. The starting point
is a detailed analysis of the importance of the openness and import preferences of
the foreign countries. As these preferences have strong influence on the sign and size
of the indirect effect and also on the size of the direct effect, I choose to tailor the
consequent experiments to a more specific context. This consists in an open and
sizeable reforming country, a small and very open country, for which I study the
spillover effects and a big rest of the world country with a strong home bias (trade
within this aggregate is not of relevance). This scenario is far from the baseline
case with identical import preferences and country sizes but is more suitable to
answer applied questions about the drivers of spillover effects from one country to
another including third-country effects stemming from interaction with the rest of
the world. One example is the analysis of the spillover effects of the German Hartz
reforms to its neighbours in the European context, to which I refer in Section 4.3. The
possibility to analyse such a scenario distinguishes the three-country model from the
standard two-country models tailored for two large countries as well as from small
open economy models. As such the framework would also be suited to analyse the
implications of various reform scenarios discussed in Europe at the moment which
need to be evaluated ex-ante as well as ex-post. Therefore, I investigate the impact
of further country characteristics based on this asymmetric country constellation in
the subsequent section.
7 In addition, test simulations with this alternative calibration reveal that results do not differ fundamen-
tally.
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4.2.3 Trade Openness
All asymmetries between country 2 and 3 with respect to their own import prefer-
ence parameters as well as between country 1’s preferences for goods from country
2 and country 3 have an impact on ∆TOT 23 . In other words, as long as country 1
has identical preferences for intermediates from country 2 and 3 (κ12 = κ13), the
trade relation between country 2 and 3 is symmetric (κ23 = κ32), which together
implies κ22 = κ33, and these countries have symmetric preferences for the interme-
diate of country 1 (κ21 = κ31), there is no indirect effect, given the non-openness
related parameters are symmetric as well. In the following, I relax these symmetries
stepwise to analyse their implications. As equation (4.26) shows, the marginal effect
of a change in terms of trade with country 1 for employment in a country i is char-
acterised by a large set of parameters as well as initial steady state values. Observe
that if we assume all these parameters and initial conditions to be equal between
countries in the following, with the exception of the import preferences κij, then
initial unemployment, labour-capital ratio and production have also to be equal.
I start by analysing the impact of overall openness of country 2 (1 − κ22) and
country 3 (1 − κ33) on the employment spillover to country 2 while keeping the
openness of country 1 fixed as in the baseline calibration, i.e. 1−κ11 = 0.3. Thereby,
I keep the bilateral import preferences of each country symmetric, hence κki = κji =
(1 − κii)/2. Recall that the model assumptions imply open countries to be smaller
(in terms of output) than closed economies. In Figure 4.2 the upper two panels show
the change of the terms of trade of country 2 with country 1 and country 3 due to
the reduction in unemployment benefits b1 as a function of 1− κ22 and 1− κ33. The
lower panels of Figure 4.2 show the changes in N2 separated in the direct and the
indirect effect. ∆TOT 21 decreases with increasing openness of country 2. The direct
effect, in contrast, increases as the rise in the elasticity due to the increasing openness
dominates the terms of trade changes. The panels on the right hand side demonstrate
the importance of the relative openness and country size between country 2 and 3 for
the direction of ∆TOT 23 and the indirect effect. For 1−κ22 > 1−κ33, which implies
pi2 < pi3, the reform leads to a stronger rise of TOT
3
1 than of TOT
2
1 and therefore
triggers a depreciation of TOT 23 and in consequence a negative indirect effect. The
opposite applies if country 2 is more open and bigger than country 3. Independent of
the relatively openness, the absolute change in TOT 23 is relative small compared to
TOT 21 . The same applies to the indirect effect compared to the direct effect. Thus,
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Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3. N2,TOT21 and N2,TOT23 increase both linear with growing
openness 1− κ22 = κ12 + κ32.
Fig. 4.2. Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects with Varying
Degrees of Openness in Country 2 and 3
the aggregated effect is very similar to the direct effect. The size of the employment
spillover measured relative to the effect in the domestic economy, i.e. ∆N2/∆N1,
ranges between close to 0% for very high κ22 and 1.6% for a very open country 2
whose import share adds up to about 50% of output.
In the second step, I fix the overall openness of country 3 to 1 − κ33 = 0.1 as
I regard country 3 from now on as the large rest aggregate consistent with the
empirical questions of interest. I vary the import preferences of country 2 κ12 and
κ32 (in conjunction with κ22 = 1−κ12−κ32) in Figure 4.3. Remember that N2,TOT 21
increases in κ12 and N2,TOT 23 in κ32. This explains why the direct effect mainly
depends on κ12 and rises with higher values of κ12, whereas ∆TOT
2
1 decreases in
κ12 and increases in κ32. The indirect effect is most relevant for very small κ12 and
relatively high κ32, where it becomes several times as large as the direct effect. In
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Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3 and 1 − κ33 = 0.1. N2,TOT21 increases linear with growing
κ12, while N2,TOT23
increase linear with growing κ32.
Fig. 4.3. Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying κ12
and κ32
contrast, it is negligible for a high import preference towards country 1 as it is
dominated by a strong direct effect of close to 3%. Nevertheless, the absolute size of
indirect effects is with maximal 0.002% very small. The range of ∆N2/∆N1 extends
from close to zero for a very closed country 2, i.e. very small κ12 and κ32, to about
2.9% for small κ22 (see Table 4.3).
Finally, I also fix 1− κ22 = 0.5, which implies that country 2 represents a coun-
try which is more open and smaller than the reforming country. In Figure 4.4 I
let the import shares of country 1 and 3 from country 2 float up to half of their
overall openness adjusting κ13 and κ31 accordingly. The lower the import preference
of country 3, the higher are the direct and indirect effect. The higher the import
preference of country 1, the higher are both effects. In contrast to the other import
preferences analysed before, κ21 and κ23 influence the direct and the indirect effect
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Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3, 1 − κ33 = 0.1 and 1 − κ22 = 0.5. Both elasticities of
employment are constant in κ21 and κ23.
Fig. 4.4. Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying κ21
and κ23
in the same direction. Hence, high direct effects are strengthened by the indirect ef-
fect, whereas low values of the direct effect are additionally reduced by the indirect
effect. But the variation in size of the direct effect relative to ∆N1 ranges only from
1.45% to 1.74% and the indirect effect is still small in comparison, varying between
-0.21% and 0.21% of ∆N1. Since ∆N1 is lowest for high κ21 and low κ23, the relative
spillover size ∆N2/∆N1 reaches with 1.94% its highest values for this constellation.
For weak import preferences of country 1 towards country 2 and strong preferences
of country 3, the relative size of the effect goes down to 1.24%.
Summarising the results of this subsection, import preferences in conjunction
with the country size have a strong impact on the relative and absolute size of
spillover effects. Very open countries with a strong trade relationship to the reforming
country are likely to be subject to the strongest spillovers. While the direct effects
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vary in a relative broad range, the indirect effects, whether they are positive or
negative, are always relatively small. In addition, the import preference parameters
having the strongest impact on the size of direct and indirect effects, κ12 and κ32
have an opposing impact on direct and indirect effects. Thus, the strongest direct
effect is dampened by a negative indirect effect, whereas the weakest direct effect
is strengthened by a relatively high positive indirect effect. As a result, negative
indirect effects never overturn the direct effect, which yields a positive overall effect
in all cases.
4.2.4 Further Country Characteristics
In the following, I discuss the impact of further country characteristics of the foreign
countries which are of relevance for the labour market outcome there. Equation
(4.26) suggests that there are many parameters and initial conditions which could
potentially have an impact on the direct and indirect spillover effect. I explore these
characteristics separately based on the previously introduced scenario with a small
open second country (κ22 = 0.5), and a big and less open third country (κ33 = 0.1)
representing the rest aggregate. The bilateral import preferences are assumed to
be symmetric, i.e. κji = κki. This entails pi1 = 0.22, pi2 = 0.13 and pi3 = 0.65
everything else being symmetric as in the baseline calibration. Furthermore, the
scenario implies that the indirect effect stemming from the reform is negative and
amounts to a decrease in N2 of 0.191 per mill (cf. Figure 4.2). While I check for
the impact of characteristics of country 2 as well as of country 3 since both may
be at the root of asymmetries, in the lower part of Table 4.3 only those of country
2 are summarised. This choice is based on the fact, that changes in the calibration
of country 3 have in quantitative terms only a very limited or no influence at all
on the size of employment spillovers to country 2. Detailed figures of the simulation
results are provided in Appendix C.3. In the following, I discuss the consequence of
differences in the country characteristics with a focus on those having a quantitative
relevant impact.
• Unemployment benefit ratio b/w:
A higher level of unemployment benefits in country 2 strengthens the direct
spillover effect to employment by increasing the elasticity of employment in re-
sponse to the change in terms of trade with country 1 N2,TOT 21 .
8 Since N2,TOT 23
8 A higher unemployment benefit ratio implies a lower cost of vacancy posting for a given level of unem-
ployment in a country.
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rises as well, it contemporaneously leads to a stronger negative indirect effect,
thus opposing the direct effect. Nevertheless, the aggregated effect is stronger
for higher b2/w2 as indirect effects play only a minimal role. For a generous un-
employment benefit ratio of 40% in country 2 the relative size of the spillover
∆N2/∆N1 amounts to 2.32%. Unsurprisingly, the unemployment benefit ratio of
country 3 has only a slight impact on ∆TOT 23 but none on ∆TOT
2
1 as Figure
C.2 in Appendix C.3 illustrates.
• Pre-reform steady state unemployment level U :
Similar to the unemployment benefit ratio the unemployment rate in country 3
has only a minor impact on ∆TOT 23 and the indirect effect (see Figure C.3).
In contrast, a very high initial unemployment rate in country 2 of about 20%
yields a strong change in employment with a direct effect of over 0.036%, a
negative indirect effect of -0.002% and a high relative overall effect above 4%.
This increase is on the one hand driven by level effects. Higher unemployment in
the model is equivalent to a lower number of employed agents and therefore the
same absolute change translates into a bigger percentage change based on a lower
initial employment rate. On the other hand, a higher initial unemployment rate
implies a higher job separation rate in the calibration which in turn leads to a
higher responsiveness of N2 with respect to terms of trade with country 1 and 3
on the simulated value range.9 For a very low initial U2 (and high N2 respectively)
the direct and indirect spillover effect are close to zero.
• Capital share α:
Differences in the capital share of income are a very crude but simple approach to
account for differences in production technologies between countries. The higher
the capital share in country 2, the stronger is the response of employment to
changes in the terms of trade on the simulated interval from 20 to 40%. This
results in an increase of the absolute as well as the relative size of the spillover to
employment as the indirect effect is with -0.7 per mill to 0.3 per mill negligible and
the rise in N2,TOT 21 overturns the in α shrinking appreciation of TOT
2
1 . Observe
that α contemporaneously influences the relative country size: the country size
decreases in capital share of the country. Since the capital share of country 3
diminishes the appreciation of country 3, on the one hand, and increases ∆TOT 21 ,
on the other hand, by slightly increasing pi1 and pi2, it has a small positive impact
on the spillover size as well (see Figure C.4). Overall, the changes in the absolute
9 Observe that a higher level of unemployment also implies a slightly smaller country size.
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and relative spillover size caused by the capital share of both countries is not very
big. The relative spillover size ranges between 1.36% and 1.71%.
• Elasticity of vacancies in the matching function ψ:
A stronger impact on the relative strength of the spillover to employment is
exercised by the elasticity of the matching function ψ. If ψ2 is well above the
benchmark of 0.5, the relative spillover size approaches 2%, for values below 0.3,
the relative spillover effect drops under 1%. Given the calibration, higher values
of ψ on the value range from 0.2 to 0.8 lead to an increase in the elasticity of
employment with respect to the terms of trade with both countries. Furthermore,
for a given initial unemployment rate, job finding and vacancy filling probability,
higher values of ψ imply a higher matching efficiency χ if the labour markets are
not extremely tight, i.e. θ < 1. Thus, the positive effect of ψ on the employment
spillover is driven by an increasing direct effect which is marginally dampened by
a negative and in ψ falling indirect effect (see Figure C.5).
• Employees’ tax rate on wages τ d:
If the tax rate on wages paid by the employees in country 2 is higher at the time
the reform in country 1 occurs, the overall spillover effect is higher too. Since the
level of τ d is taken into consideration, when wages are bargained (see equation
(4.19)), it effects the calibration of the vacancy posting costs negatively. Thus, a
higher τ d leads to higher elasticities of employment with respect to terms of trade
which strengthen the direct as well as the indirect spillover effect (see Figure C.6).
The direct spillover increases from 1.45 to 1.80% of the domestic effect for a low
tax rate of 1% to a very high tax rate of 31% while the indirect is of negligible
magnitude. In contrast to τ d, the tax rate employers pay on wages τ f has no
impact on spillover effects.
Unlike the just discussed country characteristics, the pre-reform steady state prob-
ability of finding a job φ and the bargaining power of the firm  have quantitatively
only a limited influence on the size of employment spillovers. A higher job finding
probability implies a higher efficiency of matching χ in the model and thus decreases
the vacancy posting cost of firms. The productivity increase due to the reform can
therefore be mapped more efficiently into new jobs leading to a increase in foreign
employment.10 This effect, however, is minimal even for a very high initial proba-
bility as reported in Table 4.3. Similarly, strong changes in the level of 2 have only
10 The result resembles a finding by Dao (2013a), that a higher degree of labour market rigidity in a foreign
country (introduced by assuming a lower initial job finding rate) leads to higher spillover effects.
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a small impact on the aggregated spillover effect, with higher levels of 2 leading to
a slightly higher impact of the reform on foreign employment (see equation (4.26)).
The reason is that more of the reform induced productivity gain in country 2 is used
to increase employment (in place of wages) if firms have a stronger standing in the
Nash bargaining.
To summarise the results for the non-trade related country characteristics, the
indirect effect is in most cases very small compared to the direct effect. Furthermore,
in most cases it opposes the direct effect in the sense that it assumes its lowest
negative value for a parametrisation where the direct effect is at its maximum and
adds positively to the direct effect when it is relatively low (see Table 4.3). This
result implies that the aggregated spillover effect, which is given by the sum of the
direct effect and the indirect effect, is positive in all simulations which matches the
result of empirical studies by Felbermayr et al. (2013) and Dao (2013a).
The analysis has shown that country characteristics as the relative openness and
bilateral import preferences, the unemployment rate, the unemployment benefit ra-
tio, the capital share, the elasticity of matching and employee’s wage taxes have non
negligible effect on the overall size of the spillover and its components. In particular,
the more open a country in general, but especially versus the reforming country,
and the stronger (weaker) the import preferences of the reforming (third) country
for intermediates from country 2, the stronger is the spillover to employment there.
Furthermore, countries with high unemployment benefits and high unemployment
rates, but also with a relatively high capital share, elasticity of matching or em-
ployee’s wage tax rate benefit more from a labour market reform of their trading
partners in terms of an increase in employment.
In the preceding simulations, I varied one parameter at a time and found that
the relative size of the aggregated spillover effect measured as the ratio between the
change of employment in the country of interest and the reforming country ranges
between 0 and close to 4% for calibrations in an empirically realistic range. If I use for
all analysed parameters and initial conditions the value from the tested (empirically
plausible) range for which I obtained the strongest overall spillover,11 the relative
size of the aggregated spillover is more than 11%. This value exceeds the average of
9% estimated by Felbermayr et al. (2013). Thus, under certain conditions the model
is able to generate employment spillovers which reach the empirically found average.
11 I choose κ21 = 0.29, κ31 = 0.01, κ12 = 0.4, κ32 = 0.1, κ23 = κ13 = 0.05, U2 = 0.2, φ2 = 0.75, b2 = 0.4,
τd = 0.3, 2 = 0.8, ψ2 = 0.7 and α2 = 0.4.
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The driving force of these high spillovers are, however, high direct effects, but not
strong positive indirect effects.
4.3 The German Hartz IV Reform and its Impact on
Different Neighbours
Finally, I present the model implications of the reform in the unemployment benefit
scheme for three scenarios taking differing German neighbours, namely France, Bel-
gium and Austria, as second country and assuming the third country to be the rest
of the euro area 12 (EA12) countries (RoEA in the following). The three scenarios
demonstrate how strongly the model predicts spillovers to vary in the long as well as
in the short-run between heterogeneous countries in empirically relevant scenarios.
France, Belgium and Austria are assumed to differ with respect to their calibration of
labour market institutions and fiscal policy parameters as summarised in Table 4.4.
While Belgium and France are relatively similar in most aspects, Austria’s labour
market situation differs strongly with a lower unemployment rate, average unem-
ployment duration and unemployment benefit ratio. With exception of the trade
preferences, Germany is parameterised as described in Subsection 4.1.7. The import
preferences parameters for the different scenarios are calibrated to correspond to the
respective import shares given in Table 4.5. In contrast to France, Austria and Bel-
gium are very open countries with a home bias κii of only 0.74 and 0.52 respectively.
Both have a high import share with respect to Germany, but while Austria’s trade
relationship is strongly focused on Germany, Belgium trades also heavily with the
RoEA. The country sizes implied by these import shares are close but not identical
to the countries’ GDP weights in the EA12.
The equilibrium effects of the reduction in the unemployment benefit ratio in
Germany for Germany and the respective second country are summarised in Table
4.6. In the long run, the reaction of France resembles much that of the RoEA,12
whereas spillovers to Belgium and Austria, depending on the outcome of interest,
are two to three times the size of the RoEA or France. With respect to employment,
I find the spillover effect to the second country to range between 0.3% and 0.8% of
the original effect in Germany. France’s labour force is the least affected, although its
12 The results for the three differing EA aggregates vary only slightly with the composition of the RoEA
and are very similar to the result for France. Therefore, I refrain from reporting them.
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Table 4.4. Calibration of Heterogeneity in the Labour Market Institutions and
Fiscal Policy
Country 2 Country 3
France Belgium Austria RoEA
1−N Unemployment rate 8.93 8.18 4.29 9.02 a
1/φ Av. duration of unemployment 15.50 16.57 b 3.88 c 16.57 b
φ Job finding probability 19.35 18.11 77.23 c 18.11
b/wh Unemployment benefit ratio 35.66 38.19 28.43 27.70 d
τ f Employers’ labour tax 29.00 23.00 23.00 23.75 d
τ d Employees’ labour tax 10.00 11.00 14.00 9.44 d
τ c Consumption tax 19.60 21.00 20.00 19.11 d
Notes: All numbers are in percentage points except the average duration of unemployment which
is given in months and refer to the year 2003 if not stated otherwise.
a EA average unemployment rate as published by the OECD including Germany.
b The Belgian as well as the EA average duration of unemployment are approximated by the
average duration of unemployment in the EU as published by the OECD owing to a lack of more
precise data.
c 2004 values.
d These rates are calculated as EA-12 averages excluding Germany using GDP weights at PPP
exchange rates of the corresponding year.
Sources: OECD Reference Series, INSEE, OECD Labour Market Statistics, OECD Benefits and
Wages: Statistics, OECD Taxing Wages 2003, OECD Recent Tax Policy Trends and Reforms in
OECD Countries 2004.
Table 4.5. Bilateral Import Shares
From From
To Germany France RoEA To Germany Belgium RoEA
Germany 0.8777 0.0248 0.0975 Germany 0.8777 0.0175 0.1048
France 0.0450 0.8661 0.0888 Belgium 0.1359 0.5193 0.3448
RoEA 0.0615 0.0300 0.9086 RoEA 0.0521 0.0189 0.9290
From
To Germany Austria RoEA
Germany 0.8777 0.0121 0.1102
Austria 0.1798 0.7412 0.0790
RoEA 0.0510 0.0033 0.9457
Notes: RoEA refers to the EA12 excluding Germany and the respective second country. The
reported import shares are mean values over the period 1999-2012.
Sources: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, World Bank World Development Indicators.
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Table 4.6. Percentage Change in Steady-State after a Reduction in b1
Country 1 Country 2
Germany France Belgium Austria
N 0.866 0.002 0.007 0.004
U -7.962 -0.024 -0.077 -0.084
φ 9.649 0.026 0.084 0.088
w -0.767 0.010 0.031 0.040
Y 0.839 0.012 0.037 0.043
C 0.293 0.032 0.096 0.118
TOT 21 0.431 0.431 0.423
TOT 23 0.001 0.001 -0.008
N2,TOT 21 0.005 0.016 0.009
N2,TOT 23 0.011 0.040 0.004
Note: All values in the upper part of the table measure the relative change from the pre-reform
steady state to the post-reform steady state. The elasticities in the lower part are calculated at
the initial steady state.
terms of trade change to the same extent as the Belgian.13 The lower responsiveness
of employment in France is driven by its less intense trade relationship with Germany
relative to Belgium and Austria combined with its bigger country size which implies
a smaller relative change in the traded quantities. In Austria, the country specific
import preferences lead to a lower responsiveness of terms of trade in comparison to
Belgium which is mainly due to stronger preference for RoEA goods in Belgium. The
relatively less pronounced reaction of terms of trade due to the import preferences is
partially countervailed by a better labour market situation and lower unemployment
benefits which induce ceteris paribus a stronger increase in the terms of trade vis-
a`-vis Belgium and France. Because of its strong trade relation to Germany, which
outstrips Belgium, and its very small country size, Austria is subject to the strongest
percentage changes in terms of output, consumption and wages. Employment, on
the contrary, is affected to a weaker extent than in Belgium percentagewise since it
improves from a very high pre-reform level (see Table 4.4). To give a complete picture
of the composition of the spillover effects, the elasticities of employment with respect
13 Since labour market and fiscal institutions are very similar within these countries, the virtually identical
terms of trade effects point to the fact that the effects stemming from differences in import preferences
cancel out. In particular, the higher Belgian preference for German goods (κBG12 > κ
FR
12 ) and German
preference for French goods (κFR21 > κ
BG
21 ), which would both imply that the French terms of trade
effect should be higher according to the analysis above, counterbalance the higher Belgian preference for
RoEA goods (κBG32 > κ
FR
32 ) and RoEA preference for French goods (κ
FR
23 > κ
BG
23 ), which in turn point
to a higher terms of trade effect in Belgium.
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to the terms of trade calculated at the initial steady state are listed in the lower
part of Table 4.6. Multiplying these elasticities with the respective terms of trades
changes, reveals that the indirect effects, whether positive or negative, add less than
1% to the direct effect. For France and Belgium we observe a small appreciation vis-
a`-vis the RoEA, but obviously the strong import preferences of Belgium for German
as well as for RoEA products yield a higher elasticity with respect to both terms
of trade according to equation (4.26) and thus a higher direct and indirect effect
on employment compared to France. The higher level of tightness in the Austrian
labour market leads to a lower responsiveness of employment to changes in terms of
trade there, even though κ12 is comparable between Austria and Belgium and κ32
between Austria and France. Interestingly, the indirect effect in Austria is negative,
i.e. the terms of trade between Germany and Austria are less affected by the reform
than between Germany and the RoEA. The negative effect stems from the relative
large overall openness of Austria (κ22 > κ33, compare Figure 4.2) and its strong
focus on German imports (κ12 > κ32, compare Figure 4.3) in contrast to France and
Belgium. Thus, these import preferences imply a depreciation versus the RoEA, but
at the same time strong κ12 and low κ32 mean a higher elasticity for the direct effect
and a lower impact of the indirect effect.
The short-run response of selected variables is summarised in Figure 4.5. The
first row shows the adjustments of output, consumption and employment of country
1, i.e. Germany, after a decline in its unemployment benefit ratio by 10 percentage
points. Domestic employment and output rise monotonously whereas consumption
initially drops due to a reduction in household income and intertemporal prefer-
ences, recovering slowly afterwards as described in Subsection 4.2.1. While the major
adjustments in employment occur in the first two years, consumption and output
approach the new equilibrium much slower. The same outcomes of country 2 are
displayed in the second row of the figure for the three scenarios where country 2 is
calibrated to French, Belgian and Austrian data. The third row contains the impulse
responses of these countries’ terms of trade with Germany and with the RoEA and
their net foreign asset position as a share of their output. The reduction of unem-
ployment benefits in Germany induces its relative prices with its trading partners
to shift. As plot (g) reveals, the long-run appreciation of foreign terms of trade is
preceded by a short initial depreciation. This development causes an initial small
drop in employment abroad (plot f). Since in the first years after the reform the
reaction of Austrian and Belgian terms of trade is stronger than that of the RoEA,
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Note: All variables are expressed in percentage deviations from their pre-reform steady state with
the exception of net foreign assets (NFA) which are given as share of output.
Fig. 4.5. Adjustments in Country 1 and 2 after a Reduction in b1
these countries appreciate vis-a`-vis the RoEA as displayed in plot (h). In contrast
to equilibrium, in the short run the third-country terms of trade effects are sizeable
amounting to more than 10% of the direct terms of trade effect with Germany in
these two countries. Thus, they should tend to dampen the negative effect on em-
ployment.14 For France, being very similar to the RoEA, we observe only a minimal
effect on its terms of trade with the RoEA in the short run.
Thus, Austria as a very small country with a strong trade relationship to Ger-
many is initially hit strongest by the adverse effects and profits most in the long
14 In the short run, the impact of the adjustment in terms of trade on employment deviates from the steady
state approximation of equation (4.27). The deviations occur as, on the one hand, out of steady state
additional transmission effects arise from the international bond market and, on the other hand, the
steady state conditions used when calculating elasticities with respect to terms of trade need not to hold
during the convergence process towards the new steady state which does not occur at the same speed
for all variables. The out-of-steady-state change in employment in the second country can therefore not
simply be decomposed in a direct and indirect effect stemming from the changes in terms of trade.
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run, at least in terms of output and consumption, by the German reforms. In ad-
dition, adjustments occur faster in this country as its labour market is tight and
unemployment benefits at a low level compared to the other countries. This reflects
also in the Austrian net foreign assets as share of output which is initially higher
than in the other countries but reverts also fast, especially compared to France.
To wrap up, this section illustrated how differences in trade linkages as well as
in institutions and initial situations among European countries lead to differences
in the strength and propagation of spillovers after the same reform.
4.4 Conclusion
In this study, I explored the size of spillover effects to employment in a foreign coun-
try after a labour market reform in the domestic country. In contrast to previous
studies, which mainly focus on a two-country scenario, my analysis considers the
presence of a third (large) country. Thus, it explicitly includes indirect spillover ef-
fects caused by shifts in the relation of the country of interest and a third country
in addition to the direct spillover effect stemming from shifts between the country
of interest and the domestic country. In order to assess the direction and strength
of these spillover components, I conducted simulations based on a standard interna-
tional RBC model expanded to include a third country with search and matching
frictions in the labour market. I found that the aggregated spillover size measured
relative to the effect in the domestic country can be sizeable. It can reach the empir-
ically estimated size documented by Felbermayr et al. (2012) of about one-tenth for
specific country characteristics. Variation in the size of the spillover effects stems,
however, mainly from changes in the size of the direct effect. The indirect effect
turns out to be small in all calibrations. Hence, neither does it strongly increase the
direct effect nor overturn the direct effect to yield a negative aggregated effect.
This result must be interpreted in the light of mechanisms included in the model.
The direct and indirect spillover effects in the model are based on shifts in terms
of trade, thus on competitiveness in terms of intermediate goods prices. The model
does not capture non-price competitiveness factors like product quality. These play
an important role in international competition as the study by Estrada et al. (2013)
demonstrates and may, therefore, be of relevance for the size of third-country effects.
The model also abstracts from shifts in import preferences which may be triggered by
a reform. As the simulation results of Subsection 4.2.3 have shown, these preferences
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have a big influence on the size of spillover effects. Finally, in the discussion on
third-country effects, differences in the sector structure and specialisation between
countries may also play a role for the size of direct and indirect effects. I only consider
differences in the capital share in the production as a rough approximation. But
these do not have major effects on the strength of direct and indirect spillovers.
An alternative approach to take structural differences into account is an explicit
modelling of a non-tradeable vs. tradeable sector as in Helpman and Itskhoki (2010).
Such an extended model could provide additional insights and would therefore be a
logical extension of this study.
5Conclusion and Outlook
This thesis contributes three studies to a better understanding of how globalisation,
i.e. the increase in cross-border trade and capital linkages, shapes the economic
dependence and interaction between countries.
The first study, which is based on Busl and Kappler (2013), extends the liter-
ature on the determinants of business cycle synchronisation by investigating the
importance of FDI-induced channels employing a panel approach suited to iden-
tify the direct transmission channels of idiosyncratic shocks. The results show that
FDI acts as a force enhancing synchronisation between (OECD) countries, whereas
trade linkages have no direct significant impact. The latter finding stands in contrast
to the literature based on cross-section identification strategies, but is in line with
other studies using the time-series dimension (see Kappler, 2011 or Kalemli-Ozcan
et al., 2013). Unlike the cross-section methods, a panel approach allows to focus on
the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks and to exclude common shocks as driver of
comovement, which explains the diverging findings. The results of our analysis are
limited to the fact that based on the panel approach with the available data it was
not possible to identify indirect effects on the comovement of business cycles. These
may arise due to the fact that e.g. FDI linkages have an impact on other determi-
nants, i.e. trade or the similarity of the industry structure between countries. The
development of new identification strategies for these indirect channels of synchro-
nisation for the panel dimension is a challenging task for future research. A very
important topic would thereby be to disentangle trade and FDI linkages. A promis-
ing starting point in the literature are studies which do not confine themselves to
the contemporaneous relations but investigate the dynamic linkages exploiting the
time-series dimension by means of panel vector autoregressive models and Granger-
causality tests (see Aizenman and Noy, 2006 and Kappler, 2011).
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The second study, based on Busl and Seymen (2013), was confined to assess the
effects of a very specific idiosyncratic shock: the German labour market reforms in
2003-2005. In contrast to previous studies on these reforms, the focus of the analysis
was on the macroeconomic national and international effects of the entire reform
package. In particular, it addressed the question whether the weak consumption
growth and wage increase coupled with the persistent current account surplus in
Germany in the last decade were triggered by the reform laws. The analysis based
on a two-country real business cycle model points to a partial responsibility of the
reforms with respect to the consumption dampening and wage restraint helped by a
decrease in the bargaining power of workers. The reforms, however, do not manifest
in a (persistent) current account surplus. In the model, current accounts are allowed
to be imbalanced through the existence of a simple structure of an incomplete fi-
nancial market: an international bond market.1 This might be the reason why a new
model-based study by Kollmann et al. (2014) attributes the labour market reforms
to have played a role in the German current account surplus. Thereby they challenge
the results of the recent literature on the drivers of the current account. It would be
an interesting exercise to extend the financial market structure in our model and to
add more persistence in the behaviour of the investing agents, e.g. by habit forma-
tion, in order to see whether the findings with respect to the current account change.
However, even though Kollmann et al. (2014) find the labour market reforms to be
in parts responsible for the positive current account, they find only a very modest
effect of the reforms on real activity in the euro area. Interestingly, their analysis
builds on a three-country framework consisting in Germany, the rest of the euro
area, and the rest of the world. Thus, they allow for third-country effects,2 which
are the subject of the third study.
The contribution of the third study, which is based on Busl (2014), lies in the de-
tailed analysis of the potential direction and strength of such an indirect effect after
an appreciation of the terms of trade caused by a labour market reform. The analysis
was carried out in a standard international real business cycle model with labour
market frictions extended to include a third country. The evaluation over varying
country characteristics revealed that the indirect spillover effect to employment is
very small in this model class and does not overturn the direct spillover, which is
1 Note that the assumption of incomplete financial markets plays an important role for the international
transmission of shocks (see Ghironi, 2006).
2 In their estimated model, they consider in particular external demand shocks to Germany from the rest
of the world.
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always positive. A logical extension of this study would be the assessment of indi-
rect effects in other model classes such as the trade models with heterogeneous firms
(Ghironi and Melitz, 2005) and models with a sector of non-tradable goods (Help-
man and Itskhoki, 2010). The latter type of models exhibits different implications
with respect to spillovers already in the two-country case. Furthermore, medium to
large-scale policy oriented models such as the QUEST model by the European Com-
mission (Ratto et al., 2009) or the EAGLE model by the European Central Bank
(Gomes et al., 2012) typically include three or more countries and allow therefore
for indirect spillover effects. It would be interesting to evaluate the magnitude of
the indirect effects in such models, as their explicit discussion and quantification is
missing in studies like Gomes et al. (2011) or Kollmann et al. (2014).
To conclude, the literature has made great leaps forward to answer the manifold
questions raised by the globalisation process. This thesis contributes by investigat-
ing three specific questions: the importance of FDI as a transmission channel of
business cycle synchronisation, the internationally criticised effects of the German
labour market reforms, and the relevance of indirect spillover effects. Finally, as
the precedent paragraphs have shown, the effects of globalisation on the economic
interplay between countries will offer research topics for the years to come.

AAppendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Measures and Data Sources
Synchronisation: Negative absolute difference of real GDP growth, see equation
(2.6). Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
HP-filtered synchronisation measure: Negative absolute difference of HP-
filtered GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
Residual synchronisation measure: Negative absolute difference of real residual
GDP growth after eliminating time and country-pair effects, see equations (2.13)
and (2.14). Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
Relative synchronisation measure: Negative absolute difference of real GDP
growth divided by average absolute GDP growth, see equation (2.15). Source: OECD
Economic Outlook.
FDI integration: Sum of bilateral FDI inward and outward positions divided by
the sum of nominal GDP, see equation (2.7). Source: OECD International Direct
Investment Statistics; World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Alternative FDI integration: Sum of bilateral FDI inward and outward posi-
tions divided by the sum of total FDI positions, see equation (2.12). Source: OECD
International Direct Investment Statistics.
Trade integration: Bilateral import and export divided by the sum of nominal
GDP, see equation (2.8). Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; World Bank,
World Development Indicators.
Alternative trade integration: Bilateral import and export divided by the sum
of total trade, see equation (2.11). Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; World
Bank, World Development Indicators.
Differences in the sector structure: Sum over negative absolute differences be-
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tween value added shares for 41 sectors, see equation (2.9). Source: OECD STAN
database.
Monetary policy: Absolute difference in short term interest rates (three month
nominal interest rate, mainly interbank rates). Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
Fiscal policy: Absolute difference in government budget balance. Source: IMF,
World Economic Outlook April 2012.
Return spreads between share price indices: Absolute difference in growth of
share price index. Source: IMF, IFS
Volume-based measure of capital openness: Bilateral sum of gross private cap-
ital flows ratio to GDP. Source: World Bank WDI.
Economic similarity: Indicator based on nominal GDP following Egger (2000),
see equation (2.10). Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Overall economic development: Bilateral sum of GDP per capita (in PPP).
Source: World Bank, International Comparison Program database.
Differences in economic development: Absolute differences in GDP per capita
(in PPP). Source: World Bank, International Comparison Program database.
De jure economic integration: Ranking of bilateral degree of economic inte-
gration. Source: Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Database on Economic Integration
Agreements.
De jure capital openness: Bilateral sum of an index measuring share holder
rights. Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Distance between the main economic centers: Mean of (by population)
weighted distances between biggest cities/areas. Source: CEPII, GRAVITY dataset,
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/bdd.asp.
Common border: Dummy variables with value 1 if countries have a common bor-
der and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPII, GRAVITY dataset,
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/bdd.asp.
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Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Synchronisation 3360 -0.017 0.017 -0.169 0.000
HP-filtered Sync. 3360 -0.019 0.017 -0.107 0.000
Residual Sync. 3360 -0.017 0.017 -0.177 0.000
Relative Sync. 3360 -0.696 0.691 -4.496 0.000
FDI 2744 0.006 0.012 -0.001 0.119
FDI Alternative 2744 0.034 0.064 -0.002 0.540
Trade 3360 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.039
Trade Alternative 3360 0.033 0.048 0.001 0.549
Sectoral Differences 2685 0.329 0.106 0.107 0.823
Monetary Policy 3360 0.030 0.033 0.000 0.189
Fiscal Policy 2454 0.047 0.044 0.000 0.285
Return Spread 3022 0.173 0.202 0.000 2.115
Capital Openness 3345 -0.001 0.006 -0.036 0.030
Economic Similarity 3360 0.298 0.155 0.021 0.500
Economic Development 3360 5.390 1.104 2.760 9.289
Development Differences 3360 0.583 0.474 0.000 2.71
Economic Integration Agreements 2880 2.833 2.205 0.000 6.000
De Jure Capital Openness 3360 6.125 1.773 2.000 10.00
Distance 3360 3695 3203 379.2 11035
Common Border 3360 0.117 0.321 0.000 1.000
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Table A.2. Business Cycle Synchronisation: 2SLS Cross-Section Basic Specification
(Including Time-Invariant Instruments)
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1982-2009 1982-1998 1999-2009
FDI 0.118 -0.268 0.312
(0.164) (0.398) (0.175)*
Trade 0.058 0.485 -0.400
(0.208) (0.251)* (0.283)
Sectoral Differences -0.000 0.004 -0.026
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014)*
Monetary Policy -0.120 -0.074 -0.135
(0.037)*** (0.022)*** (0.058)**
Fiscal Policy -0.029 -0.083 0.054
(0.034) (0.036)** (0.025)**
N 120 102 120
Hansen’s J Test
χ2 (d.f.) 7.47 (3) 1.62 (3) 2.49 (3)
p-value .058 .655 .477
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.3. Business Cycle Synchronisation: EC2SLS with Cross-Section Averages
instead of Year Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Instrumentation Pars. Ec. Diff. Return Spread EIA L.FDI
Period 1983-2009 1983-2009 1983-2009 1988-2005 1983-2009
FDI 0.337 0.350 0.368 0.541 -0.018
(0.095)*** (0.122)*** (0.122)*** (0.179)*** (0.063)
Trade -0.248 -0.284 -0.276 -0.255 0.080
(0.145)* (0.186) (0.175) (0.240) (0.190)
Sectoral Differences -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.031 -0.039
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)***
Monetary Policy -0.092 -0.086 -0.084 -0.087 -0.055
(0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.024)**
Fiscal Policy 0.059 0.062 0.064 0.056 0.053
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.015)*** (0.012)***
Cross-Section Averages Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,788 1,788 1,786 1,447 1,750
Hansen’s J Test
χ2 (d.f.) 31.58 (13) 21.15 (15) 25.98 (15) 25.1 (15) 16.9 (15)
p-value .003 .132 .038 .049 .325
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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P1t+1
P c1t+1
α
Y1t+1
K1t+1
+ qT1t+1 − δ +
ΦI
2
(
Ic1t+1 − δK1t+1
K1t+1
)2}]
(C.14)
ω1
H1t/V1t
= βEt
[
P c1t+1λ1t+1
P c1tλ1t
{
z1t+1 − P1t+1
P c1t+1
w1t+1
(
1 + τ f1
)
+ (1− s1) ω1
H1t+1/V1t+1
}]
(C.15)
H1t = χ1V
ψ
1t (1−N1t)1−ψ (C.16)
w1t =
1− 
1 + τ f1
P c1t
P1t
[ω1θ1t + z1t] +

1− τ d1
P c1t
P1t
b1(C.17)
θ1t = V1t/(1−N1t) (C.18)
τ c1P
c
1tC
c
1t +
(
τ d1 + τ
f
1
)
P1tN1tw1t = T1t + (1−N1t)P c1tb1 (C.19)
U1t = 1−N1t (C.20)
φ1t = H1t/U1t (C.21)
TB1t = P1tY1t − P c1tDc1t (C.22)
C.1.2 Country 2
(1 + τ c2)P
c
2tC
c
2t +B2t+1 + P
c
2t
Φb
2
(
B2t+1
P c2t
)2
=
= P2tN2tw2t
(
1− τ d2
)
+ (1−N2t)P c2tb2 +B2t (1 + it) + T2t +Π2t (C.23)
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1
Cc2t
= (1 + τ c2)λ2tP
c
2t (C.24)
1 + Φb
B2t+1
P c2t
= βEt
[
λ2t+1
λ2t
(1 + it+1)
]
(C.25)
Dc2t =
[
κ
1
η
12y
η−1
η
12t + κ
1
η
22y
η−1
η
22t + κ
1
η
32y
η−1
η
32t
] η
η−1
(C.26)
y12t = κ12
(
P c2t
P1t
)η
Dc2t (C.27)
y22t = κ22
(
P c2t
P2t
)η
Dc2t (C.28)
y32t = κ32
(
P c2t
P3t
)η
Dc2t (C.29)
Π2t = P2tY2t−P2tN2tw2t
(
1 + τ f2
)
−ω2P c2tV2t−P c2tIc2t−P c2t
ΦI
2
(K2t+1 −K2t)2
K2t
(C.30)
Y2t = A2K
α
2tN
1−α
2t (C.31)
N2t+1 = (1− s2)N2t +H2t (C.32)
K2t+1 = (1− δ)K2t + Ic2t (C.33)
qT2t = 1 + ΦI
Ic2t − δK2t
K2t
(C.34)
z2t =
P2t
P c2t
(1− α) Y2t
N2t
(C.35)
qT2t = βEt
[
P c2t+1λ2t+1
P c2tλ2t
{
P2t+1
P c2t+1
α
Y2t+1
K2t+1
+ qT2t+1 − δ +
ΦI
2
(
Ic2t+1 − δK2t+1
K2t+1
)2}]
(C.36)
ω2
H2t/V2t
= βEt
[
P c2t+1λ2t+1
P c2tλ2t
{
z2t+1 − P2t+1
P c2t+1
w2t+1
(
1 + τ f2
)
+ (1− s2) ω2
H2t+1/V2t+1
}]
(C.37)
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H2t = χ2V
ψ
2t (1−N2t)1−ψ (C.38)
w2t =
1− 
1 + τ f2
P c2t
P2t
[ω2θ2t + z2t] +

1− τ d2
P c2t
P2t
b2(C.39)
θ2t = V2t/(1−N2t) (C.40)
τ c2P
c
2tC
c
2t +
(
τ d2 + τ
f
2
)
P2tN2tw2t = T2t + (1−N2t)P c2tb2 (C.41)
U2t = 1−N2t (C.42)
φ2t = H2t/U2t (C.43)
TB2t = P2tY2t − P c2tDc2t (C.44)
TOT 23t = P3t/P2t (C.45)
C.1.3 Country 3
(1 + τ c3)P
c
3tC
c
3t +B3t+1 + P
c
3t
Φb
2
(
B3t+1
P c3t
)2
=
= P3tN3tw3t
(
1− τ d3
)
+ (1−N3t)P c3tb3 +B3t (1 + it) + T3t +Π3t (C.46)
1
Cc3t
= (1 + τ c3)λ3tP
c
3t (C.47)
1 + Φb
B3t+1
P c3t
= βEt
[
λ3t+1
λ3t
(1 + it+1)
]
(C.48)
Dc3t =
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η
13y
η−1
η
13t + κ
1
η
23y
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η
23t + κ
1
η
33y
η−1
η
33t
] η
η−1
(C.49)
y13t = κ13
(
P c3t
P1t
)η
Dc3t (C.50)
y23t = κ23
(
P c3t
P2t
)η
Dc3t (C.51)
y33t = κ33
(
P c3t
P3t
)η
Dc3t (C.52)
Π3t = P3tY3t−P3tN3tw3t
(
1 + τ f3
)
−ω3P c3tV3t−P c3tIc3t−P c3t
ΦI
2
(K3t+1 −K3t)2
K3t
(C.53)
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Y3t = A3K
α
3tN
1−α
3t (C.54)
N3t+1 = (1− s3)N3t +H3t (C.55)
K3t+1 = (1− δ)K3t + Ic3t (C.56)
qT3t = 1 + ΦI
Ic3t − δK3t
K3t
(C.57)
z3t =
P3t
P c3t
(1− α) Y3t
N3t
(C.58)
qT3t = βEt
[
P c3t+1λ3t+1
P c3tλ3t
{
P3t+1
P c3t+1
α
Y3t+1
K3t+1
+ qT3t+1 − δ +
ΦI
2
(
Ic3t+1 − δK3t+1
K3t+1
)2}]
(C.59)
ω3
H3t/V3t
= βEt
[
P c3t+1λ3t+1
P c3tλ3t
{
z3t+1 − P3t+1
P c3t+1
w3t+1
(
1 + τ f3
)
+ (1− s3) ω3
H3t+1/V3t+1
}]
(C.60)
H3t = χ3V
ψ
3t (1−N3t)1−ψ (C.61)
w3t =
1− 
1 + τ f3
P c3t
P3t
[ω3θ3t + z3t] +

1− τ d3
P c3t
P3t
b3(C.62)
θ3t = V3t/(1−N3t) (C.63)
τ c3P
c
3tC
c
3t +
(
τ d3 + τ
f
3
)
P3tN3tw3t = T3t + (1−N3t)P c3tb3 (C.64)
U3t = 1−N3t (C.65)
φ3t = H3t/U3t (C.66)
TB3t = P3tY3t − P c3tDc3t (C.67)
C.1.4 Equilibrium
pi1Y1t = pi1y11t + pi2y12t + pi3y13t (C.68)
pi2Y2t = pi1y21t + pi2y22t + pi3y23t (C.69)
(pi3Y3t = pi1y31t + pi2y32t + pi3y33t) (C.70)
pi1B1t+1 + pi2B2t+1 + pi3B3t+1 = 0 (C.71)
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c
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2
(K1t+1 −K1t)2
K1t
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Φb
2
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B1t+1
P c1t
)2
(C.72)
Dc2t = C
c
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c
2t + ω2V2t +
ΦI
2
(K2t+1 −K2t)2
K2t
+
Φb
2
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B2t+1
P c2t
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(C.73)
Dc3t = C
c
3t + I
c
3t + ω3V3t +
ΦI
2
(K3t+1 −K3t)2
K3t
+
Φb
2
(
B3t+1
P c3t
)2
(C.74)
C.2 Country Size
Taking the deterministic steady state of equations (4.7)-(4.9) and (4.21)-(4.23) and
the condition that intermediate goods output equals final goods output in each
country and combining them the size of country 1 can be expressed as a function of
relative employment and import preferences:
pi1 =
(κ12κ23 + κ13(κ12 + κ32))
((1− κ11)(κ12 + κ32)− κ21κ12)N1N3 + (κ23(1− κ11) + κ21κ13)N1N2 + (κ12κ23 + κ13(κ12 + κ32))
This equation implies that the size of country 1 depends positively on foreign
employment N2, N3, its home bias κ11 and the import preferences of the other coun-
tries with respect to the domestic good κ12 and κ13. Domestic employment N1 and
import preferences of country 1 for the intermediate goods of the other countries
κ21 and κ31 have a negative impact on pi1.
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Notes: The surface of this graph displays how the size of a country (e.g. country 1) varies with
its bilateral import preferences. It deviates from the baseline calibration only for the openness
preferences of country 1. The figure implicitly contains the overall preference towards openness
which is given by the sum of κ21 and κ31. For the case of symmetric preferences between country
2 and 3, i.e. when κ21 = κ31, the overall preference towards openness is given by the diagonal
from north to south. So the higher the preference, the smaller the country. The same applies
for the individual preferences. The red horizontal diagonal (which lies in the surface) displays
all scenarios where 1 − κ11 = 0.3, i.e. as in the baseline calibration, which implies that the size
of country 1 pi1 = 1/3, although import preferences of country 1 do not have to be symmetric.
Asymmetries in bilateral import preferences in turn influence the size of the trade partners. The
black line represents the size of country 2 pi2 for the case that κ11 = κ22 = κ33 = 0.3. The higher
the preference of country 1 for goods from country 2 relative to country 3, all other bilateral
preferences being symmetric, the bigger country 2 relative to country 3.
Fig. C.1. Relation between Country Size and Openness Preferences
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C.3 Graphical Appendix
Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3, 1 − κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1 − κ33)/2 and 1 − κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. Both elasticities increase in b2/w2.
Fig. C.2. Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying
b2/w2 and b3/w3
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Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3, 1 − κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1 − κ33)/2 and 1 − κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. Both elasticities of employment increase in U2.
Fig. C.3. Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying U2
and U3
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Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3, 1 − κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1 − κ33)/2 and 1 − κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. N2,TOT21 and N2,TOT23 increase both with growing α2.
Fig. C.4. Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying α2
and α3
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Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3, 1 − κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1 − κ33)/2 and 1 − κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. N2,TOT21 and N2,TOT23 increase both with growing ψ2.
Fig. C.5. Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying ψ2
and ψ3
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Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3, 1 − κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1 − κ33)/2 and 1 − κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. N2,TOT21 and N2,TOT23 increase both with growing τ
d
2 .
Fig. C.6. Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying τ d2
and τ d3
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Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3, 1 − κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1 − κ33)/2 and 1 − κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. N2,TOT21 and N2,TOT23 fall both with growing φ2.
Fig. C.7. Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying φ2
and φ3
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Notes: In this scenario 1 − κ11 = 0.3, 1 − κ33 = 0.1, κ13 = κ23 = (1 − κ33)/2 and 1 − κ22 = 0.5,
κ12 = κ32 = (1− κ22)/2. N2,TOT21 and N2,TOT23 increase both with growing 2.
Fig. C.8. Decomposition of Spillover in Direct and Indirect Effects for Varying 2
and 3
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C.4 Proof
In this appendix I derive the elasticity of employment in country 2 with respect
to its terms of trade with country j N2,TOT 2j and show that it has to be positive.
Consider the steady state of the model, where steady state values are expressed
as variables without time index. Combining the optimality conditions for vacancy
posting and from the wage bargaining, equations (4.15) and (4.19), and using the
following expression for the capital labour ratio K2
N2
=
(
P2
P c2
α
1/β−1+δ
)
derived from
optimal bond demand (equation 4.14), we obtain:
(1− β (1− s2))
βχ2
θ1−ψ2 + (1− ) θ2 =
=

ω2
(P2
P c2
) 1
1−α
(1− α)
(
α
1
β
− 1 + δ
) α
1−α
− 1 + τ
f
2
1− τ d2
b2
 . (C.75)
Furthermore, with the help of equation (4.10), we can express the inverse of the
final good price in terms of the intermediate good of country 2 as a function of its
terms of trade with its neighbours:
P2
P c2
=
[
κ12TOT
2 η−1
1 + κ22 + κ32TOT
2 η−1
3
] 1
η−1 .
The marginal effects of a change in terms of trade on prices in country 2 in the steady
state, where TOT 21 = TOT
2
3 = 1, read κ12 and κ32 for country 1 and 3, respectively.
Based on this knowledge, I apply the implicit function theorem to equation (C.75)
to derive the elasticity of labour market tightness in country 2 with respect to its
terms of trade with country 1:
θ2,TOT 21 =
δθ2
δTOT 21
1
θ2
=

ω2
κ12
(
α
1
β
−1+δ
) α
1−α
(1−β(1−s2))(1−ψ)
βχ2
θ1−ψ2 + (1− ) θ2
> 0, (C.76)
which is always positive for , ω2,, κ12, h2, δ, α, χ2, θ2 > 0, 0 < β < 1, 0 < s2 < 1,
0 < ψ < 1. The elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to the terms of
trade with country 3 are given by a very similar expression, the only difference being
the preference for imports from country 3 κ32:
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θ2,TOT 23 =

ω2
κ32
(
α
1
β
−1+δ
) α
1−α
(1−β(1−s2))(1−ψ)
βχ2
θ1−ψ2 + (1− ) θ2
> 0. (C.77)
One can then use the relation between employment N and labour market tight-
ness θ, given by s2N2 = q2V2 = H2 = χ2θ
ψ
2 (1−N2), to derive
δN2
δθ2
=
s2ψχ2θ
ψ−1
2(
s2 + χ2θ
ψ
2
)2 > 0. (C.78)
Finally, by combining equation (C.76) or (C.77) with (C.78), we can write the
elasticity of employment with respect to the terms of trade of any trading partner
j as:
N2,TOT 2j =
δN2
δθ2
δθ2
δTOT 2j
1
N2
=
s2ψ(
s2 + χ2θ
ψ
2
)θ2,TOT 2j ,
such that
N2,TOT 2j =
κj2
ω2
s2ψ(
s2 + χ2θ
ψ
2
) 
(
α
1
β
−1+δ
) α
1−α
[
(1−β(1−s2))(1−ψ)
βχ2
θ1−ψ2 + (1− ) θ2
] > 0. (C.79)
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